United States v. Jones

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
July 25, 2013
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 12-3261
v.
(D.C. No. 6:11-CR-10131-MLB-1)
(D. Kan.)
JASON JONES, a/k/a Peek-A-Boo,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, GORSUCH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Jason Jones entered a guilty plea, without a plea
agreement, to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). Mr. Jones’s Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) noted that his
criminal history included four prior burglary convictions. Three of the
convictions were for burglaries Mr. Jones committed when he was seventeen
years old. Based on these convictions, the PSR stated that Mr. Jones was subject
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth
Circuit Rule 32.1.
to an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (the “ACCA”), 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), warranting a base offense level of thirty-three under the
United States Sentencing Guidelines (“the Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”) § 4B1.4 1
and a mandatory minimum fifteen-year sentence. Prior to being sentenced, Mr.
Jones lodged multiple objections to the application of the ACCA’s fifteen-year
mandatory minimum to his case, all of which were rejected by the district court
during Mr. Jones’s sentencing hearing. The district court sentenced Mr. Jones to
a term of 180 months’ imprisonment to be followed by a term of five years’
supervised release. On appeal, Mr. Jones raises the same issues he raised before
the district court. Exercising our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I
In November 2010, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (“ATF”) began conducting an undercover storefront operation in
Wichita, Kansas. The purpose of the operation “was for undercover ATF agents
to purchase and/or trade controlled substances, firearms, and stolen property from
various individuals in the Wichita, Kansas area.” R., Vol. 2, at 7 (PSR, filed July
24, 2012). On May 7, 2011, Mr. Jones entered the undercover storefront and sold
a Browning 12-gauge shotgun to undercover ATF agents. During the transaction,
Mr. Jones indicated that he had access to other firearms. After the sale, agents
1
In preparing the PSR, the U.S. Probation Office relied on the 2011 edition
of the Guidelines. We do the same.
2
traced the shotgun to its purchaser, who informed the agents that the shotgun had
been stolen from his home during a burglary that occurred on August 12, 2009.
Mr. Jones had previously been convicted of this burglary. Mr. Jones was
subsequently arrested on September 21, 2011.
On May 14, 2012, Mr. Jones pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to
being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
The PSR revealed that Mr. Jones’s criminal history included four prior burglary
convictions: (1) a 1999 conviction for second degree burglary in Springfield,
Missouri; (2) a 2000 conviction for second degree burglary in Springfield,
Missouri; (3) another 2000 conviction for second degree burglary in Springfield,
Missouri; and (4) a 2009 conviction for burglary in Wichita, Kansas. Based on
these prior convictions, Mr. Jones qualified as an Armed Career Criminal within
the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4 and 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), warranting a base
offense level of thirty-three under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4 and a mandatory minimum
fifteen-year sentence.
Mr. Jones’s base offense level was reduced to thirty due to his acceptance
of responsibility. This offense level, combined with Mr. Jones’s criminal history
category of V, resulted in an advisory Guidelines sentencing range of 151 to 188
months’ imprisonment. However, because Mr. Jones was deemed an Armed
Career Criminal subject to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)’s mandatory fifteen-year minimum
sentence, the PSR determined his Guidelines range to be 180 to 188 months’
3
imprisonment.
Prior to being sentenced, Mr. Jones filed a Sentencing Memorandum, along
with numerous supplemental memoranda, in which he raised each of the claims
that are before us on appeal. Mr. Jones urged the district court to disregard the
ACCA and sentence him to a term of sixty-three months’ imprisonment based
solely on the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The district court
rejected each of Mr. Jones’s objections, and held that Mr. Jones was subject to the
mandatory minimum sentence under the ACCA. Accordingly, on September 24,
2012, the district court sentenced Mr. Jones to a term of 180 months’
imprisonment to be followed by a term of five years’ supervised release. Mr.
Jones timely appealed.
