United States v. Aguilar

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 17, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 12-2047
v. (D. N.M.)
MARTIN AGUILAR, (D.C. No. 1:10-CR-03101-MCA-1)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, SEYMOUR, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
I. Introduction
Defendant-appellant Martin Aguilar entered a conditional plea of guilty,
pursuant to Fed. R. Crim P. 11(a)(2), to two counts of violating the Bald and
Golden Eagle Protection Act (“Eagle Protection Act”) by taking a bald eagle and
possessing bald eagle parts without a permit. See 16 U.S.C. § 668. Consistent
with his conditional plea, Aguilar now appeals two adverse rulings of the district
court: an order denying his motion to suppress evidence and an order denying his
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
motion to dismiss the indictment. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, this court affirms.
II. Background
Aguilar is an enrolled member of Kewa Pueblo (formerly known as the
Pueblo of Santo Domingo), a federally recognized Indian tribe. Indian Entities
Recognized and Eligible To Receive Services From the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
77 Fed. Reg. 47,868, 47,870 (Aug. 10, 2012). On February 12, 2010, Special
Agents Jason Riley and Russell Stanford of the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service (USFWS) began investigating an anonymous tip that Aguilar had killed
eagles on tribal land the previous weekend. The agents drove onto the Pueblo and
conducted surveillance near the Rio Grande for about three hours, beginning
around 5:30 a.m. They then drove to the Kewa Pueblo government headquarters
and spoke to tribal officials about their investigation. The agents asked the tribal
officials if they knew anything about eagles being killed. The tribal officials
responded they had spoken about such a matter with a tribe member, whom they
would not identify. It was tribal policy to assign a tribal officer as an escort when
outsiders were conducting business within the main village of the Pueblo.
However, because the agents did not tell the tribal officials they would be
conducting their investigation within the village, the tribal Governor did not
assign a tribal officer to escort them.
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The agents drove to the main village of the Pueblo and located Aguilar’s
house, which he shared with his sister and mother. They knocked on the door and
spoke with Aguilar’s sister. After identifying themselves as USFWS special
agents, they asked to speak with Aguilar, and were informed he was not home.
The agents returned to their vehicle and left the Pueblo, returning to Aguilar’s
house later and waiting for him to come home. Some time later, Aguilar’s sister
invited the agents to come into the house because Aguilar was on the phone and
wanted to speak to the agents. Special Agent Stanford spoke to Aguilar,
identifying himself and stating he had some questions about eagle feathers.
Aguilar told Agent Stanford he was at a Sam’s Club in Albuquerque and agreed to
meet the agents outside the store. The agents arrived at the Sam’s Club twenty to
twenty-five minutes later, where they found Aguilar in the food court. The agents
explained to Aguilar that they wanted to talk with him based on information he
shot two eagles the previous weekend. He perceived the agents as polite and
courteous; they told him he was not under arrest, did not have to speak with them,
and could leave.
Aguilar was very cooperative with the agents. He admitted he shot one
eagle the previous weekend and his son shot another. He explained that he was a
medicine man and had killed the eagles for their feathers. Aguilar told the agents
he had been called into the Governor’s office two days earlier and that, when
questioned about the incident, he was told to stop killing eagles. He also told the
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agents he had the feathers in a basket in a workshop behind his house. Special
Agent Stanford asked if he could see the feathers, and Aguilar agreed to meet the
agents at his house later that afternoon. The agents returned to the Pueblo around
3:00 p.m. to find Aguilar already home. Aguilar had moved the eagle parts from
a shed into his house, and invited the agents to examine the feathers. The agents
asked if they could look inside the shed where he kept the feathers, and he
responded they could not. He then told the agents he had telephoned tribal
officials and wanted to wait until they arrived before proceeding further. Tribal
police officer Kerwin Tenorio arrived minutes later and discussed the
investigation with Special Agent Stanford. After conferring with Aguilar in their
native language, Keres, Officer Tenorio told the agents they should immediately
report to the Governor at his office. Prior to doing so, the agents seized a .22
magnum rifle, eagle feathers, and a pair of mounted eagle wings.
