Panos v. Supreme Court of UT

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
August 21, 2006
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
CLIFTO N W . PANOS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 06-4000
(D.C. No. 2:05-CV-950-TC)
SUPREM E COURT OF UTAH, a (D. Utah)
governmental entity; CHIEF JUSTICE
CHRISTINE DURHAM , in her
individual and official capacity;
ASSOC. CH IEF JUSTICE M ICH AEL
J. W ILKINS, in his individual and
official capacity; JUSTICE
M ATTHEW B. DURRANT, in his
individual and official capacity;
JUSTICE JILL N. PA RRISH , in her
individual and official capacity;
JU STICE RONALD NEHRING, in his
individual and official capacity;
SPECIAL M ASTER JUDITH S.
ATHERTON, in her individual and
official capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
(continued...)
Before TA CH A, Chief Judge, O’BRIEN, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Clifton W . Panos filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights
complaint in the federal district court against the Supreme Court of Utah, all of its
Justices, and a Special M aster of the Court, individually and in their official
capacities, seeking to enjoin enforcement of certain orders issued against him.
The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
M r. Panos appeals, and we affirm.
The Supreme Court of Utah issued an order in April 2005 (the “Sanctions
Order”) imposing certain filing and contact restrictions against M r. Panos, and it
has twice cited M r. Panos for contempt of court. M r. Panos then filed his § 1983
complaint in federal district order claiming that the Sanctions Order and the
contempt citations violate his federal and constitutional rights to court access,
free association, free expression, and equal protection. He sought declaratory and
injunctive relief to prohibit the Utah Supreme Court and the defendants from
enforcing the contempt citations and the Sanction Order.
The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction, ruling that M r. Panos’ challenge of the U tah Supreme Court’s orders
was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See D.C. Court of Appeals v.
*
(...continued)
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
W e review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Kiowa Indian Tribe of Okla. v. Hoover, 150 F.3d 1163, 1165
(10th Cir. 1998). W e construe M r. Panos’ pleadings liberally because he appears
pro se. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars “cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
544 U .S. 280, 284 (2005). This doctrine is based upon an inference that follow s
from 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a), which provides that “[f]inal judgments or decrees
rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be
review ed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari.” Because appellate
jurisdiction over state court judgments has been vested exclusively in the
Supreme Court, “no court of the United States other than [the Supreme Court]
could entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify the judgment” of a state’s
highest court. Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416.
M r. Panos’ § 1983 complaint complains of an injury caused by state court
judgments, here the contempt citations and the Sanction Order, and he seeks
review and rejection of those orders. Although he is nominally seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief, M r. Panos is seeking to reverse the Utah
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Supreme Court’s contempt citations and Sanction Order. See Stern v. Nix,
840 F.2d 208, 212 (3d Cir. 1988) (ruling that Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprived
district court of jurisdiction over § 1983 complaint seeking to enjoin enforcement
of state court disciplinary disbarment order because suit effectively required
review of the state court’s order).
M r. Panos contends that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable
because the state court, in imposing the contempt citations and the Sanctions
Order, w as acting in an administrative, not a judicial, capacity. See Feldman,
460 U.S. at 479 (holding that Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply when
proceedings before the court are not judicial in nature, but legislative, ministerial,
or administrative). W e disagree. The Utah Supreme Court was not engaged in
general rulemaking; both the contempt citations and the Sanctions Order involved
judicial inquiries, and were clearly judicial in nature. See In re Chapman,
328 F.3d 903, 904 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that imposition of filing restrictions
are judicial in nature, not administrative); Crooks v. M aynard, 913 F.2d 699(9th Cir. 1990) (holding that judge’s contempt citation, even against a
non-litigant, is clearly a judicial act).
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The district court correctly ruled that it lacked jurisdiction over M r. Panos’
complaint pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Accordingly, the judgment
of the district court is AFFIRM ED. M r. Panos’ motion for appointment of
counsel is DENIED, and his second renewed motion for injunctive relief pending
appeal is DENIED as moot.
Entered for the Court
Deanell Reece Tacha
Chief Circuit Judge
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