Janke v. Novac

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 28 2002
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
SCOTT JANKE,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 01-1334
(D.C. No. 01-D-11)
JUANITA NOVAC; ATTORNEY (D. Colorado)
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
COLORADO,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HENRY , ANDERSON , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Petitioner Scott Janke, a Colorado state prisoner proceeding pro se, requests
a certificate of appealability (COA) to permit this court to review the merits of
the district court’s order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (no appeal unless
COA issued). He also seeks leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis ; that
request is granted. Because we determine that Mr. Janke has not made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, we deny issuance of a
COA and dismiss the appeal.
Mr. Janke was convicted by a jury of kidnaping and sexually assaulting
four women. He entered a guilty plea to an additional sexual assault charge
involving a fifth woman. His convictions at issue here were affirmed on direct
appeal, and on remand for resentencing, he was sentenced to sixty-four years’
imprisonment. People v. Janke , 720 P.2d 613 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986). He filed a
post-conviction motion with the state court on which he eventually received a
hearing. The state trial court issued written findings of fact and denied relief.
That decision was affirmed by the state appellate court. People v. Janke ,
No. 98CA0900 (Colo. Ct. App. May 4, 2000).
Mr. Janke then filed the underlying habeas petition claiming he was denied
his constitutional rights to testify at his trial and to receive the effective
assistance of counsel. He further asserts that he is entitled to habeas relief based
2
on newly discovered evidence. We apply the provisions of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(1996).
Right to testify
There is no dispute that a defendant has a constitutional right “to take the
witness stand and to testify in his or her own defense.” Rock v. Arkansas, 483
U.S. 44, 49 (1987). The Supreme Court has held that “[t]here is a presumption
against the waiver of constitutional rights, and for a waiver to be effective it must
be clearly established that there was an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Brookhart v. Janis , 384 U.S. 1, 4
(1966) (quotation and citations omitted). Mr. Janke argues that the state appellate
court’s post-conviction holding unreasonably applied Supreme Court law by
stating that “the legality of the judgment and the regularity of the proceedings
leading up to the judgment are presumed. The burden is on the defendant to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence the allegations of his motion.”
Janke , No. 98CA0900, slip op. at 3. Therefore, according to him, he is entitled to
habeas relief under § 2254(d)(1) (habeas application “shall not be granted with
respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings
unless the adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
3
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”).
Following a post-conviction hearing, the state trial court made the
following written findings of fact: Mr. Janke’s trial attorney advised him prior to
trial of his right to testify, Mr. Janke was clearly aware of his right to testify, and
he understood throughout the trial that he could decide whether or not to testify
regardless of his attorney’s advice. R. doc. 13, Ex. B at 5. In addition, the state
trial court found not credible Mr. Janke’s claim that he told his attorney that he
had decided to testify during the defense case. Id. doc. 13, Ex. B at 4.
The presumption of correctness accorded to factual findings applies to
rulings by either a state trial court or a state appellate court. Bryan v. Gibson ,
276 F.3d 1163, 1170 n.3 (10th Cir. 2001). Therefore, we need not address
Mr. Janke’s argument that the state appellate court’s decision was contrary to or
an unreasonable application of Federal law because the state trial court’s findings
of fact provide an ample foundation for determining Mr. Janke’s legal claims.
Whether Mr. Janke understood his right to testify is a question of fact; the
legal question is whether his waiver was knowing and intelligent. See Valdez v.
Ward , 219 F.3d 1222, 1231 (10th Cir. 2000) (applying AEDPA to evaluate
whether petitioner waived Miranda rights), cert. denied , 532 U.S. 979 (2001).
Consequently, we presume the state trial court’s factual findings are correct,
4
“unless Mr. [Janke] convinces us otherwise by clear and convincing evidence.”
Id. (citing § 2254(e)(1)).
Mr. Janke argues only that the evidence could be interpreted to his
advantage. He points to no contradiction between the evidence and the findings
of fact, and he offers no further evidence to rebut the state trial court’s factual
findings. See id. We have considered the facts that Mr. Janke was aware of his
right to testify throughout the trial and he did not tell his attorney he had decided
to testify in light of the law holding a valid waiver of a constitutional right must
be knowing and intentional. We conclude that the adjudication of Mr. Janke’s
right-to-testify claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of
Federal law. A COA is denied on this claim.
