Ross v. Federal Highway Administration

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAN 10 2001
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
THOMASINE ROSS; STANLEY
ROSS; ANJANETTE BITSIE;
PAMINA YELLOWBIRD; JASON No. 99-3269
DANIELS; and WETLANDS (D. Kansas)
PRESERVATION ORGANIZATION (D.C. No. Civ-97-2132-GTV)
and KANSAS UNIVERSITY
ENVIRONS, Kansas unincorporated
associations,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
FEDERAL HIGHWAY
ADMINISTRATION; DAVID
GEIGER, in his official capacity as
Division Administrator, Federal
Highway Administration; MARK
BUHLER, TOM TAUL, DEAN
NIEDER, in their official capacities as
County Commissioners of Douglas
County, Kansas; and E. DEAN
CARLSON, in his official capacity as
Kansas Secretary of Transportation,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
(continued...)
Before KELLY , ANDERSON , and HENRY , Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs brought this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
against the defendant federal and state officials. They contended that in planning
and building a highway near Lawrence, Kansas, defendants failed to comply with
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347.
The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs, and enjoined the defendants
from taking any further action on the uncompleted eastern portion of the highway
project until the requirements of NEPA had been met. See Ross v. Federal
Highway Administration , 972 F.Supp. 552, 562-63 (D. Kan. 1997). This court
affirmed that judgment in Ross v. Federal Highway Administration , 162 F.3d
1046 (10th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Ross II ]. Plaintiffs then filed a motion in the
district court for attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice
Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d). The district court denied
both fees and costs. The plaintiffs now appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm the judgment of the district court.
I. BACKGROUND
*
(...continued)
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As the facts of this case were described in detail in Ross II , 162 F.3d at
1048-50, we will only briefly recount that background.
In 1986, federal, state, and local officials began to plan the South Lawrence
Trafficway, a highway bypass which was supposed to traverse the south side of
Lawrence, Kansas. The project was jointly funded under the Federal-Aid
Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. §§ 101-189. Most of the highway was constructed and is
in use. However, before the eastern portion of the project could be built, a
neighboring educational institution (Haskell Indian Nation University), as well as
several community groups, raised objections to its location. These objections
appeared to necessitate a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS)
under NEPA. Instead of completing the SEIS, though, the federal and state
highway officials decided to “defederalize” the unbuilt eastern segment of the
highway.
Although the federal government had funded a significant percentage of the
trafficway’s total coast, relatively little federal money had been spent directly on
the eastern segment, which was to be primarily paid for by the state. Apparently,
federal and state highway officials concluded that the eastern segment could
consequently be “defederalized”–i.e. redefined as an independent state project. If
the project were thus redefined, NEPA would not apply, and an SEIS would not
be required. Accordingly, in early 1997, the Federal Highway Administration
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published a notice of its intent to withdraw from both the eastern segment of the
project and the SEIS, which would allow the state to proceed with construction.
The plaintiffs then sued, arguing that this defederalization was improper.
The district court agreed; it ruled that because all federal appropriations for the
trafficway had included the eastern segment in the trafficway’s description, the
entire project should be considered federal, even if little federal money was
actually to be spent on the eastern segment. It therefore enjoined further action
on the eastern segment, pending completion of the SEIS. Ross , 972 F.Supp. at
562-63.
On appeal, this court upheld the ruling of the district court, although our
rationale was slightly different. We held that by 1997, the “advanced stage” of
the bypass collaboration meant “it was simply too late for the state of Kansas to
convert the eastern segment into a local project.” Ross II , 162 F.3d at 1052-53.
Despite the relatively small federal expenditures directly related to the eastern
segment, we wrote, “[t]he federal nature of the trafficway was so pervasive that
the Kansas authorities could not rid the project of federal involvement simply by
withdrawing the last segment of the project from federal funding.” Id. at 1053(citations omitted).
The plaintiffs next filed a motion in the district court for attorneys’ fees
and costs. The district court denied attorneys’ fees against both the federal and
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state defendants, and on separate grounds also denied costs. The plaintiffs now
appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Denial of Attorneys’ Fees from Federal Defendants
Under the EAJA, a party that prevails in a civil action against the United
States is entitled to fees and other expenses, “unless the court finds that the
position of the United States was substantially justified or that special
circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). In the present
case, the district court found that the government’s litigating position was
substantially justified. We review the district court’s ruling on this question for
an abuse of discretion. Pierce v. Underwood , 487 U.S. 552, 562 (1988); Gilbert
v. Shalala , 45 F.3d 1391, 1394 (10th Cir. 1995).
In order to determine whether the federal government’s position was
substantially justified, a court must ask whether that position was justified “in
substance or in the main.” Pierce , 487 U.S. at 564. A position is substantially
justified if it has “a reasonable basis both in law and fact,” or is “justified to a
degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Id. at 565. Here, the district court
found that when the government announced its intent to withdraw from the SEIS,
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its position was reasonable, based on “the case law governing in 1997.” Aplt’s
Supp. App. at 22 (District Court Order filed May 24, 1999).
Applying this standard, the district court placed particular weight on
Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque v. Barnhart , 906 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir.