II
Where a defendant “adequately objects to the introduction of a prior
conviction because . . . the defendant was pardoned or has had civil rights
restored, we will review de novo the district court’s legal decision as to the
admissibility of such prior conviction and we will review the court’s underlying
factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Flower, 29 F.3d 530, 536 (10th
Cir. 1994) (applying this standard in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)).
“We review a sentence enhancement imposed under the ACCA de novo.”
United States v. Delossantos, 680 F.3d 1217, 1219 (10th Cir. 2012); see United
States v. Tisdale, 921 F.2d 1095, 1098 (10th Cir. 1990) (“We will review de novo
4
the trial court’s interpretation and application of the ACCA.”). Whether a
defendant’s “juvenile adjudication qualifies as a violent felony conviction under
the ACCA is a legal question that we review de novo.” United States v.
Washington, 706 F.3d 1215, 1217 (10th Cir. 2012). Similarly, “[w]e review
constitutional challenges to a sentence de novo,” United States v. Angelos, 433
F.3d 738, 754 (10th Cir. 2006), including whether a criminal sentence violates the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, see
United States v. Yeley-Davis, 632 F.3d 673, 682 (10th Cir. 2011).
We turn first to Mr. Jones’s argument that the restoration of his civil rights
as to his three prior burglary convictions was sufficient to trigger operation of 18
U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), which excludes convictions “for which a person has been
pardoned or has had civil rights restored.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). We then turn
to Mr. Jones’s remaining arguments, none of which are successful. Most are
squarely foreclosed by controlling precedent; the rest are otherwise wholly
without merit.
A
Mr. Jones argues that his three prior burglary convictions “should not count
as convictions under § 921(a)(20) because [he] ‘has had civil rights restored’ as to
those convictions.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 10. The ACCA enhances a sentence to a
fifteen-year mandatory minimum for a felon convicted of possession of a firearm
with “three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug
5
offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). However, “[a]ny conviction . . . for which a
person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be considered
a conviction for purposes of this chapter.” Id. § 921(a)(20) (emphasis added).
Mr. Jones was discharged from his sentence for the three Missouri burglary
convictions in 2005, at which time his rights to vote and hold office were
automatically restored under Missouri law. Based on this discharge and
restoration of rights, Mr. Jones argues that his “three burglaries should not count
as convictions under § 921(a)(20) because [he] has had civil rights restored as to
those convictions.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Jones concedes that not all of his civil rights were restored upon his
2005 discharge. Notably, his right to sit on a jury was not restored. However,
Mr. Jones argues that the restoration of his rights to vote and hold office were
sufficient to render his three Missouri burglary convictions non-qualifying
predicate convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).
“[W]e look to the whole of state law, rather than only at a certificate of
restoration of civil rights upon release from parole or imprisonment, in
determining whether a defendant’s civil rights have been restored.” United States
v. Hoyle, 697 F.3d 1158, 1166 (10th Cir. 2012). Under § 921(a)(20), Missouri
law applies. See 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20) (“What constitutes a conviction of such a
crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which
the proceedings were held.”). The Eighth Circuit, which is arguably the circuit in
6
the best position to decide issues of Missouri law, rejected a claim analogous to
that made by Mr. Jones in United States v. Akens, 602 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 2010).
Specifically, the Eighth Circuit in Akens held that Missouri’s restoration of the
defendant’s right to vote and hold office was insufficient to qualify as a
restoration of civil rights under § 921(a)(20):
Missouri automatically restores some civil rights, such as voting
(upon release from confinement) and holding office (upon
completion of sentence). See Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 561.016,
561.026(1), 561.021.2. However, felons may not serve as jurors,
sheriffs, highway patrol officers, state fire investigators or
employees, state lottery licensees or employees, or manage,
conduct or operate bingo games. See Mo. Rev. Stat.
§§ 494.425(4), 540.045(1), 561.026(3), 57.010.1, 43.060.1,
320.210, 313.245, 313.255.6(2), 313.035.1(1); Mo. Const. Art.
III, § 39(a)(3)(e). Moreover, felons face statutory hurdles to
being licensed in many occupations and professions.
