Tusshani v. United States

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 5 2001
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
OMAR MUHAMED TUSSHANI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 00-8031
(D.C. No. 98-CV-122)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, (D. Wyo.)
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR , BALDOCK , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Omar Muhamed Tusshani brought this action under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) alleging malpractice by government medical personnel
while he was in the pretrial custody of the Bureau of Prisons. The district court
granted summary judgment to the government on the basis that Tusshani failed to
provide reliable expert testimony that his injuries were proximately caused by the
*
The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument pursuant
to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The Court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
government’s actions. We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo, Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. , 50 F.3d 793, 796 (10th Cir. 1995),
and its evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, Summers v. Missouri Pac. R.R.
Sys. , 132 F.3d 599, 603 (10th Cir. 1997) (decision to admit or exclude expert
testimony reviewed for abuse of discretion); Sports Racing Servs., Inc. v. Sports
Car Club of Am., Inc. , 131 F.3d 874, 894 (10th Cir. 1997) (evidentiary rulings
at summary judgment stage reviewed for abuse of discretion). Applying these
standards, we affirm the district court’s decision with respect to Tusshani’s claim
of permanent injury but reverse with respect to his claim of non-permanent injury.
In October 1996, while he was a pretrial detainee being held on federal
charges, Tusshani slipped and fell at the Laramie County Detention Facility in
Wyoming. He suffered a fracture of one or more of his vertebrae and paraplegia
and subsequently underwent surgery on his spine. Following the surgery, he was
receiving rehabilitative treatment under the care of Dr. Victoria Vernon at
Spalding Rehabilitation Hospital, a private medical facility in Wyoming, when the
U.S. Marshals Service petitioned the District Court in Wyoming to have him
transferred to a federal facility. Over Dr. Vernon’s objections, the court granted
the request, and Tusshani was transferred in December 1996 to the Federal
Medical Facility run by the U.S. Bureau of Prisons in Fort Worth, Texas, where
he remained for the next seven months. In July 1997, he was transferred back to
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the Laramie County Detention Facility for trial. After several days in this facility,
he was moved back to the Spalding Rehabilitation Hospital and placed again
under the care of Dr. Vernon. He remained at Spalding, receiving additional
treatment, for three more months before the indictment against him was dismissed
and he was released from federal custody.
Tusshani then brought this action against the government under the FTCA
alleging that his transfer to the federal facility in Fort Worth and the care he
received were negligent. In particular, he contends that he received insufficient
and inadequate physical therapy at the federal facility and that, as a result, his
condition, including his ability to get around without a wheelchair, deteriorated
markedly during this time. He alleges that the government’s actions caused
a variety of harm and injuries including his permanent restriction to a wheelchair.
Following discovery, the government moved for summary judgment on the
ground, inter alia, that Tusshani could not establish a prima facie case of medical
malpractice because he could not meet his burden of proving the government’s
actions proximately caused his inability to ambulate. The district court agreed,
holding that the testimony of Tusshani’s expert, Dr. Vernon, was insufficient
under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. , 509 U.S. 579 (1993), to
establish a reliable, scientific basis for his claim that the government’s negligence
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“caused his current, wheelchair-bound condition.” (Appellant’s App. at 498.) 1
The court therefore granted summary judgment in favor of the government.
Tusshani raises two issues on appeal. First, he contends that the district
court erred in concluding that Dr. Vernon’s testimony was insufficient under
Daubert to establish that the government proximately caused his inability to
ambulate. In his complaint, Tusshani alleged that the government’s negligent
provision of physical therapy while he was at the Fort Worth facility “directly and
proximately resulted in the Plaintiff being permanently restricted to a wheel chair
rather than having the ability to ambulate.” (Appellant’s App. at 6–7.) At her
deposition, Dr. Vernon, whom Tusshani had designated as his expert, testified
that had the therapy he had been receiving at Spalding not been interrupted by his
transfer to Fort Worth, he would be more functional. However, on further
questioning, she testified that she did not know of any physiological reason why a
temporary cessation of physical therapy, which is essentially what Tusshani
claims occurred while he was at the Fort Worth facility, would prevent him from
later achieving his maximum level of ambulation through resumed therapy. The
1
The district court did not resolve the question of whether Wyoming or
Texas law applied to Tusshani’s claim but determined that under both states’ law,
he had to present “expert testimony as to the appropriate standard of care, whether
it was met, and whether a failure to meet the standard of care proximately caused
the plaintiff’s injuries.” (Appellant’s App. at 496 (citing Meyer v. Mulligan , 889
P.2d 509, 516 (Wyo. 1995); Blan v. Ali , 7 S.W.3d 741, 744 (Tex. Ct. App.
