Barzanji v. Sealy Mattress Manufacturing Co.

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAR 20 2001
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JAMAL BARZANJI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 00-1205
(D.C. No. 00-M-75)
SEALY MATTRESS (D. Colo.)
MANUFACTURING COMPANY;
STEVE HILL; CHARLY; MARIO
PIRIA,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE , ANDERSON , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff Jamal Baranji appeals the district court’s summary judgment
dismissing his discrimination complaint on the ground that he failed to file an
administrative charge within three hundred days of the alleged acts of
discrimination. We affirm.
Plaintiff was employed by the Sealy Mattress Company from September 25,
1997, until June 10, 1998. During this time he suffered a back injury for which
he was treated conservatively and was advised to restrict his lifting and hours.
Sealy contested plaintiff’s workers’ compensation and disability claims on the
ground that the injury was not work related. On June 10, 1998, Sealy informed
plaintiff that it did not have any work available to fit his medical restrictions, and
that he should notify them when he was released for unrestricted work. Plaintiff
has not worked for Sealy since then. On February 12, 1999, plaintiff and Sealy
entered into an agreement settling his workers’ compensation claim.
On May 5, 1999, plaintiff filled out an “intake questionnaire” with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), in which he claimed the
following acts constituted discrimination based on his national origin and
disability: being given less hours and a lower wage than other assemblers;
reassignment to a janitorial position in October 1997 because of his difficulty
with English; failing to accommodate his medical condition; contesting his
applications for workers’ compensation and disability benefits; and terminating
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him on June 10, 1998. Across the top of the questionnaire, in bold lettering, the
form stated: “COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE THE FILING OF A CHARGE.” R. I., doc. 19, Questionnaire
attached to Notice of Appeal.
On September 9, 1999, plaintiff filed a formal charge with the EEOC, in
which he alleged discrimination based on the following: despite his additional
bulging disks, the February 1999 workers’ compensation settlement stated that he
could not reopen his claim; he was informed on June 10, 1998 that he could no
longer perform his job due to his medical restrictions; between September 9, 1997
and June 10, 1998, he was told he did not speak English well; during the same
time frame, he was paid less than employees who were hired later and his
coworkers made fun of him; and he was not placed on light duty after his doctor
released him on May 19, 1998. Id. , doc. 16, ex. A. On October 6, 1999, the
EEOC dismissed the charge as untimely because it was not filed withing three
hundred days of the alleged discrimination. Id. , ex. B.
On January 6, 2000, plaintiff filed a discrimination action in the district
court, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e through § 2000e-17, and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 through § 12221. His complaint, as amended on
February 11, 2000, alleged the following discriminatory acts: giving other
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assemblers more hours and paying them more; assigning him to a janitorial
position; playing a joke on him with a paper stuck to his back; contesting his
workers’ compensation and short term disability claims; failing to accommodate
his work restrictions; discharging him as of June 10, 1998 based on his disability;
and ignoring an August 1998 report that he could perform light duty. Id. , doc. 5.
The district court dismissed the complaint based on plaintiff’s failure to file his
administrative charge within three hundred days of the alleged discrimination.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the district court erred because (1) the
May 5, 1999 intake questionnaire was within three hundred days of the
discrimination; and (2) the discrimination continued until the settlement of his
workers’ compensation claim on February 12, 1999. We review de novo the
district court’s decision granting summary judgment and apply the same legal
standards as the district court. Robbins v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1 , 186
F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 1999) . Summary judgment is appropriate when a
record demonstrates that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). We view the factual record and inferences therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Robbins , 186 F.3d at 1258.
Both Title VII and the ADA limit the time within which a plaintiff must file
an administrative charge of discrimination with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C.
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§ 2000e-5(e)(1) (permitting claimants to seek relief for adverse actions occurring
no more than three hundred days before the filing of an EEOC complaint so long
as the plaintiff filed a state agency complaint as well); Id. , § 12117(a)
(incorporating by reference Title VII procedures into ADA actions). A plaintiff
may not bring a lawsuit based upon claims that were not part of a timely-filed
EEOC charge.
In this case, plaintiff filed charges with both the EEOC and the Colorado
Civil Rights Division on September 9, 1999. The discriminatory acts alleged in
this charge, with one exception, occurred before June 10, 1998, and thus fell well
beyond the three hundred-day limit. As for plaintiff’s allegation that Sealy
discriminated against him on February 12, 1999, by seeking a clause in the
workers’ compensation settlement agreement precluding the reopening of his
claim, this is not the type of “adverse employment action” necessary to support a
discrimination claim. See Sanchez v. Denver Pub. Schs. , 164 F.3d 527, 531 (10th
Cir. 1998). In any event, plaintiff has not alleged this particular act in his
discrimination complaint. See Amended Complaint, R. I, doc. 5.
Plaintiff argues that his EEOC intake questionnaire, filed May 5, 1999, can
suffice as a discrimination charge. Courts are split on whether such an informal
questionnaire can be deemed a timely filing when it is later verified by a formal
charge. Compare Shempert v. Harwick Chem. Corp. , 151 F.3d 793, 796-98 (8th
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Cir. 1998) (rejecting claim that a verified charge filed after the deadline related
back to convert an intake questionnaire into a timely charge), and Park v. Howard
Univ. , 71 F.3d 904, 908-09 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding pre-complaint intake
questionnaire could not be deemed a valid charge), with Philbin v. General Elec.
Capital Auto Lease, Inc. , 929 F.2d 321, 322 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding subsequently
verified charge related back to date intake questionnaire was filed to satisfy
statute), and Casavantes v. California State Univ., Sacramento , 732 F.2d 1441,
1442-43 (9th Cir. 1984) (same). We need not decide this issue, however, because
the May 5, 1999 questionnaire was also filed more than three hundred days after
plaintiff’s June 10, 1998 separation from work and was therefore untimely.
Finally, plaintiff argues that his charge was timely because the
discrimination continued until his workers’ compensation case was settled on
February 12, 1999. This was not the first date, though, that plaintiff learned that
Sealy would contest his workers’ compensation claim and would not provide him
with light employment. The Supreme Court has held that the trigger of the
limitations period in which to file an EEOC charge is the date an employee first
learns of the alleged discrimination, even if the effects of the discrimination
become more painful at a later date. Delaware State College v. Ricks , 449 U.S.
250, 258 (1980); see Hulsey v. Kmart, Inc. , 43 F.3d 555, 557 (10th Cir. 1994)
(holding discrimination claim accrues on the date an employee is notified of
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adverse employment decision). Here, plaintiff is simply alleging that acts
occurring outside the filing period had a continuing effect within the time allowed
for suit. This is insufficient to demonstrate a timely claim under the “continuing
violation theory.” Martin v. Nannie & the Newborns, Inc. , 3 F.3d 1410, 1415
(10th Cir. 1993). As plaintiff learned of the underlying acts more than three
hundred days before filing either his intake questionnaire or his formal charge,
the district court correctly dismissed his discrimination complaint for failure to
exhaust his remedies by filing a timely administrative charge with the EEOC.
Plaintiff’s motion to supplement the record with documents that were not
presented to the district court is DENIED, and the judgment of the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall
issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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