Because Missouri withholds substantial civil rights, [the
defendant] has not been restored to sufficient civil rights in order
to invoke section 921(a)(20).
602 F.3d at 908 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting United States v.
Brown, 408 F.3d 1016, 1017 (8th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under the reasoning in Akens, the restoration of Mr. Jones’s rights to vote
and hold public office did not sufficiently restore his civil rights in order to
invoke § 921(a)(20). This is consistent with our own case law. Specifically, “we
have held that the rights to vote, serve on a jury, and hold public office, as well
as the right to possess firearms, must all be restored under § 921(a)(20) before a
prior conviction may be excluded on the basis of restoration of civil rights.”
7
Flower, 29 F.3d at 536; see also id. (“The acknowledgment that [the defendant]
has not had restored his right to sit on a jury is an acknowledgment that his civil
rights have not adequately been restored to disqualify the use of those convictions
as predicate convictions for the § 922(g)(1) charge.”); United States v. Maines, 20
F.3d 1102, 1104 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that “in order for a conviction to fall
outside the scope of § 924(e)(1) enhancement” there must be a restoration of the
following civil rights: (1) the right to vote, (2) the right to seek and hold public
office, (3) the right to serve on a jury, and (4) the right to possess firearms). As
noted, Mr. Jones’s right to serve on a jury was not restored. Thus, consistent with
these holdings, we conclude that Mr. Jones’s civil rights were not sufficiently
restored to invoke § 921(a)(20), and therefore his convictions qualified as
predicate felonies for purposes of applying the provisions of the ACCA.
B
We turn now to Mr. Jones’s remaining arguments. Mr. Jones raises seven
additional challenges to his sentence, all of which were raised before the district
court. Specifically, Mr. Jones asserts the following: (1) his three burglary
convictions were part of a common episode and should not be treated as different
from one another under the ACCA; (2) Missouri law establishing the age of
adulthood at seventeen for criminal law purposes violates the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses; (3) a fifteen-year sentence based upon an act committed
by a juvenile constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
8
Amendment; (4) the ACCA unconstitutionally infringes on the district court’s
sentencing power by limiting its authority to apply the sentencing factors under
18 U.S.C. § 3553; (5) a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen-years’
imprisonment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because it is grossly
disproportionate; (6) Mr. Jones is entitled to a jury finding as to the elements of
the ACCA under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments; and (7) the ACCA and
inherent charging power violate the separation of powers doctrine. Because we
conclude that these arguments are either squarely foreclosed by controlling
precedent or otherwise patently meritless, we may resolve the remainder of this
appeal in relatively short order.
Mr. Jones first argues that his three burglaries were part of a common
episode and should not be treated as different from one another under the ACCA. 1
We reject this argument. Specifically, our case law makes clear that where, as
here, a defendant burglarizes different businesses on different dates, the
burglaries are committed on “occasions different from one another” for purposes
of applying 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) and the ACCA. Tisdale, 921 F.2d at 1098–99
(finding that three burglaries that occurred on the same night, in the same mall,
and were prosecuted together, constituted three “separate criminal episode[s]” for
purposes of the ACCA); see United States v. Michel, 446 F.3d 1122, 1133–35
1
In order for a defendant to be subject to the fifteen-year mandatory
minimum under the ACCA, he must have three prior convictions of violent felonies
“committed on occasions different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
9
(10th Cir. 2006) (finding three separate criminal episodes even though the
defendant committed all of the offenses in the same night); see also United States
v. Riggs, 302 F. App’x 805, 810 (10th Cir. 2008) (rejecting defendant’s argument
that a “robbery spree” was a single criminal episode under the ACCA where the
second robbery was committed two days after the first robbery (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Mr. Jones next argues that Missouri’s law establishing the age of adulthood
at age seventeen for criminal law purposes violates the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Constitution. As Mr. Jones himself concedes, this
argument is foreclosed by circuit precedent. See United States v. Johnson, 630
F.3d 970, 976 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that under the definition of conviction in
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), the court must defer to Missouri law’s definition of
juvenile and treat defendant’s convictions at age seventeen as qualifying predicate
felony offenses under the ACCA); see also United States v. Cole-Jackson, 414 F.
