Hansen v. PT Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero)

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
February 5, 2013
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
THEODORE L. HANSEN;
INTERSTATE ENERGY; TRIPLE M,
Plaintiffs - Appellants, No. 12-4053
v.
PT BANK NEGARA INDONESIA
(PERSERO),
Defendant - Appellee,
and
NATIVE AMERICAN OIL
REFINERY COMPANY; EKO
BUDIWIYONO; FIRMANSYAH;
GATOT SISMOYO; RACHMAT
WIRIATMAJA; YOPIE LAMONGE;
MAX NIODE; LILLES
HANDAYANI; UTTI KARIAYAM;
MUBARIK AS DJATIMUDA; STEVE
O.Z. FINKEL-MINKIN, a/k/a Steve
Finkel; ROBERT MCKEE; FRED
NEWCOMB; NEWCOMB &
COMPANY,
Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
(D.C. No. 2:06-CV-00109-DB-PMW)
Barnard Madsen, (Matthew R. Howell and Joseph M. Hepworth of Fillmore,
Spencer, L.L.C., with him on the briefs), Provo, Utah, for Appellant.
Orlee Goldfeld of Hollyer, Brady, L.L.P. (and Arthur B. Berger of Ray, Quinney
& Nebeker, P.C., Salt Lake City, Utah, on the brief), New York, New York, for
Appellee.
Before KELLY, McKAY, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
KELLY, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs-Appellants Theodore L. Hansen, Interstate Energy Corp. and
Triple M, L.L.C., appeal from the district court’s judgment in favor of Defendant-
Appellee PT. Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero) Tbk. (“BNI”). BNI is a banking
corporation established under the laws of Indonesia. Plaintiffs sued BNI and
various other defendants based on BNI’s refusal to honor certain bank guaranties
and letters of credit. Eventually, the district court granted BNI’s motion for
summary judgment for lack of jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (“FSIA”). Hansen v. Native Am. Oil
Refinery Co., No. 2:06-CV-109, 2012 WL 567191 (D. Utah Feb. 21, 2012). Our
jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Background
Mr. Hansen owned gas stations, convenience stores, and other businesses in
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Utah, Idaho, and Wyoming. Aplt. App. 185. In 2003, he decided to sell these
assets and related liabilities to Defendant Native American Refinery Company
(“NARCO”) for $50 million. Id. at 185–88. To secure its obligations, NARCO
provided various BNI financial instruments. See id. at 188, 192–93, 1093, 1096,
1098 (describing a total of eight bank guaranties); id. at 191–92, 1097–98
(describing twenty-six different standby letters of credit). Some of these
instruments secured Mr. Hansen’s obligations to Triple M. Id. at 193, 953–57.
The rest, however, secured NARCO’s obligations to Mr. Hansen and to Interstate
Energy, which Mr. Hansen owned. Id. at 188, 191–92, 967–1015.
Prior to the issuance of these guaranties, NARCO had never been a BNI
customer, and Mr. Hansen had no experience with bank guaranties. See id. at
675–76, 694, 697, 899. But Mr. Hansen and others made various efforts to
confirm these instruments. For example, Mr. Hansen searched a purported BNI
website—which no longer exists—to see if the names of the bank officers on the
guaranties matched those on the website. Id. at 581 (Hansen Dep.). Mr. Hansen
also spoke by telephone with individuals he believed to be BNI employees Dr.
Firmansyah and Eko Budiwiyono. Id. at 581, 583. According to Mr. Hansen,
they confirmed the Bank’s relationship with NARCO and the guaranties. Id. at
60, 581, 583. In none of these attempts to confirm the guaranties, however, did
any individual explicitly validate any of the financial instruments as authentic
BNI paper. Id. at 582, 708–09.
