United States v. Bickett

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 8 1998
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 97-3171
(D.C. No. 97-3182-RDR)
JOSEPH KEITH BICKETT, (D. Kan.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, LOGAN, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Defendant Joseph Keith Bickett appeals the district court’s order denying
his motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255. He contends that the sentence imposed in the underlying criminal case
should run concurrently with an earlier sentence imposed by a Kentucky federal
court. He asserts that his attorney provided constitutionally ineffective assistance
of counsel by failing to argue that he was entitled to the provisions of United
States Sentencing Guideline § 5G1.3 (1987). He claims the sentencing court
applied the 1989 version of § 5G1.3, and improperly imposed his Kansas sentence
to run consecutively to his Kentucky sentence. Defendant does not otherwise
challenge his conviction or sentence.
Defendant was convicted in federal court in Kentucky of the crimes
of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute over
100 kilograms of marijuana, aiding and abetting his co-conspirators to possess
with intent to distribute approximately 150 pounds of marijuana, being a felon in
possession of a firearm, and simple possession of cocaine. See United States v.
Bickett, Nos. 90-5710, 90-5711, 90-5712, 90-5726, 90-5760 & 90-5783, 1991 WL
175285, **2 (6th Cir. Sept. 10, 1991). He there received a 240 month
prison sentence.
Defendant was charged in federal court in Kansas with several counts of
conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute large quantities of marijuana,
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as well as one count charging violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3).
He entered a guilty plea to the Travel Act count; the prosecution dismissed the
remaining counts; and defendant was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment, to
run consecutively to his recently imposed Kentucky sentence. Our court
dismissed defendant’s appeal of that the sentence, which argued only that the
district court abused its discretion in running the sentences consecutively instead
of concurrently. See United States v. Bickett, No. 90-3214, 1991 WL 128217(10th Cir. July 3, 1991) (no jurisdiction to review for alleged abuse of discretion).
Defendant filed this § 2255 motion within the time limit imposed by the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, see United States v. Simmonds,
111 F.3d 737, 746 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[P]risoners whose convictions became final
on or before April 24, 1996 must file their § 2255 motions before April 24,
1997.”). This court issued a certificate of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1)(B).
The guideline defendant claims should have been applied, U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3
(1987), provided:
If at the time of sentencing, the defendant is already serving
one or more unexpired sentences, then the sentences for the instant
offense(s) shall run consecutively to such unexpired sentences,
unless one or more of the instant offenses(s) arose out of the same
transactions or occurrences as the unexpired sentences. In the latter
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case, such instant sentences and the unexpired sentences shall run
concurrently, except to the extent otherwise required by law.
Commentary
This section reflects the statutory presumption that sentences
imposed at different times ordinarily run consecutively. See
18 U.S.C. §3584(a). This presumption does not apply when the new
counts arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as a prior
conviction.
Departure would be warranted when independent prosecutions
produce anomalous results that circumvent or defeat the intent of the
guidelines.
(emphasis added).
The 1989 version of § 5G1.3, which defendant claims was erroneously
applied to him, provided:
If the instant offense was committed while the defendant was
serving a term of imprisonment . . ., the sentence for the instant
offense shall be imposed to run consecutively to the unexpired term
of imprisonment.
Commentary
...
Where the defendant is serving an unexpired term of
imprisonment, but did not commit the instant offense while serving
that term of imprisonment, the sentence for the instant offense may
be imposed to run consecutively or concurrently with the unexpired
term of imprisonment. The court may consider imposing a sentence
for the instant offense that results in a combined sentence that
approximates the total punishment that would have been imposed
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under § 5G1.2 (Sentencing on Multiple Counts of Conviction) had all
of the offenses been federal offenses for which sentences were being
imposed at the same time.
(emphasis added).
A sentencing court applies the guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing
unless that version imposes harsher punishment than the guidelines in effect at the
time of a defendant’s offense. See United States v. Saucedo, 950 F.2d 1508, 1513
(10th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds, Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S.
