Sanchez v. Bryant

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
TENTH CIRCUIT June 9, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
CARLOS G. SANCHEZ,
Petitioner-Appellant, No. 16-6027
v. (D.C. No. 5:15-CV-00079-R)
(W.D. Okla.)
JASON BRYANT, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
AND LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Before LUCERO, MATHESON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
Mr. Carlos Sanchez, an Oklahoma prisoner, sought a writ of habeas
corpus in U.S. District Court. Unsuccessful, he wants to appeal. To do so,
however, he needs a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A)
(2012). The district court denied the certificate, and Mr. Sanchez asks us
for one. We deny his request.
Procedural History
In state court, Mr. Sanchez was convicted of (1) aggravated
trafficking in illegal drugs and (2) possession of a firearm while
committing a felony. For these crimes, Mr. Sanchez was sentenced to
concurrent prison terms of 30 years and 2 years. The Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed, prompting Mr. Sanchez to seek habeas relief in
federal district court below. The magistrate judge recommended denial of
the habeas petition, and the district judge adopted the recommendation.
Mr. Sanchez requests (1) a certificate of appealability so that he can appeal
the denial of habeas relief and (2) leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
Standard for Certificate of Appealability
To obtain a certificate of appealability, Mr. Sanchez must make “a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2) (2012). Mr. Sanchez can meet this standard “by demonstrating
that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of
his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented
are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003).
When a claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state court, a
federal district court can grant habeas relief only if the applicant
establishes that the state-court decision
 was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States” or
 “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”
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28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1)-(2) (2012). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal
[district] court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion
opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] or . . . decides a case
differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000).
Under the “unreasonable application” clause, the federal district court may
grant the writ only if “the state court’s application of clearly established
federal law was objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409.
Issue One: Bias of the U.S. Magistrate Judge
Mr. Sanchez contends that in the habeas proceedings, the magistrate
judge showed bias in his report and recommendation by providing a one-
sided statement of facts. This contention is not reasonably debatable.
A certificate of appealability on Mr. Sanchez’s claim of bias is
appropriate only if reasonable jurists could find that the magistrate judge’s
statement of facts demonstrated judicial bias “so extreme as to display
clear inability to render fair judgment.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S.
540, 551 (1994).
Mr. Sanchez has not satisfied this burden for two reasons: (1) He did
not show actual bias on the part of the magistrate judge, and (2) the district
judge independently considered the magistrate judge’s recommended
conclusions.
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First, Mr. Sanchez did not show that the magistrate judge was biased.
According to Mr. Sanchez, the magistrate judge’s statement of facts
omitted exculpatory facts and drew unfair factual inferences. These
omissions and unfair inferences, Mr. Sanchez argues, establish the
magistrate judge’s actual bias. We disagree, for the putative omissions and
inferences would not lead any reasonable jurist to question the magistrate
judge’s neutrality.
Second, the magistrate judge did not actually rule on the habeas
petition. Instead, the magistrate judge simply recommended rulings to the
district judge, who made his own decision on how to rule. In making this
decision, the district judge exercised de novo review, meaning that he did
not defer to the magistrate judge. See Northington v. Marin, 102 F.3d
1564, 1570 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating the standard for a district judge’s
review of magistrate judges’ recommended rulings). As a result, even if the
magistrate judge had been biased, no reasonable jurist could have found
prejudice.
For both reasons, we deny a certificate of appealability on Mr.
Sanchez’s allegation of bias on the part of the magistrate judge.
Issue Two: Application of Stone v. Powell
State officers found drugs in Mr. Sanchez’s car after making a traffic
stop and searching the car. Mr. Sanchez contends that the stop and search
violated the Fourth Amendment because (1) the officers lacked probable
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cause for the stop and (2) the officers extended the stop longer than
necessary to effectuate the stop’s purpose. Based on these alleged
violations of the Fourth Amendment, Mr. Sanchez contends that the state
trial court should have excluded the evidence found in the car. On habeas
review, the federal district court declined to consider these claims, relying
on Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
In Stone, the U.S. Supreme Court held that federal habeas relief
cannot be granted based on a Fourth Amendment violation if the state
prisoner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the Fourth Amendment
claim in state court. Stone, 428 U.S. at 494. Mr. Sanchez argues that the
state appellate court failed to provide a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issue by issuing an irrational decision.
