Quintero v. Encarnacion

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 29 2000
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
RITA PATINO QUINTERO,
also known as Rita Carillo,
No. 99-3258
Plaintiff-Appellee, (D.C. No. 96-CV-1205)
(D. Kan.)
and
KANSAS ADVOCACY &
PROTECTIVE SERVICES, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
CONRADO B. ENCARNACION,
M.D.; DARA JOHNSON, M.D.;
MICHAEL P. HORNICEK, M.D.;
BENJAMIN H. ARTILES, M.D.;
ZITA CALDERON, M.D.;
PRAKASH P. REDDY, M.D.;
REMEDIOS C. PRIMERO, M.D.;
BASUVIAH SHANKER, M.D.;
AURORA P. TRABAJO, M.D.;
BAL SHARMA, M.S., M.D.; JEAN
DANIEL POLICARD, M.D.; SYBIL
SHAFI, M.D.; LYDIA P. OBLEADA,
M.D.; GEORGE GETZ; MANI LEE,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
GLORIA CHAPMAN, LBSW, TTL;
RITA GONZALES, LBSW;
KATHLEEN SHERLOCK, LMSW;
ADELE DUNN, LBSW; LISA VAN
HORN, LMSW; MARY
PATTERSON, LBSW; REGIS
LOPATA, PH.D.; REX
ROSENBERG, RMLP; JOHN
MARKINGS; ROCHELLE
CHRONISTER; LAVERNE FISS,
Defendants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , EBEL , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
This lawsuit arose from the involuntary commitment of plaintiff Rita
Quintero to the Larned State Hospital (Larned) from 1983 to 1995, when Kansas
Advocacy and Protective Services, Inc. (KAPS) arranged for Ms. Quintero’s
release and return to her home in Mexico. Plaintiff then sued the Larned
administrators, physicians and others involved in Ms. Quintero’s care and
treatment, claiming they violated various federal laws, including 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, and Kansas state laws. All defendants moved to dismiss Counts I through
*
The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument pursuant
to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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VI of plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 2
Defendants moved to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds, claiming plaintiff
failed to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that they violated a clearly
established constitutional right. The district court adopted the recommendations
of the magistrate judge, with one modification, and granted the motions to dismiss
filed by the social workers and psychologists, but denied dismissal on qualified
immunity grounds to the administrators and physicians. This appeal was brought
by the administrators, Getz and Lee, and the physicians, Encarnacion, Johnson,
Hornicek, Artiles, Calderon, Reddy, Primero, Shanker, Trabajo, Sharma, Policard,
Shafi, and Obleada. We have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal from the
denial of qualified immunity. See Breidenbach v. Bolish , 126 F.3d 1288, 1290
(10th Cir. 1997). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In 1983, plaintiff, Rita Quintero was found on the streets of Johnson,
Kansas. Because she exhibited signs of mental illness, she was taken into
protective custody. At a Kansas state court hearing, Ms. Quintero was determined
to be “in need of treatment,” and she was involuntarily committed to the Larned
State Hospital for evaluation and treatment. She was diagnosed with
2
Counts VII through XVIII, which raise pendent state law claims, claims of
legal malpractice, and claims for injunctive relief are not before us.
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schizophrenia, and remained at Larned until 1995, when KAPS advocated for her
release.
While Ms. Quintero was at Larned, psychotropic medications were
administered to her, which she alleges was against her will. Eventually, she
developed tardive dyskinesia, a condition that often results from long-term
treatment with psychotropic medication. It is characterized by involuntary
movements of the face, shuffling gate and other symptoms.
In 1983, the Mexican Consulate in Salt Lake City informed Larned
personnel that Ms. Quintero matched the description of a Tarahumara Indian from
Mexico. The information was placed in Ms. Quintero’s file but no effort was
made to tailor her treatment to her culture or to return her to Mexico.
In 1986, a Kansas state court held a hearing to review the 1983 commitment
order. Ms. Quintero was represented by a court-appointed attorney, but she did
not appear in person. The state court did not make specific findings, but
continued the commitment order until “those who are in the care and control of
[Ms. Quintero]” determine that she may “be safely returned to society.”
Magistrate judge’s report and recommendation at 11 (quoting state court order).
Larned personnel made periodic reports to the court, but no further judicial
hearings were conducted regarding Ms. Quintero’s commitment.
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Contributing to Ms. Quintero’s diagnosis of schizophrenia were her unusual
statements, depression, aggression, and behaviors of dressing in layers and
refusing to bathe. Ms. Quintero is a citizen of Mexico and a member of the
Tarahumara Indian tribe. Members of the Tarahumara tribe dress in layers and
rarely bathe. Her primary language is Ramuri. She speaks some Spanish, but no
English. During her commitment at Larned, interpreters were not always
provided for Ms. Quintero, and at no time was a Ramuri interpreter provided.