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NARCO’s CEO, Defendant Steve O.Z. Finkel-Minkin, NARCO’s president,
Defendant Robert McKee, and Triple M manager Mark McDougal corroborated
this account. Id. at 1173, 566, 587. Finally, after Mr. Hansen attempted to use
the financial instruments to secure another line of credit, Merrill Lynch employee
Quinn Jensen contacted the BNI New York office to determine the authenticity of
the instruments. Id. at 556, 558. During each call with BNI, the bank confirmed
that a guaranty number Mr. Jensen provided was consistent with BNI guaranty
numbers generally, but responded that the bank would have to see an actual
certificate before confirming authenticity. Id. at 556–58. Merrill Lynch
eventually decided not to extend the line of credit to Mr. Hansen. Id. at 1049–50.
Ultimately, NARCO failed to meet its obligations, and creditors foreclosed
on the assets. Id. at 192, 1095. When Mr. Hansen contacted BNI, BNI refused to
make payment and denied issuing or authenticating any of the instruments. Id. at
193, 225. BNI submitted fifteen declarations by individuals whose names and
purported signatures appear on the guaranties denying issuance and authenticity.
Id. at 242–45; see also id. at 247–48, 254–56, 266–67, 277–83, 289–91, 297–99,
306–07, 314–15, 321–22, 328, 339–40, 348–51, 356–58, 365–66, 370–72. One
Indonesian resident, Eko Budianto, however, declared that, on behalf of NARCO,
he helped facilitate the bank guaranties and letters of credit issued by BNI and
spoke with various BNI employees when doing so. Id. at 1215–18. Mr. Budianto
was not employed by BNI. Id. at 902, 915–16.
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Plaintiffs sued BNI on February 6, 2006 based on its refusal to honor its
alleged financial instruments. Id. at 38–55. BNI invoked the FSIA based on its
relationship with the government of Indonesia. Specifically, BNI argued that it
had not engaged in any commercial activity with Plaintiffs because all of the
financial instruments at issue were fraudulent. Id. at 382–406. On October 3,
2008, BNI filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings that was denied. Id. at
239–41. An appeal followed, and this court affirmed. See Hansen v. PT. Bank
Negara Indonesia (Persero) Tbk., 601 F.3d 1059 (10th Cir. 2010). A protracted
period of jurisdictional discovery followed during which time Plaintiffs took no
depositions of BNI or its employees and obtained different counsel, and the
district court denied another motion by BNI for judgment on the pleadings. See
Hansen, 2012 WL 567191, at *3–4.
In opposition to the summary judgment motion, Plaintiffs relied mainly
upon Mr. Budianto’s declaration, Aplt. App. 1215–18, although they had not
previously disclosed this witness nor made him available for deposition. Aplee.
Supp. App. 22–23; see also Hansen, 2012 WL 567191, at *7. The district court
held that Plaintiffs did not satisfy their burden of production under the FSIA and
there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether BNI was subject to the
district court’s jurisdiction under the Act’s commercial activity exception. See
Hansen, 2012 WL 567191, at *8.
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Discussion
We review de novo the district court’s determination of its subject matter
jurisdiction under the FSIA. Southway v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 328 F.3d 1267,
1272 (10th Cir. 2003). When reviewing this determination on a motion for
summary judgment, we look at the record and draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party. See Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 421
F.3d 1133, 1146 (10th Cir. 2005). A party cannot rely entirely on pleadings, but
must present significant probative evidence to support its position. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). If the
nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element with
respect to which he has the burden of proof, judgment as a matter of law is
appropriate. Shero v. City of Grove, 510 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2007). We
review the district court’s evidentiary rulings at summary judgment for abuse of
discretion. Milne v. USA Cycling Inc., 575 F.3d 1120, 1133 (10th Cir. 2009).
FSIA provides the exclusive basis for obtaining jurisdiction over claims
against a foreign state or its instrumentalities in the United States. See Republic
of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 611 (1992). Under the FSIA, a
foreign state and its instrumentalities are immune from suit in American courts
unless a statutory exception to immunity applies. 28 U.S.C. § 1604; see id. §
1603(a). The parties agree that BNI, as majority-owned by the government of
Indonesia, qualifies as a foreign state under the FSIA, and as such, it is
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presumptively immune. Aplt. Open. Br. 21–22; Aplee. Br. 4–5. Under FSIA’s
burden shifting analysis, however, once a defendant establishes that it is a foreign
state entitled to immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of production to make an
initial showing that a FSIA exception to immunity applies. Orient Mineral Co. v.
