United States v. Vaughan

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
TENTH CIRCUIT June 4, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. Nos. 12-1179, 12-1181 & 12-1182
ALBERT LAWRENCE VAUGHAN, (D.C. Nos. 1:05-CR-00368-MSK-1 and
1:11-CR-00280-MSK-1 and
Defendant-Appellant. 1:11-CR-00310-MSK-1)
(D. Colo.)
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before KELLY, BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and JOHNSON, District Judge.**
In November 2011, Defendant-Appellant Albert Vaughan (“Vaughan”) pled guilty
to two charges of armed bank robbery and one charge of bank robbery arising from
criminal conduct in Colorado, Arizona, and Utah. Vaughan received a one hundred
month sentence on each charge with the sentences to run concurrent to each other.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered
submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent
except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may
be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
Honorable William P. Johnson, United States District Judge, District of New
Mexico, sitting by designation.
Vaughan had previously been convicted on charges of bank robbery in Nevada and
armed bank robbery in Kansas. On appeal, Vaughan contends that the district court
should not have considered the sentences for his Nevada and Kansas robberies as “prior
sentences” for the purposes of calculating his criminal history category under the United
States Sentencing Guidelines. Vaughan also contends that the sentence imposed is
unreasonable. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
I
Factual background
Between September 30, 2004, and May 2, 2005, Vaughan robbed nine banks in
Nevada, Kansas, Arizona, Utah, and Colorado. He was subsequently charged with five
counts of bank robbery in the District of Nevada, to which he pled guilty. Vaughan was
sentenced to seventy-eight months imprisonment as to each count, to be served
concurrently.1 Vaughan was then indicted in the District of Kansas and charged with one
count of armed bank robbery and one count of discharging a firearm during a crime of
violence. Vaughan proceeded to trial in this case and was convicted.2 He was sentenced
to seventy-eight months as to the armed robbery count, and 120 months as to the firearm
count. The firearm sentence was to be served consecutively to the bank robbery count as
well as to his Nevada sentence, as required by 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c)(1)(D). Vaughn is
still serving time on this sentence.
1
Vaughan completed this 78 month sentence before being sentenced in the case that is the
subject of this appeal.
2
Vaughan appealed these convictions and this Court affirmed. United States v. Vaughan, 450
Fed. App’x. 757 (10th Cir. 2011).
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Following these convictions, Vaughan was charged with one count of armed bank
robbery in the District of Arizona, one count of bank robbery in the District of Utah, and
three counts of armed bank robbery in the District of Colorado. The Arizona and Utah
cases were transferred to the District of Colorado, and all three cases were consolidated
for plea and sentencing purposes. Vaughan pled guilty to the Arizona and Utah charges,
and pled guilty to one of the three Colorado counts of armed bank robbery while the
remaining Colorado charges were dismissed. The judgment and sentence imposed in the
consolidated case in the District of Colorado pertaining to the Arizona, Utah and
Colorado robberies is the subject of this appeal.
Procedural background
A Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) was completed before sentencing in
the instant case. Vaughan’s base offense level for the robberies committed in Utah,
Arizona and Colorado was calculated at level 20 under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(a). The offense
level was increased by 2 levels under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(1), because the property of a
financial institution was taken, and then by 3 levels under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(E),
because a dangerous weapon was brandished during the commission of the offense.
Vaughan’s adjusted offense level moved up from 20 to 25. Because multiple robberies
were committed in Arizona, Utah and Colorado, Vaughan also received a multiple-count
upward adjustment of three levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4 so the offense level went
up to 28. The final adjustment to Vaughan’s offense level was a 3 level reduction for
acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) and (b). Thus, the PSR reported a
total offense level for Vaughan of 25.
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As for Vaughan’s criminal history category, the PSR placed him in category V as
a result of having 10 criminal history points based on prior criminal history. Vaughan
was assessed four criminal history points for two previous driving-while-impaired
convictions, and six criminal history points for prior bank robbery convictions resulting
in sentences in excess of one year and one month. Specifically, he was assessed three
criminal history points under U.S.S.G. § 4A.1(a) for the Nevada bank robbery conviction,
as well as three criminal history points under U.S.S.G. § 4A.1(a) for the Kansas bank
robbery conviction. With a total offense level of 25 and a criminal history category of V,
the PSR determined Vaughan’s advisory sentencing guidelines range to be 100 to 125
months incarceration.
