Daniel v. Franklin

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
March 5, 2013
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
DONNIE MAX DANIEL,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 12-6119
(D.C. No. 5:12-CV-00309-M)
ERIC FRANKLIN, Warden, (W.D. Okla.)
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE
OF APPEALABILITY *
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, McKAY and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner-Appellant Donnie Max Daniel, an Oklahoma state prisoner
proceeding pro se, 1 seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) to appeal from the district court’s dismissal of his petition for
a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We deny Mr. Daniel’s
application for a COA and dismiss this matter.
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law
of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and
Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.
1
Because Mr. Daniel is proceeding pro se, we review his pleadings
and filings liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam); Garza v. Davis, 596 F.3d 1198, 1201 n.2 (10th Cir. 2010).
I
Mr. Daniel was convicted in 1997 in the District Court of McClain County,
Oklahoma, Case No. CF-1995-339, for trafficking of controlled dangerous
substances after former conviction of two or more drug-related felonies (Count
One); possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute
after former conviction of two or more drug-related felonies (Count Two); and
possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute after
former conviction of two or more drug-related felonies (Count Three). He was
sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and fined $25,000
for Count One; a ten-year term of imprisonment and a $10,000 fine for Count
Two; and life imprisonment and a $10,000 fine for Count Three.
On direct appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the
convictions in Counts One and Three, and reversed the conviction in Count Two
with instructions to the trial court to dismiss this count. On February 23, 2000,
Mr. Daniel filed a petition for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The
district court denied Mr. Daniel’s § 2254 petition on May 21, 2002, and Mr.
Daniel did not appeal that denial. See Daniel v. Ward, Case No. CIV-00-381-M
(W.D. Okla. May 21, 2002).
Mr. Daniel then filed in the district court the instant petition for habeas
relief on March 22, 2012, asserting that he was entitled to bring the action under
28 U.S.C. § 2241 because his remedy under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 was inadequate and
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ineffective. The district court assigned the case to a magistrate judge for
consideration. On March 27, 2012, the magistrate judge issued a report and
recommendation (“R&R”), concluding that Mr. Daniel’s § 2241 petition was
properly construed as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2254;
that, as such, it was an unauthorized second or successive § 2254 petition that the
district court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate; and that it was not in the interest
of justice to transfer the petition to our court because the petition was time-barred
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
Mr. Daniel filed objections to the R&R on April 18, 2012. On April 30,
2012, the district court adopted the R&R, construed Mr. Daniel’s § 2241 petition
as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2254, and dismissed the
petition for lack of jurisdiction. Mr. Daniel seeks to challenge on appeal the
district court’s construction of his action as being one brought under § 2254, and
its dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction.
II
A COA is a jurisdictional prerequisite to our review of the merits of
a § 2254 appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); Clark v. Oklahoma, 468 F.3d
711, 713 (10th Cir. 2006); see also Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 647–49
(2012) (discussing, inter alia, the “clear” jurisdictional language in § 2253(c)(1)).
We will issue a COA only if the applicant makes “a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” Woodward v. Cline, 693 F.3d 1289, 1292 (10th
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Cir. 2012) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)) (internal quotation marks omitted);
accord Clark, 468 F.3d at 713. An applicant “satisfies this standard by
demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s
resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude that the issues
presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Dulworth
v. Jones, 496 F.3d 1133, 1136–37 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
When the district court denies relief “on procedural grounds, the applicant
faces a double hurdle. Not only must the applicant make a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right, but he must also show ‘that jurists of reason
would find it debatable . . . whether the district court was correct in its procedural
ruling.’” Coppage v. McKune, 534 F.3d 1279, 1281 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)); see also Gonzalez, 132 S. Ct.
at 648. “Where a plain procedural bar is present and the district court is correct
to invoke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could not conclude either
that the district court erred in dismissing the petition or that the [applicant] should
be allowed to proceed further.” Woodward, 693 F.3d at 1292 (quoting Slack, 529
U.S. at 484) (internal quotation marks omitted).
III
“Before a petitioner may file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254
petition in the district court, he must successfully apply to this court for an order
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authorizing the district court to consider the petition.” Spitznas v. Boone, 464
F.3d 1213, 1215 (10th Cir. 2006); see also In re Cline, 531 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th
Cir. 2008) (“A district court does not have jurisdiction to address the merits of a
second or successive . . . 28 U.S.C. § 2254 claim until this court has granted the
required authorization.”). “Accordingly, when a second or successive petition for
habeas corpus relief under § 2254 . . . is filed in the district court without the
required authorization by this court, the district court should transfer the petition
or motion to this court in the interest of justice pursuant to [28 U.S.C.] § 1631.”
Coleman v. United States, 106 F.3d 339, 341 (10th Cir. 1997). Coleman does not,
however, impose a mandatory transfer rule—“[w]here there is no risk that a
meritorious successive claim will be lost absent a § 1631 transfer, a district court
does not abuse its discretion if it concludes it is not in the interest of justice to
transfer the matter to this court for authorization.” Cline, 531 F.3d at 1252.
Pursuant to the analytic framework that the Supreme Court established,
most notably in Miller-El and Slack, we have carefully reviewed Mr. Daniel’s
combined opening brief and application for COA and the record, including the
R&R that determined Mr. Daniel’s petition should be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. Based upon this review, we conclude that Mr. Daniel is not entitled
to a COA because reasonable jurists would not debate the correctness of the
district court’s decision to deny Mr. Daniel relief on procedural grounds.
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Mr. Daniel claims that it was erroneous for the district court to retitle his
§ 2241 petition as a petition brought under § 2254. Because his petition was
properly titled under § 2241, says Mr. Daniel, the district court needed no
authorization from our court in order for it to acquire jurisdiction over his
petition. “A petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 attacks the execution of a sentence
rather than its validity . . . . It is not an additional, alternative, or supplemental
remedy to [§ 2254].” Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164, 166 (10th Cir. 1996). Mr.
Daniel does not purport to challenge the execution of his sentence; rather, he
challenges the validity of his sentence. Because § 2241 was not the appropriate
avenue of relief for challenging the validity of Mr. Daniel’s sentence, the district
court properly construed Mr. Daniel’s petition as one brought pursuant to § 2254.
See McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1997)
(“Petitions under § 2241 are used to attack the execution of a sentence, in contrast
to § 2254 habeas . . . proceedings, which are used to collaterally attack the
validity of a conviction and sentence.” (citations omitted)); cf. Hamm v. Saffle,
300 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir. 2002) (“The district court noted that Hamm’s
habeas petition should be construed as a § 2241 petition because he was
challenging the execution of his sentence rather than the validity of his
conviction. We agree and construe the § 2254 petition as a § 2241 petition.”).
Having properly construed Mr. Daniel’s petition as one brought pursuant to
§ 2254, the district court was correct to determine that there was no risk that a
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meritorious claim would be lost absent a § 1631 transfer to our court because Mr.
Daniel’s petition was time-barred. 2 See Cline, 531 F.3d at 1252. Therefore, Mr.
Daniel cannot demonstrate that the issues he has presented are adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, we deny Mr. Daniel’s request for a COA and
dismiss this matter.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Jerome A. Holmes
Circuit Judge
2
Mr. Daniel asserts a variety of equitable tolling arguments as to why
his petition is not time-barred. Because we find none of Mr. Daniel’s equitable
tolling arguments availing, there is no risk of losing a meritorious claim absent
transfer because his petition would be time-barred under the one-year statute of
limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
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