Bank of China, 506 F.3d 980, 991 (10th Cir. 2007). If the plaintiff carries its
initial burden, the defendant ultimately must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the claimed exception does not apply. Id. at 991–92.
An exception to foreign sovereign immunity exists when the state or its
instrumentalities are engaged in “commercial activity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
FSIA allows federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over foreign states when such
states engage in certain “commercial activities,” with direct effects in the United
States. Id. Plaintiffs rely upon this exception and were required to produce
significantly probative evidence that BNI engaged in the commercial activity at
issue in this case.
The district court held that plaintiffs did not satisfy their burden of
production under the FSIA. Hansen, 2012 WL 567191, at *4. Specifically, it
held that the bank guaranties representing BNI’s commercial activity were not
sufficiently authenticated, that the statements of Dr. Firmansyah and Mr.
Budiwiyono were hearsay, and that the declaration of Mr. Budianto, who
allegedly assisted in obtaining the guaranties, was not sufficiently detailed to
show that it was based on personal knowledge. Id. at *5–8. Plaintiffs challenge
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these holdings and the ultimate conclusion, and we take up their arguments in
turn.
A. Are the Guarantees Assumed Valid?
Relying on a Sixth Circuit case, Plaintiffs argue that the district court was
required to assume the guaranties were validly issued by BNI for the purpose of
determining jurisdiction. See Aplt. Open. Br. 24–25 (citing DRFP L.L.C. v.
Republic Bolivariana de Venezuela, 622 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2010)). In DFRP, the
plaintiff was the holder of two notes allegedly issued by the government of
Venezuela but which Venezuela refused to honor on the grounds they were
forged. 622 F.3d at 515. In denying Venezuela’s motion to dismiss, the court
explained, “Despite Venezuela’s insistence that the notes are forgeries, we must
assume, for purposes of deciding the jurisdictional issues before us, that they are
valid.” Id.We are not persuaded. When the Sixth Circuit assumed the validity of the
notes, it was in the context of a motion to dismiss. See id. at 514–15. Assuming
validity based on allegations in a complaint is different from assuming it when it
is challenged on summary judgment. See DRFP L.L.C. v. Republica Bolivariana
de Venezuela, No. 2:04-cv-793, 2009 WL 414581, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 13,
2009). Of course, on summary judgment, we do not rely solely on pleadings.
Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) with Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Moreover, Plaintiffs
never raised this argument before the district court, and it is therefore waived.
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See Cummings v. Norton, 393 F.3d 1186, 1190 (10th Cir. 2005).
B. Are the Bank Guaranties Self-Authenticating?
Plaintiffs also argue that because the guaranties are self-authenticating, the
district court was presented with sufficient evidence of BNI’s commercial
activity. They contend that the guaranties are self-authenticating (1) as
commercial paper, (2) because they bear BNI’s watermark, and (3) as publications
of public authority. See Aplt. Open. Br. 18, 25–28 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 902(9),
(7), (5); Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-104(1)).
Again, Plaintiffs did not raise these arguments before the district court and
have waived them. See Cummings, 393 F.3d at 1190. We do not find any
exceptional reason to consider them. See In re C.W. Mining Co., 625 F.3d 1240,
1246 (10th Cir. 2010).
C. Are the Statements About the Telephone Conversations Sufficiently
Authenticated?
Plaintiffs next argue that there was sufficient evidence that Dr. Firmansyah
and Mr. Budiwiyono were agents of party-opponent BNI and that the district court
erred in finding that their alleged statements during various telephone
conversations were inadmissable hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)
(describing admissions by party-opponents as non-hearsay). Plaintiffs rely on
evidence about how the telephone number for BNI was obtained, that calls were
answered purportedly by BNI representatives, and that the conversations related
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to business one would expect to be conducted over the phone. See Aplt. Open.