App’x 108, 111 (10th Cir. 2011) (“The conclusion in Johnson that the ACCA
embraces prior felony convictions in which the defendant was treated as an adult,
even if the defendant was a juvenile at the time of the commission of the crime, is
binding on this panel and fully resolves [the defendant’s] arguments on appeal.”).
Accordingly, we need not address this argument further.
Mr. Jones similarly concedes that his third argument—that a fifteen-year
sentence based upon an act of juvenile delinquency is cruel and unusual
10
punishment under the Eight Amendment—has been “addressed by the Tenth
Circuit and rejected.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 18. The case Mr. Jones cites in
recognition of this proposition—Cole-Jackson—is, in fact, unpublished and
therefore not binding on this panel. See Cole-Jackson, 414 F. App’x at 111
(rejecting a virtually identical Eighth Amendment challenge where the defendant
was sentenced to a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence under the ACCA
where the defendant had committed one of the qualifying predicate offenses when
he was a juvenile). That being said, we agree with the panel’s reasoning in Cole-
Jackson and its recognition that “other courts have uniformly rejected the notion
that use of an adult conviction . . . in reaching a sentencing determination
implicates the Eighth Amendment.” Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Graham, 622
F.3d 445, 461–64 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that mandatory life sentence for
conspiracy to distribute cocaine did not violate the Eighth Amendment even
though one of the defendant’s predicate felony drug convictions was committed
when he was a juvenile); United States v. Jones, 574 F.3d 546, 553 (8th Cir.
2009) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment does not prohibit using an adult conviction
based on juvenile conduct to increase a sentence under the ACCA.”); United
States v. Salahuddin, 509 F.3d 858, 863–64 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Eighth
Amendment does not prohibit using a conviction based on juvenile conduct to
increase a sentence under the armed career criminal provisions.”). For these
11
reasons, we reject Mr. Jones’s argument.
In his next argument, Mr. Jones contends that the ACCA
“unconstitutionally infringe[s] on the [district court’s] sentencing power” by
limiting the court’s authority to apply the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553. 2 Aplt. Opening Br. at 18. This argument is unpersuasive. Specifically,
in United States v. Hatch, 925 F.2d 362 (10th Cir. 1991), we rejected the
argument that a mandatory minimum sentence violated the defendant’s
constitutional rights by removing the judge’s sentencing discretion. See 925 F.2d
at 363. As we noted in Hatch, “[t]he Supreme Court has clearly indicated that a
mandatory minimum sentence which dictates the precise weight a particular factor
must be given is not unconstitutional.” Id.; see also Riggs, 302 F. App’x at 812
(applying the reasoning from Hatch to a mandatory minimum sentence imposed
under § 924(e)).
Moreover, contrary to Mr. Jones’s suggestions, there is no conflict between
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)’s mandatory minimum. Section
3553(a) must be viewed in light of another provision of the statute, § 3553(e).
2
To the extent that Mr. Jones argues he is entitled to an individualized
sentence, we disagree. Our case law makes clear that “there is no constitutional right to
an individualized sentence.” Straley v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 582 F.3d 1208, 1213 (10th
Cir. 2009); United States v. Horn, 946 F.2d 738, 746 (10th Cir. 1991) (“We have rejected
the notion that a defendant has a due process right to a discretionary, individualized
sentence in a noncapital case . . . .”).