1999)).) Plaintiff does not challenge this determination on appeal.
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district court relied on this testimony, along with the absence of any relevant
neurological evidence, to hold that “Tusshani has presented no reliable
expert testimony that such a failure to provide therapy caused his current,
wheelchair-bound condition.” ( Id. at 498.)
Under Daubert , the district court has the obligation to “ensure that any and
all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”
509 U.S. at 589. We cannot say that the district court’s decision to exclude as
unreliable Dr. Vernon’s testimony regarding causation of permanent injury
constituted an abuse of discretion.
Tusshani’s second contention is that even if the district court were correct
in its conclusion that he did not meet his burden of proving causation with respect
to his permanent injury, the court should not have granted summary judgment on
the entire case because his permanent injury was only one aspect of the harm he
suffered from the government’s negligence. Although his argument is not
particularly clear, Tusshani contends that the government’s action or inaction at
least caused temporary aggravation of his condition and a delay in his recovery.
The district court did not address Tusshani’s claim of non-permanent injury.
The government contends this argument as to non-permanent injury should
be rejected because Tusshani failed to present expert opinion evidence to survive
summary judgment on this issue. Because of the limited grounds on which the
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government moved for summary judgment, we find it questionable whether
Tusshani was obligated to present any evidence on this issue. 2
In any event,
Tusshani did produce evidence of causation regarding his non-permanent injuries.
Dr. Vernon testified that
based on my training and my experience and the literature, a spinal
cord injured individual should be admitted to an acute rehab facility
shortly after they sustained their spinal cord injury, and the intensive
therapy should be given that first six months. That’s in all the
textbooks. That’s a standard of care.
(Appellant’s App. at 168.) She described Tusshani’s state on his return to
Spalding from Fort Worth as “appalling” and stated that “[h]e lost a significant
amount of strength in his lower extremities,” he had been provided with a very ill-
fitting wheelchair, his posture was poor, and he had a severe kyphosis. ( Id. at
91.) She further testified that based on his history, her objective findings on
physical examination, and the lack of evidence indicating he had received
physical therapy at Fort Worth, it was her opinion that Tusshani had not received
2
The government’s opening summary judgment brief at best only vaguely
asserted, without citation to relevant authority or evidence, that Tusshani could
not prove causation. In its summary judgment reply brief, the government
asserted, this time with citation to authority and evidence, that Tusshani could not
prove it caused any permanent injury. It is thus questionable whether Tusshani
was under any obligation to present evidence relating to his claim of
non-permanent injury. See Tavery v. United States, 32 F.3d 1423, 1427 n.5
(10th Cir. 1994) (“When a party moves for summary judgment on ground A, his
opponent is not required to respond to ground B—a ground the movant might
have presented but did not.”) (quotation omitted).
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appropriate physical therapy at Fort Worth and that this lack of therapy caused his
deteriorated condition. This condition included severely compromised mobility
and “decline[] in strength and function.” ( Id. at 168.) She further testified with
respect to a cessation of or inappropriate therapy that “[i]t’s hard work, and it’s
also very expensive to have to go back and recoup all the ground that you’ve lost
in developing, you know, weakened muscles and contractures.” ( Id. at 422.)
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Tusshani, as the
party opposing summary judgment, see Wolf , 50 F.3d at 796, we conclude that
the government did not meet its burden of showing entitlement to summary
judgment on Tusshani’s claim that the government caused non-permanent injuries.
Dr. Vernon, as plaintiff’s designated medical expert, testified as to the
appropriate standard of care and concluded that the government breached this
standard and that the breach caused non-permanent injuries to Tusshani. Unlike
the situation with respect to Tusshani’s claim of permanent injury, there is no
evidence undermining Dr. Vernon’s opinions regarding his non-permanent
injuries. Accordingly, the district court should not have granted summary
judgment on this issue.
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The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED
in part, and the case is REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings
consistent with this order and judgment.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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