A full and fair opportunity to litigate a claim “includes, but is not
limited to, the procedural opportunity to raise or otherwise present a
Fourth Amendment claim.” Gamble v. Oklahoma, 583 F.2d 1161, 1165
(10th Cir. 1978). A Fourth Amendment claim has not been fully and fairly
heard, however, when “the state court willfully refuses to apply the correct
and controlling constitutional standards.” Id.
In state court, Mr. Sanchez raised the Fourth Amendment claims in a
motion to suppress and in an appeal to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals. According to Mr. Sanchez, the state appellate court failed to
sufficiently address the Fourth Amendment claims. We disagree with this
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assessment of the state appellate opinion. In our view, any reasonable
jurist would interpret the state appellate opinion as a rejection of Mr.
Sanchez’s constitutional claims.
The state appellate court had to consider the validity of the traffic
stop because it affected the constitutionality of the resulting search. See
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (“As a general matter,
the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have
probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”). The state
appellate court ultimately concluded that the trial court had not erred in
determining that the stop was permissible. Sanchez v. Oklahoma, Case No.
F-2013-1128 (Okla. Crim. App. Dec. 15, 2014) (unpublished).
The state appellate court then addressed “the scope and duration of
the seizure.” Id. In doing so, the court held that the stop had not taken
more time than needed to carry out the purpose of the stop. Id.
Any reasonable jurist would conclude that Mr. Sanchez had full and
fair opportunities in the state trial and appellate courts to litigate his
Fourth Amendment claims. As a result, habeas relief is unavailable under
Stone v. Powell, requiring denial of a certificate of appealability on the
Fourth Amendment claims.
Issue Three: Admission of Prejudicial Evidence
Mr. Sanchez also alleges a deprivation of due process when the trial
court allowed prejudicial testimony by a law enforcement officer. The
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challenged testimony included the officer’s statements that (1) Mr.
Sanchez had been travelling on an interstate that constituted a “drug
corridor” for traffickers, (2) Mr. Sanchez’s body language during the
traffic stop had indicated deception, and (3) drug traffickers often use
older persons, like Mr. Sanchez, as drug couriers.
The federal district court could grant habeas relief only if the state
trial court’s evidentiary rulings had “rendered the trial so fundamentally
unfair that a denial of constitutional rights result[ed].” Mayes v. Gibson,
210 F.3d 1284, 1293 (10th Cir. 2000). Federal courts must “approach such
[fundamental-fairness] analysis with considerable self-restraint,” reversing
state-court rulings only in “‘the most serious cases, which truly shock the
conscience as well as the mind.’” United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462,
1477 (1990) (quoting United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876, 880 (9th Cir.
1980) (en banc)).
In our view, no reasonable jurist could find that the state trial court
had violated Mr. Sanchez’s right to due process by allowing the officer’s
testimony. Thus, Mr. Sanchez is not entitled to a certificate of
appealability on this issue.
Issue Four: Discovery Violation
Mr. Sanchez claims that the State committed a discovery violation
under Oklahoma law by failing to disclose one of his prior arrests before
using that arrest at trial. This discovery violation, Mr. Sanchez contends,
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also constitutes a denial of his right to due process under the U.S.
Constitution. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected this
argument on direct appeal, concluding that the State had not committed a
discovery violation.
We can assume, without deciding, that the State committed a
discovery violation. But the alleged discovery violation would result in a
denial of due process only if the nondisclosure rendered the trial
fundamentally unfair. See Mayes v. Gibson, 210 F.3d 1284, 1293 (10th Cir.
2000). If Mr. Sanchez were allowed to appeal, our court would decide the
appeal based on “the entire proceedings, including the strength of the
evidence against the petitioner.” Le v. Mullin, 311 F.3d 1002, 1013 (10th
Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
As the district court noted, the evidence against Mr. Sanchez was
substantial. He was found travelling from California to Arkansas in a
rental car containing a significant supply of drugs hidden inside the car
door. Mr. Sanchez had not only the drugs but also the tools within his
reach needed to retrieve the drugs. In light of this evidence, the fairness of
the trial is not subject to reasonable debate. Thus, we conclude that Mr.
Sanchez is not entitled to a certificate of appealability on this issue.
Issue Five: Prosecutorial Misconduct
Mr. Sanchez alleges that the prosecutor’s closing argument violated
the constitutional right to a fair trial by (1) inserting impermissible
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personal opinion and facts not in evidence, (2) mocking the defense theory,
and (3) shifting the burden of proof to Mr. Sanchez.