Aguilar was charged in a four-count indictment. Counts 1 through 3 were
brought under the Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668. 1 Aguilar moved to
suppress the evidence seized at his home, arguing, inter alia, that the agents
obtained his consent to speak with them and search his home under the false
pretense that they were acting with the approval of the Governor of the Pueblo.
1
Count 4, which related to the illegal taking of a red-tailed hawk also found
on Aguilar’s property, was brought under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 703, 707(a).
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Aguilar also moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing the Eagle Protection Act
impermissibly burdened his religious practices in violation of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. The district
court denied both motions, and Aguilar now appeals.
III. Discussion
A. Motion to Suppress
When reviewing a Fourth Amendment challenge to a search by police, this
court “review[s] the district court’s factual findings for clear error, and the
ultimate reasonableness of the search de novo.” United States v. Pikyavit, 527
F.3d 1126, 1129 (10th Cir. 2008). In the course of this review, we view the facts
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below, in this case the
government. Id. at 1130. A finding is clearly erroneous only if it “is without
factual support in the record or if, after reviewing all the evidence, we are left
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” United States
v. Quaintance, 608 F.3d 717, 721 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted).
Aguilar argues his consent to the agents to enter his home and view the
eagle feathers was involuntary when considering the totality of the circumstances.
In particular, Aguilar argues the district court understated the significance of his
belief that the agents were acting under the authority of the Pueblo Governor,
whom, he argues, he was bound to obey according to Pueblo custom and tradition.
In response, the government argues Aguilar’s subjective beliefs are irrelevant to
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the issue of voluntariness of consent insofar as there is no indication the agents
were aware of or took advantage of them. The district court acknowledged there
is conflicting authority as to whether subjective facts about a defendant, unknown
to officers at the time consent to search is given, are relevant in determining
whether consent is voluntary. See United States v. Sims, 428 F.3d 945, 953 n.2
(10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Grap, 403 F.3d 439, 444 (7th Cir. 2005)
(discussing “the apparent difference between . . . approaches to voluntary consent
. . . stem[ming] from the weight to be accorded the evidence presented to a
reasonable officer asking for consent as opposed to some other facts, unknown to
the officer, but later argued to the reviewing court.”).
The district court nonetheless concluded the consent to search was valid
regardless of the extent to which Aguilar’s subjective state of mind informed the
analysis:
The Court concludes that if the voluntariness of Defendant’s consent
is measured by an objective standard limited to . . . what the special
agents knew or should have known about Defendant’s state of mind,
Defendant’s subjective concern that he might be acting contrary to
the Governor’s will if he declined to cooperate is irrelevant to the
voluntariness inquiry due to the absence of evidence that the special
agents knew or had reason to know of Defendant’s subjective state of
mind. Alternatively, the Court concludes that if Defendant’s
unexpressed subjective concern is part of the “totality of the
circumstances,” it should not be given significant weight, United
States v. Iribe, 11 F.3d 1553, 1557 (10th Cir. 1993), and that due to
the absence of evidence of coercion or duress on the part of the
special agents, Defendant’s subjective concern that a failure to
cooperate with the special agents might be viewed as disrespect for
the Governor is insufficient to render his consent involuntary.
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Order Den. Mot. to Suppress Evid. at 19 (footnote omitted). Elsewhere in its
order, the district court found that, if Aguilar believed the agents were acting at
the direction of the Governor, he would have felt obliged to cooperate with them.
The court also found, however, that at the time Aguilar agreed to meet with the
agents at the Sam’s Club, he was “unsure whether the investigation by the
USFWS had been instigated by the Governor or was being conducted with his
approval.” Id. at 14 (emphasis added). The district court arrived at this finding by
noting that, prior to the agents’ arrival, Aguilar had already spoken with the
Governor about his having killed eagles on tribal land. From this, the court found
it was possible Aguilar thought the Governor informed the USFWS about his
killing of eagles, but that it was equally likely Aguilar considered the matter to
have been resolved to the Governor’s satisfaction during their meeting.