36 (1993). In that situation, the earlier version is applied to avoid violation of the
Ex Post Facto Clause. See id. Here, we agree with defendant that the 1987
version of U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 applies.
Issues that could have been raised on direct appeal may not be raised for
the first time in a § 2255 motion absent a showing of cause and prejudice. See
United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 392 (10th Cir. 1995). Constitutionally
ineffective assistance of counsel can satisfy the cause and prejudice requirement.
See id. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel generally should be brought
in collateral proceedings under § 2255. See United States v. Svacina, 137 F.3d
1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 1998). To establish that counsel provided ineffective
assistance, a defendant must establish both that his attorney’s representation was
deficient and that the substandard performance prejudiced him. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
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The presentence report informed the sentencing judge that defendant, with
a group of acquaintances from Kentucky, engaged in a scheme to grow and
harvest marijuana in several states, including seven counties in Kansas.
According to the report, after harvest, “at least some of the marijuana was
transported by truck to Kentucky.” II R. 12. Additional information was
disclosed to the sentencing judge, but not to defendant or his attorney, at the time
defendant was sentenced. The previously undisclosed information was quoted by
the district court in denying the § 2255 motion. The undisclosed presentence
report informed the sentencing judge that if the Kansas offense arose from the
same transactions or occurrences as the Kentucky offense, the Kansas sentence
shall be imposed concurrently, and offered arguments for imposing sentence
consecutively as well as concurrently to the Kentucky sentence.
Defendant contends his appellate counsel 1 provided constitutionally
ineffective assistance in his direct criminal appeal by failing to argue that the
1987 guideline required concurrent sentences. “When a defendant alleges his
appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise an issue on
appeal, we examine the merits of the omitted issue.” Cook, 45 F.3d at 392. Here,
even though the sentencing court may have been alerted to the correct guideline’s
1
The same attorney represented defendant at his sentencing hearing and on
direct appeal. New counsel appears in this § 2255 proceeding.
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requirement that the Kansas sentence run concurrently with the Kentucky sentence
if the two convictions arose from the same transactions or occurrences, the court
did not make any findings. Consequently, had the issue been raised properly there
would have had nothing on which the appellate court could base its review, and
the case would have been remanded for findings pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3
(1987). We therefore hold that defense counsel’s performance on direct appeal
was deficient under Strickland.
We are unable to evaluate whether defense counsel’s deficient performance
prejudiced defendant because a finding of whether the Kansas offense arose from
the same transactions or occurrences as the Kentucky offenses was not made
either at the sentencing hearing or on consideration of the § 2255 motion.
Therefore, we conclude that this matter should be remanded to the district court.
See United States v. Glover, 97 F.3d 1345, 1350 (10th Cir. 1996) (critical
findings not made at sentencing or on § 2255; remanded for findings); United
States v. Kissick, 69 F.3d 1048, 1057 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
1008 (1997) (same). On remand, the district court should determine whether the
Kansas offense arose from the same transactions or occurrences as the Kentucky
offenses. If the court finds that the offenses did not arise from the same
transactions or occurrences, then defendant suffered no prejudice from his
attorney’s failure to raise the issue, and he is not entitled to be resentenced.
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If, on the other hand, the court finds that the Kansas and Kentucky offenses
arose from the same transactions or occurrences, the court should determine
whether there are grounds for an upward departure from the guidelines, justifying
imposing the Kansas sentence consecutively to the Kentucky sentence. If the
court so finds, it is directed to make the necessary findings for an upward
departure. Cf. United States v. Shewmaker, 936 F.2d 1124, 1127-28 (10th Cir.
1991) (considering 1989 version of U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3; holding that where
guideline indicates the new sentence must run consecutively, sentencing court
may run new sentence concurrently if it determines that guideline departure is
appropriate). Defendant is entitled to resentencing if the district court finds that
the Kansas offense arose from the same transactions or occurrences as the
Kentucky offenses, and that no grounds exist for an upward departure from the
sentencing guidelines that would justify imposing the Kansas sentence
consecutively to the Kentucky sentence.
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this
order and judgment.
Entered for the Court
James K. Logan
Circuit Judge
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