As relevant to this appeal, Vaughan objected to the PSR on two grounds. First, he
objected to being placed in criminal history category V on the ground that if all his bank
robbery cases had been consolidated at the time of his arrest,3 he would have had only
four criminal history points for the two driving-while-impaired convictions, placing him
in criminal history category II.4 Second, he argued that the sentences imposed for the
3
Efforts were made to consolidate Vaughan’s bank robbery cases. However, because Vaughan
denied (and continues to deny) that he had committed the Kansas bank robbery, consolidation
efforts were to no avail.
4
According to the probation officer who calculated Vaughn’s Guidelines sentence, if all of
Vaughn’s bank robbery cases had been consolidated at the time of his arrest in 2007, under the
2006 Edition of the U.S. Guidelines Manual in effect at that time, Vaughan’s guideline offense
level would have been 35, his criminal history category would have been IV thereby resulting in
an advisory guidelines imprisonment range of 235 to 293 months. (Vol. II, doc. 57, at 107-09).
The increase in the base offense level to 35 under this scenario occurs because there would be
additional counts resulting in a multi-offense adjustment, and a 7-level increase pursuant to
§ 2B.31(b)(2)(a) because a firearm was discharged in the Kansas case. (Id. at 107.) However,
during the sentencing hearing relevant to this appeal, the district court found that the parties
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Nevada and Kansas bank robberies were sufficient to meet the requirements of 18 U.S.C.
3553(a). He elaborated on these arguments in motions for a downward variance and for a
downward departure.
The district court denied the motion for a downward departure, on the grounds that
any overrepresentation of Vaughan’s criminal history resulted from the piecemeal nature
of the prosecution, rather than from any mitigating or aggravating circumstances not
addressed by the Guidelines. The court imposed a within-Guidelines sentence of 100
months for each charge, to run concurrently. However, the court granted Vaughan’s
request for a downward variance, to the extent that it set the 100-month sentence to run
concurrently with the 78-month sentence imposed for the Kansas bank robbery charge.
The court also noted that it could not set the 100-month sentence in the instant case to run
concurrently with the 120-month sentence imposed for the discharge of a firearm charge,
because that sentence was mandated by statute to run consecutively. Consequently,
Vaughan’s total sentence was increased by twenty-two months.
II
Analysis
The Trial Court Did Not Err in Adding Points for Vaughan’s Prior Sentences of
Imprisonment
First, Vaughan contends that the district court improperly calculated the advisory
Guidelines sentencing range by including the Nevada and Kansas bank robbery sentences
agreed that if the cases had been consolidated, Vaughan would have been placed in criminal
history category III. (Vol. 7, Sentencing Hearing Transcript, at 45.)
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in his criminal history category computation, because those sentences arose from the
same “relevant conduct” as the Arizona, Utah, and Colorado charges for which he was
being sentenced. Because Vaughan did not raise below the arguments he makes here, we
review for plain error.5 United States v. Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir.
2007) (“Because [appellant] did not object to the procedure by which his sentence was
determined and explained, we may reverse the district court’s judgment only in the
presence of plain error.”). Plain error occurs when there is (i) error, (ii) that is plain, (iii)
which affects the defendant’s substantial rights, and (iv) which seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Lopez-
Flores, 444 F.3d 1218, 1222 (10th Cir. 2006). We perceive no error.
When calculating a defendant’s criminal history under the Guidelines, a district
court must add three points to a criminal history computation for each “prior sentence” of
imprisonment exceeding one year and one month. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a). The Guidelines
define a “prior sentence” as “any sentence previously imposed . . . for conduct not part of
the instant offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(1). Conduct that is “part of the instant offense
means conduct that is relevant conduct to the instant offense under the provisions of
§1B1.3.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 app. n. 1.