Aguilar challenges these findings on several grounds. First, he argues the
district court disregarded the effect of the agents’ entry into the Pueblo’s main
village and Aguilar’s home on Aguilar’s state of mind. As a member of the
Pueblo, Aguilar would have understood Pueblo custom and law to prohibit such
entry unless the Governor had explicitly authorized it. Relatedly, Aguilar argues
the district court understated the significance of Aguilar’s concern that he was
bound to cooperate with the agents to meet his obligations to the Governor.
Aguilar also argues there were other coercive circumstances attendant to his
consent to search, including statements by the agents that it was in his best
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interest to tell the truth, his own impressions that he would not be prosecuted, and
the lack of evidence Aguilar was advised of his right to refuse consent to the
search. These arguments do not come close to demonstrating that the district
court’s contrary factual findings were clearly erroneous. “To be clearly
erroneous, a finding must be more than possibly or even probably wrong; the
error must be pellucid to any objective observer.” Quaintance, 608 F.3d at 721
(quotation omitted). Aguilar’s challenges to the district court’s factual findings
invite this court to reconsider and reweigh evidence already passed upon by the
district court. As such, they are insufficient to demonstrate clear error.
It is therefore unnecessary to decide the extent to which a defendant’s
subjective perceptions unknown to police officers are relevant in assessing the
voluntariness of a consent to search under the Fourth Amendment. Even
assuming the law is as Aguilar claims, he advances no persuasive argument
undermining the district court’s finding that his consent to search was voluntary
in light of the totality of the circumstances. The district court therefore correctly
denied his motion to suppress.
B. Motion to Dismiss
Appealing the denial of his motion to dismiss, Aguilar argues the Eagle
Protection Act impermissibly burdens his practice of religion in violation of
RFRA. The relevant provisions of RFRA provide:
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(a) In general
Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Exception
Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion
only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. 2 In United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 952–56 (10th
Cir. 2008), this court rejected a virtually identical argument by a similarly
situated defendant. We held that the Eagle Protection Act, and its attendant
permitting process which allows for the taking of live eagles for religious
purposes by members of federally recognized Indian tribes under certain
circumstances, was the least restrictive means of furthering compelling
governmental interests in protecting eagles and protecting the religion of federally
recognized Indian tribes. Id. at 956; see also United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d
2“In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997), the Supreme
Court held that RFRA could not be constitutionally applied to the states as an
exercise of Congress’ power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. RFRA can,
however, be constitutionally applied to the federal government, as an exercise of
Congress’ Article I, Section 8 powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause.”
United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1279 (10th Cir. 2011).
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1274, 1288 (10th Cir. 2011) (“We . . . evaluate the validity of the Eagle
[Protection] Act under RFRA with reference to two compelling governmental
interests: protecting bald and golden eagles, and fostering the culture and religion
of federally-recognized Indian tribes.”). Aguilar acknowledges his challenge to
the Eagle Protection Act is similar to the position which was rejected in Friday,
but asserts this court should reconsider the balancing of interests in light of the
delisting of the bald eagle from the endangered species list. See Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Removing the Bald Eagle in the Lower 48 States
From the List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,346,
37,372 (July 9, 2007); 50 C.F.R. 17.11(h). This argument is unpersuasive.
Contrary to Aguilar’s suggestions on appeal, the delisting of the bald eagle
occurred before Friday was decided. In fact, the court in Friday made reference
to the delisting in the course of its discussion. 525 F.3d at 954. Additionally, in
delisting the bald eagle, the USFWS specifically cited the Eagle Protection Act,
among other federal statutes, as providing the sufficient protections to ensure the
continued health of the eagle population. 72 Fed. Reg. at 37,353, 37,362–64.
Therefore, the delisting, standing alone, does not require this court to recalculate
the interests involved and means required to serve those interests in light of
Aguilar’s RFRA challenge. Because the delisting is the only changed
circumstance Aguilar points to as necessitating such a recalculation, the district
court correctly denied Aguilar’s motion to dismiss.
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IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the district court are affirmed.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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