1990). In Los Ranchos , the federal government had been involved in preparing an
environmental impact statement (EIS) for a proposed highway river crossing
project in New Mexico. The river crossing project was near another major federal
project, a highway interchange, but had been “segmented” from the interchange
for funding purposes. Id. at 1482. The federal government withdrew from the
river crossing project after completing the EIS, but before construction began; the
river crossing was to be funded thereafter by non-federal authorities. Neighbors
of the river crossing who were opposed to the project then sued. They argued that
the project could not be defederalized for two reasons: because the prior federal
involvement with the EIS precluded defederalization, and because the river
crossing had been improperly separated from the federal highway interchange
project.
This court held that both segmentation and defederalization had been
proper. We emphasized that because the federal government’s involvement had
ended very early in the project, and because the federal monetary contribution had
been a very small fraction of the river crossing’s expected cost, federal
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involvement was minimal, and defederalization was permissible. Los Ranchos ,
906 F.2d at 1480-82. We also held that segmentation had been proper. “Even if a
local project terminates at a point of juncture with a federally funded project,” we
wrote, such a juncture would not “preclude” segmentation of the two projects. Id.
at 1483.
In the present action, the district court emphasized that before our decision
on the merits in this case, Los Ranchos was the controlling case in this circuit. It
found that the Federal Highway Administration
believed that, under its reading and interpretation of Village of Los Ranchos
and other federal appellate court case law, the eastern segment of the [South
Lawrence] trafficway was not a “major federal action” because it was to be
completed without the use of further federal funds and because the FHWA no
longer had the authority to exercise control in the planning or construction of
the segment.
Aplt’s Supp. App. at 22. The district court concluded that under Los Ranchos ,
there was a reasonable basis for both the government’s action and its litigating
position.
The plaintiffs now argue that even in 1997, the law suggested
defederalization of the eastern segment would be unreasonable. Essentially, the
plaintiffs maintain that Los Ranchos is factually distinct from the Kansas
controversy, making it valueless as precedent. They further contend that all
relevant cases other than Los Ranchos have rejected defederalization.
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Our earlier opinion in this case does indeed state that “nothing in Los
Ranchos ” supports the government’s “decision to ‘defederalize’ the eastern
segment of the South Lawrence trafficway.” Ross II , 162 F.3d at 1053. The
present case, we found, differs “significantly” from the facts in Los Ranchos . Id.It also approves of the cases plaintiffs cited in support of their position, especially
Scottsdale Mall v. State of Indiana , 549 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1977). In Scottsdale
Mall , the state had attempted to defederalize a highway project in order to
circumvent NEPA. The Seventh Circuit ruled that because there had been
significant federal involvement in all stages of the project prior to the attempted
defederalization, the attempt was improper. Id. at 488-90. As a result, plaintiffs
urge us to find that the government’s position was not substantially justified.
However, under the “abuse of discretion” standard of review, we cannot
reverse the district court unless we have “a definite and firm conviction that the
lower court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible
choice in the circumstances.” McEwen v. City of Norman , 926 F.2d 1539, 1553-
54 (10th Cir. 1991). The district court’s judgment may only be reversed for an
abuse of discretion if it appears “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly
unreasonable.” FDIC v. Oldenburg , 34 F.3d 1529, 1555 (10th Cir. 1994).
Despite the plaintiffs’ contentions and our decision in Ross , the district
court’s conclusion was neither “whimsical” nor “manifestly unreasonable.”
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Although Scottsdale Mall supported the plaintiffs’ position (and raised questions
about the government’s), it was not binding authority in this circuit. See Garcia
by Garcia v. Miera , 817 F.2d 650, 658 (10th Cir. 1987) (affirming that the
decisions of one circuit court of appeals are not binding upon another circuit). In
contrast, Los Ranchos , a case from within our circuit, addressed issues of
highway segmentation and defederalization and provided some support for the
government’s contentions.
Here, the district court found that because Los Ranchos appeared to be the
most relevant precedent, it was not unreasonable for the Federal Highway
Administration to rely upon that case in formulating its arguments. In other
words, in order to have a “substantially justified” litigating position, the FHWA
need not have predicted or foreseen our decision on the merits here, which
followed the reasoning of Scottsdale Mall and distinguished Los Ranchos . This
conclusion by the district court was neither “whimsical” nor “manifestly
unreasonable.” We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees. 1
B. Denial of Costs From All Defendants
1
Because we conclude Los Ranchos provides sufficient support for the
district court’s ruling, we need not address the relevance of 23 U.S.C. § 145.
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Because the plaintiffs did not file a bill of costs within thirty days after the
final judgment, as required by the local court rules, the district court denied
plaintiffs their costs. See D. Kan. Rule 54.1. Plaintiffs state that while they did
not file a bill of costs on the specific form required by the local Kansas rule, they
did submit their costs as part of an affidavit for attorneys’ fees under the EAJA.
This, they propose, “compl[ies] with the intent” of the Kansas rule. Aplt’s Br. at
24.
We have on many occasions found that “the district court is entitled to
considerable deference in its interpretation and application of its own rules of
practice and procedure.” Mitchell v. Maynard , 80 F.3d 1433, 1447 (10th Cir.
1996). Although we might have held differently (noting the confusion that could
have resulted from the EAJA application), under this deferential standard, it was
permissible for the district court to find that plaintiffs’ affidavit did not
sufficiently comply with the local rule requiring a bill of costs.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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Entered for the Court,
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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