5
In his opening brief, Vaughan argues that we review the district court’s factual findings for
clear error, and its legal conclusions de novo. In his reply brief, he abandons this argument and
claims that under United States v. Cuthbertson, 138 F.3d 1325, 1326 (10th Cir. 1998), this court
should review for an abuse of discretion. However, in Cuthbertson, the defendant grounded his
appeal on issues raised at trial. Id. Here, at the sentencing hearing, Vaughan’s counsel expressly
stated that he had no objections to the calculation of the Guidelines sentence. (Vol. 7,
Sentencing Hearing Transcript, at 5.)
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The government asserts that by arguing that the Nevada and Kansas bank
robberies were “relevant conduct” because they occurred during the “same course of
conduct,” Vaughan’s opening brief relies exclusively on U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2). Under
this provision, two offenses qualify as part of the “same course of conduct” if “they are
sufficiently connected or related to each other to warrant the conclusion that they are part
of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses.” See U.S.S.G. §1B1.3 app. n. 9.
However, the Guidelines also expressly preclude certain offenses from being
“groupable,” or qualifying as the “same course of conduct” under §1B1.3(a)(2). Bank
robbery is one such offense. See §3D1.2(d) (expressly excluding robbery from
grouping); §3D1.2 app. n. 6 (when a defendant “is convicted of three counts of bank
robbery[, t]he counts are not to be grouped together . . .” (emphasis in original)).
Therefore, Vaughan’s multiple bank robberies cannot be grouped together as a “course of
conduct” under §1B1.3(a)(2), and he concedes as much.
Vaughan argues that this Court must nonetheless analyze his series of bank
robberies under §1B1.3(a)(1), which requires the district court to determine the base
offense level based on “all acts and omission committed, aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant; and . . . that
occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that
offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that
offense.” See United States v. Cuthbertson, 138 F.3d 1325, 1327 (10th Cir. 1998)
(“Because [the appellant]’s federal offense [is not groupable], in this case § 1B1.3(a)(2)
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does not apply. Instead, we must limit our analysis to the terms of § 1B1.3(a)(1).”). We
agree, but conclude that no error occurred under § 1B1.3(a)(1).
As we stated in United States v. Flores, “If the conduct at issue is not groupable
under § 3D1.2(d), then it qualifies as ‘relevant conduct’ only if it ‘occurred during the
commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course
of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense.’” 149 F.3d 1272, 1281
(10th Cir. 1998) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)); see also United States v. Maass, 153
F.3d 729 (10th Cir. 1998) (unpublished) (same). This definition of “relevant conduct” is
narrower than the “same course of conduct” addressed in § 1B1.3(a)(2) and defined in
U.S.S.G. §1.B1.3 app. n. 9(B). It does not encompass Vaughan’s Nevada and Kansas
bank robberies, which did not occur during the commission of the Arizona, Utah, and
Colorado bank robberies, in preparation for the latter robberies, or in the course of
attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for them. Vaughan’s analysis of the
similarity, regularity, and temporal proximity of the Nevada and Kansas bank robberies
to the instant bank robberies is relevant only to groupable offenses and does not
demonstrate that the Nevada and Kansas bank robberies constitute relevant conduct under
§ 1B1.3(a)(1). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in including
those sentences in Vaughan’s criminal history calculation.
The Sentence Imposed for Bank Robbery and Armed Bank Robbery Is
Procedurally and Substantively Reasonable
Vaughan also contends that the sentence imposed by the district court was not
reasonable because his criminal history was overrepresented and the district court did not
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properly consider the factors identified in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a). We review for an abuse of
discretion, affording substantial deference to the district court in determining “whether
the length of the sentence is reasonable given all the circumstances of the case in light of
the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a),” and reverse only when the district court
“renders a judgment that is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or manifestly unreasonable.”
United States v. Martinez, 610 F.3d 1216, 1226 (10th Cir. 2010).
