Stewart v. Oklahoma Ex Rel. Oklahoma Office of Juvenile Affairs

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT September 25, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
ELIZABETH STEWART,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 14-6010
(D.C. No. 5:12-CV-01297-C)
STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. (W.D. Okla.)
OKLAHOMA OFFICE OF JUVENILE
AFFAIRS; GENE CHRISTIAN,
individually as former Executive Director
of the Oklahoma Office of Juvenile
Affairs,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before KELLY, PORFILIO, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
Elizabeth Stewart appeals from the district court’s entry of summary judgment
in defendants’ favor on claims relating to the termination of her employment.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I. Background
Stewart is African American. In 2004, she began working as the Division
Administrator for the Institutional Services Division of the Oklahoma Office of
Juvenile Affairs (OJA). She was responsible for overseeing several youth detention
facilities, and she received positive performance reviews. Over a two-month span in
2011, an assault resulting in a brain injury, a mini riot, and an escape occurred at one
of those facilities, the medium-security Central Oklahoma Juvenile Center (COJC).
Mike Moriarty, who is Caucasian, was COJC’s Superintendent. One day after the
last of those three events, defendant Gene Christian, a Caucasian who was then
OJA’s Executive Director, relieved Stewart and Moriarty of their duties. Christian
informed Stewart that she could resign or be fired, and a few weeks later told
Moriarty that he could resign, retire, or be fired. Ms. Stewart decided to resign to
avoid the stigma of being fired. Moriarty chose to retire.
Stewart then sued OJA and Christian, alleging that they discriminated against
her on the basis of race and sex when Christian ended her employment and
that Christian retaliated against her for complaining more than a year earlier about a
racial comment his assistant made. She also asserted a procedural due process claim
against Christian regarding his failure to provide her with a reason for relieving her
of her duties.1
1
Stewart raised her race and sex discrimination claims under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 (the latter invoking the
(continued)
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Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims, which the district
court granted. Applying the familiar burden-shifting paradigm of McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973), the court assumed Stewart’s
resignation amounted to a discharge and held that she established a prima facie case
of discrimination.2 The court then determined that defendants had provided
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for discharging her. Christian felt immediate
changes needed to be made in view of the three incidents at COJC over the
two-month period and the associated bad press OJA was getting. He was also
motivated by the fact that the incidents occurred at a time when OJA was trying to
end involvement by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), which had
obtained a three-year consent decree in federal court in 2008 concerning conditions
of confinement at another OJA facility, the maximum-security L.E. Rader Center
(Rader). Rader effectively closed shortly before the first of the three incidents at
COJC.
The court next concluded that Stewart failed to demonstrate that defendants’
reasons were a pretext for discriminatory intent. Stewart argued she was treated
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution).
She raised her retaliation claim against Christian under § 1981 and her due process
claim under § 1983. Stewart also asserted other claims, but in this appeal, she has
not taken issue with the district court’s disposition of them. We therefore do not
discuss them.
2
The same elements apply to disparate treatment claims under Title VII, § 1981,
and § 1983, all of which are subject to the McDonnell Douglas analysis. Drake v.
City of Fort Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 1162 (10th Cir. 1991).
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differently than Christian and his Chief of Staff, Gary Bolin, but the court determined
Christian and Bolin were not similarly situated to her because they had larger roles
within OJA than overseeing juvenile facilities. The court reasoned that Moriarty was
most similarly situated to Stewart, and Christian treated him the same as he had
treated Stewart. The court further distinguished former Rader superintendents, none
of whom were ever relieved of their duties despite significant issues there and
allegedly constant bad press, because Stewart had not shown similar incidents
occurred there within a two-month span and at a time when OJA was trying to
conclude the consent decree.
The court next addressed Stewart’s argument that Christian should have been
fired instead of her or Moriarty because, by closing Rader, he created the conditions
at COJC that led to the three incidents. The court concluded this was immaterial
because “[t]he relevant inquiry is not whether the employer’s proffered reasons were
wise, fair or correct, but whether it honestly believed those reasons and acted in good
faith upon those beliefs.” Rivera v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 365 F.3d 912, 924-25
(10th Cir. 2004) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). As Stewart had
conceded, at the time Christian relieved her of her duties, she thought it was because
of the bad press and was “a way for him to take care of it and show that he was doing
something,” Aplt. App. at 275, similar to the reasons Christian gave.