Br. 18–19, 28–32. Plaintiffs contend that Rule 901(b)(6) or 902(5) establishes
that the statements were made by someone at or on behalf of BNI such that they
are admissible under Rule 801(d)(2).
Again, we are not persuaded. Generally, “[Fed. R. Civ. P.] 56 precludes
the use of inadmissible hearsay testimony in depositions submitted . . . in
opposition to, summary judgment.” Lancaster v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 5, 149
F.3d 1228, 1236 (10th Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted). When an otherwise
inadmissible hearsay statement is made by a party-opponent, however, it may be
admitted under Rule 801(d)(2). In order to qualify as an admission by a party-
opponent, Plaintiffs must establish that it was made by the party or that the party
adopted or authorized it. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). Neither Rule 901(b)(6) nor
Rule 902(5) gets us there.
Rule 901(b)(6)(B) provides that a telephone call to a business is
authenticated if there is evidence that a person placed a call to a telephone
number assigned by the telephone company to that particular business and the
subject of the telephone call related to business that is reasonably transacted over
the telephone. See Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(6)(B) & cmt. On a purported BNI
website that no longer exists, Mr. Hansen found a phone number and he—or
someone with whom he worked—called it. Aplt. App. 581. Mr. McKee, Mr.
McDougal, and Mr. Finkel-Minkin had similar experiences. See id. at 1173, 566,
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587. Plaintiffs admit that “there is no evidence in the record that the telephone
number called . . . was the number assigned by the telephone company to BNI.”
Aplt. Open. Br. 31. Without additional evidence, Rule 901(b)(6) cannot be used
to establish that these statements were made by anyone at, or on behalf of, BNI.
Therefore the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Dr.
Firmansyah and Mr. Budiwiyono could not be considered party-opponents on this
ground.
Plaintiffs nevertheless argue that the website should be considered self-
authenticating pursuant to Rule 902(5) and that the statements made during calls
to a number on that website are therefore admissible. Aplt. Open. Br. 31 & n.6.
We disagree. The rule provides that “[a] book, pamphlet, or other publication
purporting to be issued by a public authority” is self-authenticating. Fed. R.
Evid. 902(5). A website of a foreign bank does not fall squarely within the
language of this rule. See, e.g., id. 902(5) cmt. (“Dispensing with preliminary
proof of the genuineness of purportedly official publications [is] most commonly
encountered in connection with statutes, court reports, rules, and regulations . . .
.”). Moreover, a telephone number retrieved from a website in these
circumstances does not have the sufficient indicia of reliability that justifies the
self-authentication exceptions in the first place. See id. 902 cmt. Generally, Rule
902 eases Rule 901’s requirements of authentication where the possibility of
fraud, forgery, and mis-attribution of certain documents is slight. This is hardly
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the case here. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding the telephone conversations as inadmissible hearsay.
D. Was the Budianto Declaration Based on Personal Knowledge?
Plaintiffs argue that they established a foundation for personal knowledge,
and the district court erred in excluding the Budianto Declaration given Mr.
Budianto’s alleged meetings and telephone conferences with specified BNI
officials. See Aplt. Open. Br. 19, 32–36. In particular, Plaintiffs point out that
Mr. Budianto claims to know certain individuals as BNI officials, that he met
with them in Indonesia, that he spoke with them over the phone, and that he was
involved with guaranties issued to NARCO. See Aplt. App. 1215–18.
His statements are not so clear. Rule 602 states: “A witness may testify to
a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the
witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal
knowledge may consist of the witness’s own testimony.” Fed. R. Evid. 602.
Although affidavits are entirely proper on summary judgment, the content or
substance of the evidence contained therein must be admissible. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 327 (1986); Thomas v. Int’l Bus. Machs., 48 F.3d 478,
485 (10th Cir. 1995); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4) (“[The affidavit] must be
made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence,
and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters
stated.”). “Under the personal knowledge standard, an affidavit is inadmissible if
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‘the witness could not have actually perceived or observed that which he testifies
to.’” Argo v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 452 F.3d 1193, 1200 (10th
Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Sinclair, 109 F.3d 1527, 1536 (10th Cir.