12
That provision tacitly recognizes the generally binding operation of mandatory
minimum sentencing schemes, such as found in § 924(e), by electing to provide
limited power to district courts to sentence below mandatory minimums only “so
as to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance in the investigation or
prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(e); see United States v. A.B., 529 F.3d 1275, 1281–82 (10th Cir. 2008)
(agreeing that the district court’s authority to reduce a mandatory minimum
sentence was limited to consideration of substantial assistance factors under
§ 3553(e) and that the district court was not permitted to “reduce the sentence
further based on factors, other than assistance, set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)”
(quoting United States v. Williams, 474 F.3d 1130, 1130 (8th Cir. 2007)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Huskey, 502 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th
Cir. 2007) (rejecting claim that § 3553(a) conflicted with statute imposing
mandatory minimum sentence because “[s]ection 3553(a) simply does not apply
to mandatory sentences”).
Finally, we reject Mr. Jones’s implication that the Supreme Court’s
decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), confers discretion upon
a district court to disregard either § 3553(e) or the ACCA’s mandatory minimum.
As we have previously made clear, Booker does not affect statutory mandatory
minimum sentences. See A.B., 529 F.3d at 1281–83 (agreeing that Booker does
13
not expand the authority of the district court to sentence a defendant below a
statutory minimum). For these reasons, we reject Mr. Jones’s argument.
Mr. Jones next argues that his mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen-
years’ imprisonment is “unjust and cruel” because it is grossly disproportionate to
his crime and criminal history. Aplt. Opening Br. at 24–25. We have
consistently held that sentences such as Mr. Jones’s do not violate the Eighth
Amendment, and accordingly we reject this argument. See Angelos, 433 F.3d at
750–53 (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to a mandatory sentence under 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) of fifty-five years for drug and firearm offenses where the
defendant had no significant adult criminal history); see also United States v.
James, 303 F. App’x 632, 639–40 (10th Cir. 2008) (applying a proportionality
analysis and concluding that a fifteen-year sentence imposed under the ACCA
was not disproportionate given that the defendant was caught with a firearm and
had three prior burglary convictions).
Mr. Jones concedes that his sixth argument—that he was entitled to jury
findings as to the elements of the ACCA under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments—is foreclosed by our precedent and Supreme Court case law
regarding prior convictions in the sentencing context. See, e.g., United States v.
Harris, 447 F.3d 1300, 1303 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Applying [the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Booker], we have
14
recently held that all three elements of the ACCA are properly assessed by the
sentencing court.”); see also Booker, 543 U.S. at 244 (“Any fact (other than a
prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the
maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict
must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (emphasis added)); United States v. Apperson, 441 F.3d 1162, 1213 (10th
Cir. 2006) (“[T]he Supreme Court has consistently held, and recently reaffirmed
in Booker, that a prior felony conviction is a sentencing factor and thus does not
need to be pled in the indictment or be decided by a jury.”). Accordingly, we
need not consider this issue further.
In his final argument, Mr. Jones contends that the ACCA and inherent
charging power violate the separation of powers doctrine. Mr. Jones’s argument
is entirely unpersuasive. As the government points out: “[A]pplication of the
ACCA is mandatory, irrespective of whether the prosecutor seeks its application.
The statute does not provide either the government or a district court with any
discretion to avoid its application.” Aplee. Br. at 29. Moreover, Mr. Jones’s
argument is foreclosed by precedent. See, e.g., United States v. Gurule, 461 F.3d
1238, 1246 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Congress has the power . . . to determine
punishments, and in the exercise of that power Congress may choose to give the
judicial branch no sentencing discretion whatsoever.”); United States v. Johnson,
15
973 F.2d 857, 860 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that § 924(e)(1) “does not require
government action to trigger its application nor does it vest discretion in the
sentencing court not to apply its mandate”); see also United States v. Nolan, 342
F. App’x 368, 371 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that “[t]he court’s application of the
mandatory fifteen-year sentence prescribed by Congress [under the ACCA] did
not violate the ‘separation of powers’ doctrine” and recognizing that “[a] federal
court does not violate the ‘separation of powers’ doctrine by implementing a
mandatory sentence imposed by Congress”). Accordingly, this argument also
fails.
III
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Jerome A. Holmes
Circuit Judge
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