Browning v. Young

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 10 2001
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DAVID E. BROWNING, JR.,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 00-6391
L. L. YOUNG, Warden, (D.C. No. 00-CV-924-W)
(W.D.Okla.)
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HENRY , BRISCOE and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Petitioner David E. Browning, Jr., a state prisoner appearing pro se, seeks
a certificate of appealability to appeal the district court’s dismissal of his 28
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
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doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
U.S.C. § 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus as untimely. We deny the
request for a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal.
Browning pled guilty to possession of a knife in a penal institution on
March 23, 1994. He did not appeal his conviction. On February 22, 1999, he
filed an application for post-conviction relief in state court, contending the
conviction violated double jeopardy principles and the court abused its discretion
by not following the rule announced in State v. Campbell , 965 P.2d 991 (Okla.
Ct. Crim. App. 1998). His application was denied on March 23, 1999. On May
27, 1999, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial. The
court found Browning's double jeopardy claim could have been raised on direct
appeal. The court also found that Campbell was not to be applied retroactively
(finding "[a]s a general rule of law in Oklahoma, decisions of the highest court
are prospective in application unless specifically declared to have retroactive
effect"). Record, Doc. 9, Exh. C.
Browning filed his § 2254 petition on May 18, 2000. Respondent filed a
motion to dismiss the petition as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), and
Browning filed a reply to the motion. On September 29, 2000, the magistrate
court issued its report and recommendation. Browning filed objections to the
magistrate's report. On October 26, 2000, the district court adopted the
magistrate's report and dismissed the habeas petition as untimely filed.
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As Browning filed his habeas petition on May 18, 2000, the provisions of
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) apply. See
Lindh v. Murphy , 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) and
Hoggro v. Boone , 150 F.3d 1223, 1225-26 (10th Cir. 1998), Browning had until
April 23, 1997, to file his habeas petition. He did not seek post-conviction relief
in state court during the applicable limitation period and his application for post-
conviction relief filed in February 1999 did not toll the running of the limitation
period.
Browning's request for a certificate of appealability is DENIED. The
appeal is DISMISSED. Browning's motion to proceed on appeal in forma
pauperis is DENIED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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