Plaintiffs contend that much of Ms. Quintero’s behavior that was treated with
psychotropic drugs resulted from cultural differences, language barriers, the
hospital environment, and the side effects of the psychotropic medications, rather
than mental illness. After KAPS intervened, Ms. Quintero was released from
Larned. She returned to Mexico in September 1995, after twelve years at Larned.
Sister Beatriz Zapata was appointed as conservator to represent Ms. Quintero’s
interests in this action.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
“Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary
functions from individual liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless their conduct
violates ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.’” Baptiste v. J.C. Penney Co. , 147 F.3d
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1252, 1255 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982)). Because defendants’ qualified immunity defense was raised in the
context of a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), our review is de
novo. See Breidenbach , 126 F.3d at 1291. We consider only the fourth amended
complaint, construing plaintiff’s allegations and any reasonable inferences drawn
from them in their favor. See Dill v. City of Edmond , 155 F.3d 1193, 1203 (10th
Cir. 1998). Because qualified immunity is asserted, however, the standard is
somewhat different than in the typical Rule 12(b)(6) case. See Breidenbach , 126
F.3d at 1291. That is, “we apply a heightened pleading standard, requiring the
[fourth amended] complaint to contain ‘specific, non-conclusory allegations of
fact sufficient to allow the district court to determine that those facts, if proved,
demonstrate that the actions taken were not objectively reasonable in light of
clearly established law.’” Dill , 155 F.3d at 1204 (quoting Breidenbach , 126 F.3d
at 1293). In addition, because Getz and Lee were supervisors, to state a claim
against them under § 1983, plaintiff must “establish ‘a deliberate, intentional act
by the supervisor to violate constitutional rights.’ A plaintiff may satisfy this
standard by showing the defendant-supervisor personally directed the violation or
had actual knowledge of the violation and acquiesced in its continuance.” Jenkins
v. Wood , 81 F.3d 988, 994-95 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Woodward v. City of
Worland , 977 F.2d 1392, 1399 (10th Cir. 1992)).
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Count I – Wrongful Confinement – Superintendents Only
The district court declined to dismiss Count I against the
superintendent-defendants. Count I alleged that they violated Ms. Quintero’s
constitutional liberty interest by failing to release her. The superintendents do not
challenge the holding that “it [is] unconstitutional for a State to continue to
confine a harmless, mentally ill person.” Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77
(1992). Rather, they claim they cannot be held personally responsible because
they were entitled to rely on the recommendations of the treating physicians, none
of whom recommended that Ms. Quintero be released.
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-2924(c) and (d) (repealed 1996) provided that the
“head of the treatment facility,” here Getz and then Lee, was authorized to release
Ms. Quintero when she was (1) “no longer in need of treatment at the facility” or
(2) “not likely to cause harm to self or others.” The superintendents do not claim
that Ms. Quintero was a danger to herself or others. They were free to consult
with Ms. Quintero’s treating physicians regarding her status and condition, but
the statute clearly contemplated that the responsibility would fall on the
superintendents, not their employees. Accordingly, the district court correctly
denied dismissal of this count against the superintendents because the right to be
released was clearly established and the fourth amended complaint alleges that
Ms. Quintero was not a danger to herself or others and that she was entitled to be
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released. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 77-78 (government may confine mentally ill
person to mental institution until he regains sanity or is not danger to himself or
others).
Count III – Failure to Provide Adequate Safety, Treatment and Training –
Superintendents and Physicians
The district court placed plaintiff’s claims in Count III in two categories:
(1) inadequate medical care and (2) inadequate treatment and training. It declined
to dismiss category (1) of Count III against the superintendents and the
physicians, but it limited the claim to the administration of psychotropic
medications. Category (2) was dismissed as to the superintendents, but not as to
the physicians. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s characterization
of plaintiff’s claims as alleging a violation of substantive due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment, which ensures safe conditions of confinement, including
food, shelter, clothing and medical care, as well as “minimally adequate or
reasonable training to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint.”
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315, 319 (1982).
