United States v. Miles

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 19 2001
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
vs. No. 00-3230
(D.C. No. 99-CR-40087-SAC)
BRUCE MILES, (D. Kan.)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, McWILLIAMS, and JONES, ** Circuit Judges.
Bruce Miles entered a conditional plea of guilty to possession of a firearm
after former conviction of a felony, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2). On
appeal, he contests the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence
discovered in the third-party residence in which he was arrested.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Honorable Nathaniel R. Jones, Circuit Judge, United States Court of
**
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Background
On the morning of November 3, 1998, one Kansas and two Topeka police
officers went to the home of Yvonne and Yvette Sugura, hoping to find Bruce
Miles and execute a state warrant for his arrest. 1 II R. at 9-10, 13-14, 70. Prior
attempts to locate and apprehend Mr. Miles at other addresses had been
unsuccessful, id. at 56-57, 68, and an anonymous tip to the “CrimeStoppers”
hotline had reported that Mr. Miles was “staying” at the Suguras’ home. Id. at
11-12. Yvonne Sugura met the police at the door. Id. at 12. In response to the
officers’ inquiries, she acknowledged that she had heard Mr. Miles’ name before,
pointed upstairs to her daughter Yvette’s apartment, and invited them in to speak
with Yvette [hereinafter “Ms. Sugura”]. Id. at 12-13, 23-24, 66.
While one officer stood guard at an outside door, id. at 77-78, the other two
went upstairs to Ms. Sugura’s apartment. Id. at 13-14. The testimony is
inconsistent as to whether the door was answered by Tony Solis (Ms. Sugura’s
boyfriend), id. at 13, or Kendra Zabala (Mr. Miles’ then-girlfriend 2). Id. at 59;
1
Yvette Sugura testified that the officers were accompanied by five or six
United States Marshals. II R. at 41-42. The officers did not recall whether
marshals were present, but conceded that it was possible. Id. at 26-27, 68. But
see id. at 76 (noting that presence of additional officers would have been reflected
in contemporaneous reports of the encounter). The district court found that only
three officers were present. I R., Doc. 32 at 6.
Officer Mechler testified that Ms. Sugura referred to Mr. Miles as “her
2
roommate’s boyfriend”. II R. at 70 (emphasis added). There is no other
(continued...)
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see also V R. at 24. In any case, the police eventually spoke with Ms. Zabala,
who told the officers that Ms. Sugura was asleep. II R. at 14-15. The officers’
indicated that they needed to speak with Ms. Sugura and asked Ms. Zabala to
wake her up. Id.Ms. Sugura came to the door, wrapped in a blanket, id. at 70, and told the
officers “that she hadn’t seen [Mr. Miles], [that] he hadn’t been around.” Id. at
15. When the officers asked to come in and look for him, Ms. Sugura replied “I’d
rather you didn’t.” Id. As the officers attempted to persuade her, she stepped out
into the hall. Id. at 15, 32. It was evident to the officers that she was very
nervous. Id. at 15-16, 59-60, 70-71, 75-76; see also id. at 49. At one point, an
officer informed her that if she was lying about Mr. Miles’ presence in the
apartment, she could be arrested for harboring a fugitive or aiding a felon. Id. at
31, 71. After “approximately seven minutes,” Aplt. Br. at 20, 3 Ms. Sugura
admitted that Mr. Miles was in the apartment and consented to the officers’
search. II R. at 34, 61. Immediately upon the officers’ entry, Mr. Miles stepped
forward. Id. at 17. One officer saw a gun in plain view and asked to whom it
2
(...continued)
indication that Ms. Zabala resided in the apartment.
3
But cf. II R. at 60 (Off. Mechler: two minutes elapsed between initial
knock and Ms. Sugura’s consent); id. at 78-79 (Off. Cochran: encounter lasted
five to ten minutes).
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belonged; Mr. Miles admitted that the gun was his. 4 Id. at 17-18.
A grand jury returned a two-count indictment against Mr. Miles. I R., Doc.
1. When his motion to suppress the gun and certain incriminating statements was
denied, I R., Doc. 32, Mr. Miles entered a conditional plea of guilty to Count I of
the indictment – possessing a firearm after conviction of a felony. 5 I R., Doc. 36.