Vaughan begins by arguing that the sentence imposed was procedurally
unreasonable because the district court improperly calculated his criminal history
category when it included his sentences for the Nevada and Kansas bank robberies as
prior sentences. This erroneous calculation, he asserts, overrepresented his criminal
history. While Vaughan is correct that failure to properly calculate a Guidelines
sentencing range renders a sentence procedurally unreasonable, Gall v. United States, 552
U.S 38, 51 (2007), because we have already concluded that the district court did not err in
determining that the PSR correctly placed Vaughan in criminal history category V, this
argument fails.
Vaughan next asserts that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because the
Guidelines calculation resulted in a sentence greater than necessary to achieve the proper
purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In particular, Vaughan alleges that (1) before he
“inexplicably” began robbing banks at the age of 35 years, he was generally a law-
abiding citizen and the owner of a successful computer business; (2) after serving his
remaining Kansas sentence, he will be approaching 60 years of age before he is released
from prison, and would pose no further risk of criminal behavior; (3) the length of the
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sentence results only from the piecemeal fashion in which his offenses were prosecuted,
leading to a more severe punishment than would have resulted if the cases had been
consolidated at the outset; and (4) the additional sentence is excessive and unnecessary to
promote respect for the law or provide for a just punishment.
Vaughan received a sentence that fell within the properly calculated Guidelines
range, which is afforded a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness on appeal. United
States v. Mumma, 509 F.3d 1239, 1243 (10th Cir. 2007). To the extent that the district
court’s decision that the sentence should run concurrently with the 78-month sentence
imposed for the Kansas bank robbery charge constitutes a downward variance, we “
‘consider the extent of the deviation’ but give ‘due deference to the district court’s
decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.’”
United States v. Huckins, 529 F.3d 1312, 1317 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).
We conclude that Vaughan has failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness,
and that any deviation from the Guideless sentence is minimal and justified by the
§ 3553(a) factors. The record shows that the district court considered the relevant
sentencing factors and made particularized findings. Considering Vaughan’s argument
that he had primarily been a law-abiding citizen before he began robbing banks, the
district judge noted that “good people can make bad decisions and they’re still held
accountable for their conduct.” (Vol. VII, Sentencing Hearing Transcript, at 46.) The
district court declined to consider Vaughan’s age, explaining that because he was “asking
me to look back retrospectively to all of these particular convictions and bank robberies
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. . . the fact that he’s now spent some time in prison and he’s older doesn’t bear
particularly on my determination.” (Id.)
The district court also noted that both parties bore some responsibility for the
piecemeal nature of the prosecution, but that “to fashion a sentence based on the missteps
of the defendant or the Government at this juncture doesn’t make a lot of sense to me.”
(Id. at 48.) Instead, the court explained that taking into account the sentences already
imposed was necessary to meet the sentencing objectives of promoting respect for the
law and providing for just punishment. The district court granted Vaughan’s request for
a downward variance by allowing the 100-month sentences for each of the three counts at
issue to run concurrently with that portion of the Kansas sentence attributable to a like
offense, or the 78 months imposed for bank robbery. The district court also concluded
that the 100-month sentences could not run concurrently with the 120-month portion of
the Kansas sentence attributable to the discharge of a firearm during a crime of violence,
because that 120-month sentence was required by statute to run consecutive to the time
imposed for the crime of bank robbery. The end result of the sentence imposed by the
district court was that Vaughan would serve an additional twenty-two months
incarceration consecutive or added on to the prison time Vaughan was already serving for
the Kansas bank robbery. Vaughan has failed to demonstrate how this sentence
constitutes an abuse of discretion. In fact, Vaughan’s counsel admitted as much at
sentencing, when he stated, “If I’m understanding it correctly, the net result . . . would be
an additional 22-month sentence to the time that he’s currently serving. If I’m correct,
frankly I’m going to be hard pressed to argue that that’s not reasonable. We pled to three
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counts of armed bank robbery and we’re talking about an additional 22 months.” (Vol.
VII, Sentencing Hearing Transcript, at 29-30). Likewise, we are hard pressed to find any
abuse of discretion by the district court in the sentence imposed.
Accordingly, for the reasons explained here, the district court is affirmed on all
claims.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
William P. Johnson
District Judge
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