Boling v. Romer

PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 12/2/96
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
JASON AARON BOLING,
individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 96-1115
v.
ROY ROMER, Governor of the State
of Colorado; ARISTEDES ZAVARAS,
Executive Director of DOC; J.
FRANK RICE, Warden of DOC
Diagnostic Unit; CARL W.
WHITESIDE, Director of Colorado
Bureau of Investigation; John or Jane
Doe (1), Clinical Supervisor Medical
Services DRDC; Jane Doe (2),
Clinical Services staff member,
DRDC; Jane Doe (3), Clinical
Services staff member, DRDC; John
Doe (2), Correctional Officer, DRDC,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 95-Z-306)
Submitted on the briefs:
Jason Aaron Boling, pro se.
Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Paul S. Sanzo, First Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Litigation Section, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees
Romer, Zavaras and Whiteside.
Before PORFILIO, LOGAN and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
LOGAN, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Jason Aaron Boling appeals from the district court’s order
granting summary judgment against him on his 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and
1988 claims. 1 Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 17-2-
201(5)(g), which requires inmates convicted of an offense involving a sexual
assault to provide the state with DNA samples before their release on parole, and
1
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
One defendant, J. Frank Rice, has never been served with the complaint
and, therefore, is not a party to this action.
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the Department of Corrections’ (DOC) policies implementing that statute. 2
Plaintiff’s principal argument is that the statute violates the Fourth Amendment
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Plaintiff also argues that
the statute violates his rights under the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Summary judgment is appropriate only if there are no genuinely disputed
issues of material fact and, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c); Carl v. City of Overland Park, 65 F.3d 866, 868 (10th Cir. 1995).
We review the district court’s decision de novo and liberally construe plaintiff’s
pleadings. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). 3
2
Although not asserted as a separate claim for relief, plaintiff argues that the
policies adopted by the DOC are inconsistent with the language of Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 17-2-201(5)(g). That argument, however, addresses only state law
concerns and, therefore, does not support plaintiff’s claims for relief under the
federal civil rights statutes. Cf. Nilson v. Layton City, 45 F.3d 369, 372 (10th
Cir. 1995) (“Mere allegations that an official failed to abide by state law will not
suffice to state a constitutional claim.”); see generally, e.g., Jojola v. Chavez, 55
F.3d 488, 492 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Section 1983 created a federal cause of action
for damages to vindicate alleged violations of federal law.”).
3
In his reply brief plaintiff asserts for the first time that the district court
erred in granting summary judgment before discovery. This court will not address
issues raised for the first time in a reply brief. E.g., Codner v. United States, 17
F.3d 1331, 1332 n. 2 (10th Cir. 1994). In any event, plaintiff’s argument is
foreclosed by his failure to submit to the district court an affidavit, pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f), specifically indicating that he was unable to oppose the
summary judgment motion without discovery. See, e.g., International Surplus
(continued...)
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I
The Colorado statute provides:
As a condition of parole, the board shall require any offender
convicted of an offense for which the factual basis involved a sexual
assault as defined in part 4 of article 3 of title 18, C.R.S., to submit
to chemical testing of his blood to determine the genetic markers
thereof and to chemical testing of his saliva to determine the secretor
status thereof. Such testing shall occur prior to the offender’s release
from incarceration, and the results thereof shall be filed with and
maintained by the Colorado bureau of investigation. The results of
such tests shall be furnished to any law enforcement agency upon
request.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 17-2-201(5)(g)(I). The Ninth and Fourth Circuits have
addressed Fourth Amendment challenges to similar statutes and concluded that
although obtaining blood and/or saliva samples is a search and seizure implicating
Fourth Amendment concerns, the ordinary requirements of probable cause and a
warrant, or at least a showing of individualized suspicion, are not applicable. See
Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1554(1996); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977(1992).
3
(...continued)
Lines Ins. Co. v. Wyoming Coal Ref. Sys., Inc., 52 F.3d 901, 905 (10th Cir.
1995). More important, the issues in this case are legal, not factual; we are
satisfied that nothing obtained by further discovery could affect the conclusions
we reach on the issues that are presented in this appeal.