Ineffective assistance of counsel
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Janke must show both
that his attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
and that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his defense and deprived him
of a fair trial with a reliable result. Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668,
687-88 (1984). Mr. Janke claims his trial attorney provided constitutionally
ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to advise him adequately of his right
to testify and by preventing him from testifying when, during trial, he changed his
mind and decided to testify.
5
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are mixed questions of fact and
law. Id. at 698. Therefore, we apply § 2254(e)(1)’s presumption of correctness
to the state trial court’s findings of fact, and we uphold the decision that trial
counsel was not ineffective if it was not contrary to or an unreasonable
application of clearly established Federal law, § 2254(d)(1). As discussed above,
because he failed to rebut the finding with clear and convincing evidence, we are
bound by the finding that Mr. Janke was aware of his right to testify throughout
his trial. Furthermore, the state trial court found not credible his claim that he
changed his mind about testifying and that he conveyed this decision to his
attorney, so we must reject Mr. Janke’s assertion to the contrary. Accordingly,
we hold that Mr. Janke has failed to demonstrate that his trial attorney’s
performance was deficient.
We need not address Strickland ’s prejudice criterion because Mr. Janke did
not show that his attorney’s performance was objectively unreasonable. See
Romano v. Gibson , 278 F.3d 1145, 1151 (10th Cir. 2002). We note, however, that
contrary to Mr. Janke’s argument, neither the state appellate court nor the federal
district court found that his trial attorney’s performance was deficient. Rather,
both courts stated that even if Mr. Janke had demonstrated his attorney’s deficient
performance, he failed to show that he was prejudiced. We agree with this
assessment because Mr. Janke has not suggested what his trial testimony would
6
have been or how it would have affected the outcome. Mr. Janke is not entitled to
a COA on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Newly discovered evidence
Finally, Mr. Janke asserts that he is entitled to relief based on newly
discovered evidence. He claims that years after his trial had concluded, he
discovered an alibi witness when he learned that one of the crimes had occurred
on his twenty-first birthday, which he had celebrated with friends. He also claims
he discovered that he had been administered strong medication before and during
his trial, which may have affected his ability to participate in his defense.
We will address this claim, even though Mr. Janke failed to exhaust it by
presenting it to the state court. Generally, a habeas petition containing both
exhausted and unexhausted claims will be dismissed. Hoxsie v. Kerby , 108 F.3d
1239, 1242 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)). A habeas petition may
be denied on the merits, however, even though the petitioner has failed to exhaust
state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). Where, as here, the claim has no merit, it
will be denied without requiring useless state-court litigation to accomplish the
exhaustion rule. Hoxsie , 108 F.3d at 1242-43; see also Romero v. Furlong , 215
F.3d 1107, 1111 (10th Cir.) (declining to address complex procedural bar issues
because case more easily decided on merits), cert. denied , 531 U.S. 982 (2000).
7
To be entitled to relief based on newly discovered evidence, Colorado law
requires, among other things, that the evidence could not have been discovered
before trial or entry of a guilty plea, despite the exercise of reasonable diligence
by the defendant and his attorney, and that it would probably result in an
acquittal. Mason v. People , 25 P.3d 764, 767 (Colo. 2001) (en banc) (setting
criteria for newly discovered evidence following guilty plea); People v. Gutierrez ,
622 P.2d 547, 559-60 (Colo. 1981) (same for new trial after guilty verdict). Here,
the dates of the crimes were clearly available to Mr. Janke and his attorney before
trial, so the claim that the date of one crime qualifies as newly discovered
evidence is without merit. We also reject his claim that he is entitled to a new
trial based on newly discovered evidence that he was administered psychotropic
drugs before and during his trial. His allegations that the drugs adversely affected
his ability and diminished his capacity to participate in his trial are insufficient to
show that neither he nor his attorney could have discovered that he was receiving
the medications and that the medication records were unavailable before trial.
Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence Mr. Janke claims was discovered
after his trial and guilty plea could have been discovered before trial and would
not probably result in an acquittal. Consequently, Mr. Janke is not entitled to a
COA on this ground.
8
Mr. Janke’s request to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs and
fees is granted. APPEAL DISMISSED.
Entered for the Court
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
9