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The court also determined that no reasonable inference of discrimination by
Christian could be drawn from the racial comment his assistant had made,3 noting
that Christian was not present at the time it was made and that, after Stewart
informed him of the comment, he promptly instructed his assistant to apologize.
Finally, the court addressed Stewart’s reliance on another employee’s claims of
gender discrimination against Christian and OJA. The court observed that Christian
had apologized for a flippant comment he had made to the employee, Laura Broyles,4
and that Broyles’s equal-pay claim had been resolved in her favor. The court
concluded this evidence was insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact with regard
to pretext.
The district court next considered Stewart’s retaliation claim against Christian.
It granted summary judgment on that claim because her complaint about the racial
comment Christian’s assistant had made occurred more than a year before Christian
relieved Stewart of her duties, and there was no additional evidence to establish
causation.5
3
At an OJA Board of Directors retreat, Christian’s assistant told a story in
Stewart’s presence that when the assistant was a teenager, she and some friends
dressed up as Ku Klux Klan members for Halloween, with one person painting his
face black and wearing a noose around his neck.
4
Christian admitted he told Broyles that OJA’s budget issues might be resolved
if she slept with a state legislator.
5
The court also stated that Stewart failed to exhaust her administrative remedies
with respect to her retaliation claim against OJA under Title VII. To the extent she
stated such a claim, the district court lacked jurisdiction over it due to the failure to
(continued)
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Moving to the procedural due process claim against Christian, the district court
applied state law to determine whether Stewart had a property interest in her job.
See Ribeau v. Katt, 681 F.3d 1190, 1194 (10th Cir. 2012) (explaining that state law
governs that inquiry). Under Okla. Stat. tit. 74, § 840-5.1A(A), an unclassified
Oklahoma employee has no right or expectation of continued employment and,
consequently, no property interest in her job. The court pointed to Stewart’s
deposition testimony that she was an unclassified staff member and an at-will
employee, and it noted that her written job offer described the position in those
terms. The court also pointed out that, although Stewart’s position was not among a
list of those specifically identified by Okla. Stat. tit. 74, § 840-5.5 as unclassified,
another statutory provision (Okla. Stat. tit. 74, § 840-5.15) allows OJA to place an
additional forty-one employees into unclassified service. Accordingly, the court held
that Stewart lacked the property interest required to maintain a procedural due
process claim. See Ribeau, 681 F.3d at 1194 (property interest required for such a
claim).
II. Discussion
“We review the district court’s summary judgment order de novo, and apply
the same legal standards as the district court.” Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d
exhaust. See Eisenhour v. Weber Cnty., 744 F.3d 1220, 1226 (10th Cir. 2014). But
we fail to see such a claim in the controlling amended complaint, where the only
retaliation claim was against Christian and asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, not
Title VII. There is no exhaustion requirement for § 1981 claims. Aramburu v.
Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1410 n.9 (10th Cir. 1997).
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1111, 1122 (10th Cir. 2012). “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “When applying this
standard, we view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Doe, 667 F.3d at 1122 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Applying these standards, we agree in full with the district court’s analysis and
affirm its decision for substantially the reasons the court gave. This is not an
instance where “a claimed business judgment is so idiosyncratic or questionable that
a factfinder could reasonably find that it is a pretext for illegal discrimination.”
Beaird v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 145 F.3d 1159, 1169 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Reeves
v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000). (“[A]n employer [is]
entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the record conclusively revealed some
other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer’s decision, or if the plaintiff created
only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer’s reason was untrue and there
was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had
occurred.”). We will, however, briefly discuss a few specific points Stewart makes
about evidence the district court addressed, and we will discuss evidence the district
court did not address in its decision, the omission of which we deem harmless.