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In Jones, the Fourth Circuit rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to a
Virginia statute requiring all convicted felons to submit blood samples for DNA
analysis and inclusion in a data bank for future law enforcement purposes. In
reaching that conclusion, the court determined there is no “per se Fourth
Amendment requirement of probable cause, or even a lesser degree of
individualized suspicion, when government officials conduct a limited search for
the purpose of ascertaining and recording the identity of a person who is lawfully
confined to prison.” 962 F.2d at 306. The court relied in part on an inmate’s
diminished expectation of privacy in the prison setting.
[W]hen a suspect is arrested upon probable cause, his identification
becomes a matter of legitimate state interest and he can hardly claim
privacy in it. We accept this proposition because the identification
of suspects is relevant not only to solving the crime for which the
suspect is arrested, but also for maintaining a permanent record to
solve other past and future crimes. This becomes readily apparent
when we consider the universal approbation of “booking” procedures
that are followed for every suspect arrested for a felony, whether or
not the proof of a particular suspect’s crime will involve the use of
fingerprint identification. Thus a tax evader is fingerprinted just the
same as is a burglar. While we do not accept even this small level of
intrusion for free persons without Fourth Amendment constraint, see
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727, 89 S. Ct. 1394, 1397, 22
L.Ed.2d 676 (1969), the same protections do not hold true for those
lawfully confined to the custody of the state. As with fingerprinting,
therefore, we find that the Fourth Amendment does not require an
additional finding of individualized suspicion before blood can be
taken from incarcerated felons for the purpose of identifying them.
Jones, 962 F.2d at 306-07 (footnote omitted). Weighing the minimal intrusion
caused by the blood test against the government’s interest in making a permanent
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identification record of convicted felons for the purpose of resolving future
crimes, the court determined that DNA sampling was reasonable.
In Rise, the Ninth Circuit upheld a similar but more narrow Oregon statute
requiring all inmates convicted of murder or sex offenses, or certain related
crimes, to submit DNA samples for inclusion in a data bank. 59 F.3d at 1558-59.
The Ninth Circuit first examined the plaintiffs’ separate interests in the privacy of
the DNA information and their interest in bodily integrity. Id. at 1559. The Rise
court noted that “[t]he information derived from the blood sample is substantially
the same as that derived from fingerprinting--an identifying marker unique to the
individual from whom the information is derived.” Id. at 1559. Noting that
“everyday ‘booking’ procedures routinely require even the merely accused to
provide fingerprint identification, regardless of whether the investigation of the
crime involves fingerprint evidence,” the court concluded that “[o]nce a person is
convicted of one of the felonies included as predicate offenses under [the Oregon
statute], his identity has become a matter of state interest and he has lost any
legitimate expectation of privacy in the identifying information derived from the
blood sampling.” Id. at 1560. The Rise court then found that although obtaining
DNA information requires drawing blood as opposed to “inking and rolling a
person’s fingertips,” id., that difference does not render the intrusion on Fourth
Amendment interests more than minimal. Id. (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor
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Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989) (blood tests do not “infringe
significant privacy interests”)).
The Rise court then balanced the minimal intrusion on Fourth Amendment
interests against the legitimate government interest in identifying and prosecuting
murderers and sex offenders, the degree to which gathering the DNA information
would advance that interest, “and the severity of the resulting interference with
individual liberty.” 59 F.3d at 1560. Noting “the public’s incontestable interest
in preventing recidivism and identifying and prosecuting murderers and sexual
offenders, and the likelihood that a DNA bank will advance this interest,” the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the statute was constitutional. Id. at 1562.
We are persuaded to reach the same result, with respect to the statute at
issue here, as our sister circuits. We do not rely on any supposition that sex
offenders are more likely to be recidivists than others, nor, as the district court
did, on the penological interests within the prison. 4 We do rely upon the specific
relevance of DNA evidence to prove sexual assaults. Thus we hold that while
obtaining and analyzing the DNA or saliva of an inmate convicted of a sex
4
DNA testing, which is admittedly for future law enforcement
investigations, is less clearly a legitimate penological concern--that is, a concern
addressing the administration and operation of a prison, State ex rel. Juvenile
Dep’t v. Orozco, 878 P.2d 432, 434-35 (Or. Ct. App. 1994); see Rise, 59 F.3d at
1559 (declining to determine whether obtaining DNA samples from inmates for
law enforcement purposes also serves legitimate penological interest).