I. The Due Process Standard
Mr. Sanchez’s first two claims of prosecutorial misconduct implicate
a general right to due process. Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are
ordinarily considered under the fundamental-fairness standard. Torres v.
Mullin, 317 F.3d 1145, 1159 (10th Cir. 2003). When applying this
standard, we consider the prosecutor’s comments in the context of the
proceeding as a whole. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). In
doing so, we examine the strength of the evidence against the defendant
and the cautionary steps taken by the court to counteract any improper
remarks. Le v. Mullin, 311 F.3d 1002, 1013 (10th Cir. 2002). In addition,
we exercise caution when interpreting offending comments, for “a court
should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to
have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy
exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging
interpretations.” Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647 (1974).
II. Insertion of Personal Opinions and References to Facts Not in
Evidence
If Mr. Sanchez were allowed to appeal, our court would consider
whether the jury might “reasonably believe that the prosecutor [was]
indicating a personal belief in the witness’ credibility, either through
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explicit personal assurances of the witness’ veracity or by implicitly
indicating that information not presented to the jury supports the witness’
testimony.” United States v. Bowie, 892 F.2d 1494, 1498 (10th Cir. 1990).
Where the prosecutor does not personally vouch for a witness in this way,
his statements constitute permissible “fair comment” on the evidence.
United States v. Hartsfield, 976 F.2d 1349, 1354-55 (10th Cir. 1992). If the
prosecutor’s comments are improper, we decide whether the improper
conduct resulted in a denial of due process. United States v. Kravchuk, 335
F.3d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir. 2003).
Mr. Sanchez points to the prosecutor’s statements during closing
arguments regarding the value of methamphetamine and the usual routes
for drug smuggling operations, characterizing these statements as personal
opinions. In addition, Mr. Sanchez contends that there was no evidence to
support the prosecutor’s statements regarding forfeiture procedures in drug
cases and the cost of a rental car.
The statement regarding drug-smuggling routes does not indicate
personal belief in the truth of any testimony. The prosecutor made one
statement, however, that could reasonably be interpreted as an indication
of personal agreement with the veracity of a witness’s testimony:
450 grams to a pound. That’s $45,000 a pound. If only two of
those are methamphetamine, that’s almost $100,000. If all ten
of them are methamphetamine, it’s closer to half a million.
Now, you know which I think of those is the truth. You can
decide what you think.
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TR Vol. III, at 28 (emphasis added). Although this comment might
have been improper, it did not taint the outcome and no reasonable
jurist could question the fundamental fairness of the trial. As a
result, Mr. Sanchez is not entitled to a certificate of appealability on
this issue.
III. Mocking the Defense Theory
At trial, the prosecutor said that it would have been a “wild
coincidence” if the defendant had not knowingly possessed the drugs found
in his rental car. Id. at 30.
According to Mr. Sanchez, this statement involved mockery of his
defense. In our view, all reasonable jurists would reject this contention, for
the prosecutor’s remark involved a fair comment on the evidence. See
Hooper v. Mullin, 314 F.3d 1162, 1172-73 (10th Cir. 2002).
IV. Shifting the Burden of Proof
In closing argument, the prosecutor noted the lack of evidence to
substantiate Mr. Sanchez’s defense theory. According to Mr. Sanchez, this
statement constituted an effort to shift the burden of proof.
It is true that a defendant cannot be required to prove his innocence.
See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703 (1975); Torres v. Mullin, 371
F.3d 1145, 1158 (10th Cir. 2003). But the prosecutor’s comment did not
effectively deny Mr. Sanchez the presumption of innocence.
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In closing argument, the prosecutor acknowledged the State’s burden
of proving every element, but contended that the evidence showed guilt. In
these circumstances, no jurist could reasonably credit Mr. Sanchez’s
characterization of the prosecutor’s closing argument.
* * *
Reasonable jurists could not debate the district court’s rejection of
the habeas claims involving the prosecutor’s closing arguments. Thus, Mr.
Sanchez is not entitled to a certificate of appealability on this issue.
Issues Six and Seven: Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his sixth and seventh issues, Mr. Sanchez argues that the State
presented insufficient evidence for a conviction. In issue six, Mr. Sanchez
asserts that there was no evidence of his possession of drugs in the rental
car. In issue seven, Mr. Sanchez argues that because there was insufficient
evidence of drug trafficking, there was also insufficient evidence of
possession of a firearm while committing a felony.