Stewart contends Christian fired Moriarty in order to cloak his true objective—
ridding himself of Stewart, whom he had inherited when he was appointed Executive
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Director of OJA in 2006. In support, she points to Moriarty’s testimony that on the
day after the third incident, Christian first asked Moriarty what assistance he needed
at COJC. Later that day, Christian told Moriarty it looked like he would be getting a
new division administrator, thus indicating Stewart was going to be fired. Moriarty
offered to resign, but Christian did not respond. Still later that day, Christian
relieved Moriarty of his duties and, several weeks later, offered him the choice to
resign, retire, or be fired. Stewart claims an inference of discrimination can be drawn
from this sequence. But any such inference is speculative, not reasonable.
Stewart also claims the district court erred in crediting Christian’s view that
the three incidents at COJC complicated OJA’s efforts to conclude the Rader consent
decree because two of the incidents occurred after the federal district court declined
the DOJ’s request to extend the decree to COJC after the Rader youths were
transferred there. But this argument is faulty because it rests on a slight
mischaracterization of Christian’s affidavit, where he expressed his concern that the
three incidents “would extend the DOJ involvement at a time when we were trying to
conclude it.” Aplt. App. at 421. It is evident that Christian’s concern was DOJ
involvement in any respect, not just under the consent decree. Moreover, the federal
case was not formally closed until more than a month after the third incident took
place. Hence, Christian’s concern was not inconsistent with the facts to the point
where a reasonable inference of discrimination could be drawn from it.
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Stewart notes that, several weeks after the first of the three incidents and
before the other two, Christian signed her performance review. The review, which
did not mention the incident, indicated she was meeting standards. She also points
out that, after the second event, Christian did not discuss them with her. We see
nothing of pretext in this since the proffered reason for relieving Stewart of her duties
was the cumulative effect of the three incidents.
Stewart complains the district court failed to address evidence that Christian
engaged in a pattern of personnel decisions that resulted in white males occupying a
number of positions, including Stewart’s; that he fired an upper-level female
employee early in his tenure as OJA’s Executive Director; and that since Stewart’s
firing, there are no black executive staff in the OJA. But this evidence exists in a
vacuum. There is no indication whether any black or female candidates applied for
the positions and there is no detail as to why Christian fired the upper-level female
employee. Hence, no reasonable inference of pretext can be drawn from this
evidence.
The district court also failed to discuss evidence that, sometime during his first
year as OJA’s Executive Director, Christian was present when OJA showed a video
depicting women sitting at a bar and appearing to wear either no pants or a thong, but
he did nothing. However, there is no evidence Christian had any role in the decision
to show this video, no further detail on his reaction to it, and no allegation that there
was any complaint about it such that he might have addressed it. Moreover, the
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incident occurred some four years before he relieved Stewart of her duties.
Therefore, it would be unreasonable to draw an inference that he was biased from his
mere presence and inaction. The same can be said of a skit OJA employees put on,
during the same time frame, in which they allegedly mocked someone with a thick
Indian accent.
Stewart further points to the fact that when Christian was a state district
attorney (apparently many years before his decision to end Stewart’s OJA
employment), he told a black female assistant district attorney “that she needed to
seek other employment, that being a prosecutor, being in the courtroom was probably
not her forte.” Aplt. App. at 615. Although that person is now a special district
judge in Oklahoma County, we fail to see how a reasonable inference of
discrimination can be drawn from Christian’s opinion that she may not have been a
good prosecutor.
Stewart points out an inconsistency between Christian’s sworn statement that
he told Chief of Staff Bolin he had discussed firing Stewart with OJA’s Board of
Directors and other testimony that he had not discussed it with the Board. We fail to
see how this inconsistency creates a reasonable inference of discriminatory animus.
Stewart also claims she was paid less than the state average for her level and
only slightly more than Moriarty despite having significantly more responsibilities
than him. But there is insufficient factual development to rule out any
nondiscriminatory basis for the pay differential, so no reasonable inference of
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discrimination can be drawn from the naked facts. Likewise, several other claims
Stewart makes are insufficiently developed to reasonably infer pretext: after
complaining about discrimination, she and Broyles were excluded from decisions
they should have been involved in; both Stewart and Broyles were “aware of
Christian’s lack of respect and value of women in the workplace,” Aplt. Opening Br.
at 40; and that Broyles thought Christian was unconcerned about racially equal
treatment of youth offenders held in OJA facilities.
III. Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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