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offense is a search and seizure implicating Fourth Amendment concerns, it is a
reasonable search and seizure. This is so in light of an inmate’s diminished
privacy rights, see Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1195 (10th Cir. 1989) (in
upholding AIDS testings against inmates’ Fourth Amendment challenge, stating
that “plaintiff’s privacy expectation in his body is further reduced by his
incarceration”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1059 (1990); the minimal intrusion of
saliva and blood tests; and the legitimate government interest in the investigation
and prosecution of unsolved and future criminal acts by the use of DNA in a
manner not significantly different from the use of fingerprints.
II
Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim, alleging that requiring DNA samples
from inmates amounts to compulsory self-incrimination, fails because DNA
samples are not testimonial in nature. See Lucero v. Gunter, 17 F.3d 1347, 1350
(10th Cir. 1994) (urine samples used for drug testing not testimonial evidence).
Dismissal of plaintiff’s Ninth Amendment claim as too vague and conclusory was
also appropriate. Equally unpersuasive are plaintiff’s arguments that defendants
unconstitutionally deprived him of a property interest in his blood without due
process or just compensation. See Rise, 59 F.3d at 1562-63 (Due Process Clause
does not require hearing before involuntary extraction of blood for DNA sample;
when the only requirement for obtaining DNA sample is conviction of predicate
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offense, there would be little of substance to contest at hearing); Vanderlinden v.
Kansas, 874 F. Supp. 1210, 1216 (D. Kan. 1995) (legislative process in enacting
legislation affecting general class satisfies procedural due process to which those
members of affected class entitled); cf. Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1198 (where court had
approved, in general, blood testing of inmates for AIDS, inmates were not entitled
to individual due process hearings).
In addition, because plaintiff does not dispute defendants’ assertion that
parole in Colorado is discretionary, see generally Mahn v. Gunter, 978 F.2d 599,
600-01 (10th Cir. 1992) (parole for sex offenders, under various Colorado parole
schemes, is discretionary), Colo. Rev. Stat. § 17-2-201(5)(g) does not implicate
any liberty interest protected by due process by conditioning parole on an
inmate’s submission of DNA samples. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal
& Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (convicted individual has no
constitutional right to be conditionally released before expiration of valid
sentence); cf. Jones, 962 F.2d at 310 (retroactive application to inmates convicted
before passage of statute requiring all inmates to submit DNA samples to extend
inmates’ incarceration beyond mandatory parole date violated Ex Post Facto
Clause).
Plaintiff argues that defendants violated the Eighth Amendment by
exposing him to possible physical abuse by indicating, in front of other inmates,
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that he had to submit to DNA tests, thus disclosing to those other inmates that
plaintiff was a sex offender. Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a valid
Eighth Amendment claim. See Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1204-06
(10th Cir. 1996) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)).
Plaintiff further asserts that taking DNA samples only from inmates
convicted of sex offenses deprived him of the equal protection of the laws. There
is no equal protection violation. A rational relationship exists between the
government’s decision to classify inmates as convicted sex offenders and the
government’s stated objective to investigate and prosecute unsolved and future
sex crimes. See Rise, 59 F.3d at 1561 (in addressing Fourth Amendment claim,
holding statute’s requirement that all inmates convicted of murder or sex offenses
submit DNA samples bore rational relationship to public interest in identifying
and prosecuting murderers and sex offenders).
Finally, plaintiff’s assertion that the state might misuse the information
derived from his DNA samples, when he makes no allegations of any specific
misuse, fails to state a justiciable controversy. See In re Welfare of Z.P.B., 474
N.W.2d 651, 653-54 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
In light of the preceding discussion, the district court did not err in
declining to grant plaintiff a preliminary injunction.
AFFIRMED. All pending motions are DENIED as moot.
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