1997)).
Mr. Budianto was not employed by BNI. Aplt. App. 902, 915–16. Nor did
he personally know the various bank officials despite the fact he claims to have
met them in Indonesia. Aplee. Supp. App. 24–25. He also was not present when
the purported BNI guaranties were issued. Aplt. App. 1217–18. This certainly
makes it questionable whether he could have actually perceived or observed the
events or documents in question. See Sinclair, 109 F.3d at 1536. The district
court found that the statement in the declaration that came the closest to
establishing a foundation was:
As an agent of NARCO in Indonesia, I received funds from various
parties, paid on behalf of NARCO, for the issuance of these bank
guarantees. I paid those funds by submitting the fund to the appointed
officials representing the collateral owner and they further depositing
them into BNI Bank accounts as directed by Dr. Firmansyah through
their bank officers, for issuance of these guarantees.
Hansen, 2012 WL 567191, at *7. The district court nevertheless concluded that
the statement did not satisfy Rule 602 as it fails to give the most basic of details
about the actual deposit. Id.This is not an abuse of discretion. See Argo, 452 F.3d at 1200. The
declaration is woefully short on details about the transaction, and it is not clear to
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whom the “collateral owner” refers. Even assuming it is NARCO, the paragraph
does not explain how Mr. Budianto has any personal knowledge concerning the
disposition of the funds. See Aplt. App. 1215–18. This lack of detail provides no
information about the deposits that might authenticate the financial instruments.
See Aplee. Supp. App. 19–24. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions, requiring
evidence to establish personal knowledge of these transactions does not graft
additional requirements of admissibility to Rule 56. We think the district court
got it right in concluding that the information provided lacks an adequate
foundation and therefore would be inadmissible.
Two additional points deserve mention. First, although Plaintiffs rely
almost exclusively on Mr. Budianto’s declaration to establish a genuine issue of
material fact, they failed to disclose Mr. Budianto to BNI, see Aplt. App.
1318–22, 1307–1314, in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a). Plaintiffs have not
provided substantial justification for this failure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1).
Second, attached to Mr. Budianto’s declaration are completely different versions
of the financial instruments previously relied upon the Plaintiffs. See Aplt. App.
1271–72; compare id. at 1219–25 with id. at 1358–80. Although Plaintiffs argue
that the inconsistent evidence is permissible and that these are additional bank
guaranties issued to NARCO, see Aplt. Reply Br. 6–8, this does not seem
plausible coming this late in the litigation. Regardless, this argument was not
made before the district court and is inconsequential to our conclusion that the
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district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the Budianto Declaration
inadmissible for lack of foundation.
E. Did the District Court Correctly Apply the Summary Judgment Standard?
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in excluding the
Budianto Declaration because it impermissibly made a credibility determination,
weighed evidence, and drew inferences adverse to Mr. Hansen. See Aplt. Open.
Br. 19–20, 36–38 (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 254). For example, Plaintiffs
cite the district court’s statement that “the declaration’s credibility is so suspect
that the declaration itself may constitute a fraud on the court” as an improper
credibility determination. Hansen, 2012 WL 567191, at *7; see Aplt. Open. Br.
37. Plaintiffs maintain that the declaration alone raises a genuine dispute of
material fact that should have prevented summary judgment. Aplt. Open. Br. 36.
Plaintiffs are undoubtedly correct that a judge may not make credibility
determinations on summary judgment. The Supreme Court made clear in Liberty
Lobby that “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable
inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” 477 U.S. at 254. However, like BNI, we
read the district court’s statement as prompted by the obvious lack of foundation
provided and the manner in which the statement was procured. See Aplee. Br. 43.
Regardless, the district court’s admonition is dicta and unnecessary to its holding.
Because Plaintiffs failed to provide significant probative evidence of BNI’s
commercial activity to raise a genuine issue of material fact, the district court did
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not err in granting summary judgment to BNI.
AFFIRMED.
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