Category(1): Inadequate Medical Care - Superintendents and Physicians
Plaintiff asserts that defendants violated Ms. Quintero’s constitutional right
to be free from the unwanted administration of psychotropic medications. They
maintain that she had the right to be informed, in a language she could
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understand, of the nature of the medications and their side effects. Defendants
claim that Ms. Quintero did not allege that she objected to the medications. Even
if Ms. Quintero did not object explicitly to taking the psychotropic medications, it
does not necessarily follow that she took them voluntarily. If she did not know
anything about them, or if the effects of the medications were to blunt her ability
to refuse them, cf. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 137 (1992) (side effects of
psychotropic medication may impair ability to follow trial testimony or
communicate with counsel), her acquiescence cannot be characterized as the
voluntary ingestion of psychotropic medications. Moreover, Ms. Quintero’s
argument that she took the medications because she feared she would be denied
canteen tokens if she refused cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss filed
under Rule 12(b)(6).
We need not examine the contours of a claimed constitutional right to be
informed about psychotropic medications because a Kansas state statute provided
a liberty interest entitled to the protection of the federal Due Process Clause.
“[A] state may confer more comprehensive due process protections upon its
citizens than does the federal government. . . . ‘Because state-created liberty
interests are entitled to the protection of the federal Due Process Clause, the full
scope of a patient’s due process rights may depend in part on the substantive
liberty interests created by a state as well as federal law.’” Jurasek v. Utah State
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Hosp., 158 F.3d 506, 514-15 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S.
291, 300 (1982)).
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-2929(a)(7) (repealed 1996), stated that a patient in a
treatment facility “shall” have the right “to have explained, the nature of all
medications prescribed, the reason for the prescription and the most common side
effects and, if requested, the nature of any other treatments ordered.” We reject
any claim that these requirements could be fulfilled by conducting the explanation
in a language the patient could not understand.
Section 59-2929(a)(7) used “explicitly mandatory language in connection
with requiring specific substantive predicates.” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460,
472 (1983). Therefore, violation of the rights granted can be redressed in federal
court. See id. (State’s use of “explicitly mandatory language . . . created a
protected liberty interest”). Moreover, this law was clearly established, and
defendants reasonably would have known that this law governed their conduct.
Cf. Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.2d 393, 397 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[a] reasonably
competent public official should know the law governing his conduct”) (quotation
omitted).
The fourth amended complaint alleges that the physicians failed to explain
to Ms. Quintero the nature and effects of the psychotropic medications that were
administered to her, and failed to exercise professional judgment in their
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decisions to administer those medications. It further alleges that the
superintendents failed to implement policies, procedures, and staff training to
ensure that Ms. Quintero’s rights were protected by having her medications
explained to her and by ensuring that independent medical judgment was
exercised. Accordingly, we hold that plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to
withstand dismissal of this claim.
Category (2): Inadequate Treatment and Training – Physicians Only
On appeal, plaintiff argues only that defendants violated her constitutional
right to adequate medical care, as discussed above. Accordingly, she has
expressly conceded the issue of a right to habilitation in this context. Count III,
as it relates to a habilitation claim is, therefore, dismissed.
Count IV – Improper Administration of Psychotropic Medication –
Superintendents and Physicians
In Count IV, plaintiff alleged that the superintendents and physicians
violated Ms. Quintero’s liberty interests to be free from the unwanted
administration of psychotropic drugs. “It is well established that an individual
has a liberty interest in ‘avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic
drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.’” Jurasek,
158 F.3d at 510 (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990));
accord Bee v. Greaves, 910 F.2d 686, 688 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1990) (Bee II); Bee v.
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Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1393 (10th Cir. 1984) (Bee I). The physicians and
superintendents do not dispute plaintiff’s claim that Ms. Quintero had a right to
avoid the unwanted administration of psychotropic medications or that the right
was clearly established at the time she was admitted to Larned. They argue,
however, that plaintiff has failed to allege facts to establish that they violated Ms.
Quintero’s rights.
The fourth amended complaint alleged that Ms. Quintero (1) had never
been adjudicated unable to participate in decisions regarding her medications,
(2) she had never been adjudicated or perceived by defendants as a danger to
herself or others, (3) the nature and effects of the psychotropic medications were
never explained to her, (4) psychotropic medications were administered against
her will, and (5) defendants failed to exercise professional judgment in the
decisions to administer psychotropic medications. These allegations state a claim.
We recognize that the inquiry does not end with the allegation that Ms. Quintero’s
liberty interest was abridged because that interest must be “balanced against
competing state interests to determine whether it is outweighed by ‘the demands
of an organized society.’” Bee I, 744 F.2d at 1394 (quoting Romeo, 457 U.S. at
320 (further quotation omitted)). But the balancing is not before us in this review
of the district court’s ruling on defendants’ motion to dismiss. Thus, we leave it
to the district court to proceed to the next step.
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CONCLUSION
The right-to-habilitation claims in Count III are DISMISSED as to the
physician-defendants. The judgment is otherwise AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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