“A challenge to a state conviction brought on the ground that the
evidence cannot fairly be deemed sufficient to have established guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt states a federal constitutional claim.” Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 322 (1979). Challenges to the sufficiency of
evidence to support a conviction are decided under a highly deferential
standard. Id. at 319. The question is “whether, after viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
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could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id. (emphasis in original). We presume the correctness of the
factual findings by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals unless Mr.
Sanchez rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing
evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2012).
To demonstrate possession of drugs, the State needed to present
evidence that Mr. Sanchez had “knowingly [held] the power and ability to
exercise dominion and control over [the drugs].” United States v. Massey,
687 F.2d 1348, 1354 (10th Cir. 1982).
At trial, the State presented evidence that
 illegal drugs had been stowed inside the rear door of the rental
car and
 Mr. Sanchez had tools inside the car that would allow him to
open the door panels to access the drugs.
From this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that Mr. Sanchez had
possession of the drugs. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient for a
conviction on drug trafficking.
Because there was sufficient evidence to support the drug
conviction, all reasonable jurists would reject Mr. Sanchez’s challenge to
the sufficiency of evidence on the gun charge. Thus, Mr. Sanchez is not
entitled to a certificate of appealability on issues six and seven.
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Issue Eight: Proportionality of the Sentence
for Aggravated Drug Trafficking
Mr. Sanchez contends that his 30-year sentence for aggravated drug
trafficking is grossly disproportionate to his crimes. The district court
rejected this contention, and this disposition is not reasonably debatable.
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right under
the Eighth Amendment to proportionality between the sentence and the
crime. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003). The constitutional right
to proportionality is “narrow,” forbidding “only extreme sentences that are
grossly disproportionate to the crime.” United States v. Williams, 576 F.3d
1149, 1165 (10th Cir. 2009); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77
(2003) (“The gross disproportionality principle reserves a constitutional
violation for only the extraordinary case.”).
The state appeals court concluded that Mr. Sanchez’s sentence was
“within the range of punishment provided by law.” Sanchez v. Oklahoma,
Case No. F-2013-1128 (Okla. Crim. App. Dec. 15, 2014) (unpublished).
That conclusion was consistent with Supreme Court precedent. In Harmelin
v. Michigan, the Supreme Court upheld a life sentence, without the
possibility of parole, for possession of 650 grams or more of cocaine.
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961, 996 (1991). And in Hutto v.
Davis, the Supreme Court upheld a 40-year sentence for possession with
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intent to distribute and distribution of only 9 ounces of marijuana. 454
U.S. 370, 370, 375 (1982) (per curiam).
In light of these holdings, the state appeals court could reasonably
have determined that Mr. Sanchez’s sentence was constitutional. Mr.
Sanchez was caught while transporting distributable quantities of
methamphetamine, and drug trafficking is widely recognized as a
particularly serious crime. E.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1002
(1991); United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738, 751-52 (10th Cir. 2006).
As a result, no reasonable jurist could conclude that Mr. Sanchez’s 30-year
sentence was grossly disproportionate to his conviction for aggravated
drug trafficking.
Issue Nine: Cumulative Error
Finally, Mr. Sanchez relies on the cumulation of constitutional
violations that may otherwise be harmless. Because we conclude that no
reasonable jurist would find any constitutional errors, we conclude that
Mr. Sanchez is not entitled to a certificate of appealability on this issue.
See United States v. Gonzalez, 596 F.3d 1228, 1244 (10th Cir. 2010)
(denying a certificate of appealability on a claim of cumulative error
because our court had found no merit to any of the other claims).
Disposition
We deny Mr. Sanchez’s request for a certificate of appealability and
dismiss the appeal.
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Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis
The district court denied Mr. Sanchez leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, certifying that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) (2012). Mr. Sanchez asks us to grant leave to proceed
in forma pauperis. We decline to do so, for we agree with the district court
that the appeal is not taken in good faith because all of the appeal points
are frivolous. See Rolland v. PrimeSource Staffing, LLC, 497 F.3d 1077,
1078 (10th Cir. 2007) (denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis based
on our conclusion that the appeal had not been taken in good faith).
Entered for the Court
Robert E. Bacharach
Circuit Judge
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