This appeal followed.
Discussion
The question before us is whether the officers’ entry into Yvette Sugura’s
apartment, upon which they discovered evidence tending to incriminate Mr.
Miles, was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment despite the absence of a
search warrant. The government argues that the search was justified by the
officers’ objectively reasonable belief that Mr. Miles was both living in and
present in the apartment at the time of the search. Aplee Br. at 6-12; see also
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980) (“[A]n arrest warrant founded on
probable case implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in
which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.”);
4
Mr. Miles has waived his Miranda claim on appeal. See Coleman v. B-G
Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc. , 108 F.3d 1199, 1205 (10th Cir. 1997).
5
In exchange, the government agreed to dismiss Count II. III R., Att. at 2,
¶ 3(a); IV R. at 4.
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Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220, 1224-25 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that
Payton does not require that the arrestee actually reside in the residence searched,
provided that the officers had a “reasonable basis for believing that [the arrestee]
both (1) lived in the residence and (2) could be found within at the time of
entry”). In the alternative, the government argues that Yvette Sugura consented
to the search of her apartment, Aplee. Br. at 15-23, and that the search was
supported by exigent circumstances. Id. at 12-15; see also Steagald v. United
States, 451 U.S. 204, 216 (1981) (holding that arrest warrant does not authorize
search of third-party dwelling in which arrestee does not reside in the absence of
consent or exigent circumstances). Because we hold that Ms. Sugura’s consent
was valid, we need not address the government’s other two arguments (i.e.,
Payton/Valdez and exigent circumstances).
Whether a party has voluntarily consented to a search is a question of fact
that the district court must evaluate in light of the totality of the circumstances.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). In order to establish
voluntariness, the government must “proffer clear and positive testimony that
consent was unequivocal and specific and freely and intelligently given” and
“prove that this consent was given without implied or express duress or coercion.”
United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528, 1537 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations
and citation omitted). As with all questions of fact, when “[r]eviewing the denial
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of a motion to suppress, we accept the district court’s factual findings unless
clearly erroneous.” United States v. Davis, 197 F.3d 1048, 1050 (10th Cir. 1999)
(citation omitted).
Upon a thorough examination of the record, we see no grounds to reject the
district court’s finding that Yvette Sugura voluntarily consented to the officers’
limited search of her apartment. Doc. 32 at 17. Mr. Miles lists several factors
that, in his opinion, “establish, at best, coerced acquiescence, not voluntary
consent.” Aplt. Br. at 19. He notes that the police threatened to arrest Ms.
Sugura for harboring a fugitive, that more than one officer was present and that
they “were in uniform with visible weapons,” that she was not advised – in a
consent form or otherwise – that she could refuse consent, that the encounter took
place at her door when she had just awakened and was “wrapped in a blanket,”
that the encounter lasted approximately seven minutes, and that she believed she
had no choice but to consent. Id. at 19-20. 6 Although we emphasize that our
ruling is based on a consideration of the totality of the circumstances, we will
6
Mr. Miles also lists “fear and intimidation” as a relevant factor, but it is
unclear whether he is referring to the officers’ methods or Yvette Sugura’s state
of mind. Aplt. Br. at 20. Neither is supported by the record. The only testimony
as to the officers’ allegedly intimidating manner “is Ms. Sugura’s testimony,
when led by defense counsel, that Officer Mechler looked at her ‘[k]ind of
sternly?’ and ‘[k]ind of intimidating?’” Aplee. Br. at 18-19 (quoting II R. at 49).
In Ms. Sugura’s own words, Officer Mechler “just looked at me like ‘Are you
lying,’ kind of . . . I think she was looking at me to kind of tell whether I was
lying or not . . . .” II R. at 48-49.
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briefly discuss each of the above factors.
First, the officers’ alleged “threats” do not rise to the level of coercion or
duress necessary to negate consent. During their brief encounter with Ms.
Sugura, one officer truthfully informed her that she could be arrested for
harboring a fugitive or aiding a felon if she was lying about Mr. Miles’ presence
in the apartment. II R. at 31, 71. Even generously construed as a “threat,” this
statement was not the type of threat that negates an otherwise voluntary consent.
See, e.g., United States v. Morrow, 731 F.2d 233, 236 (4th Cir. 1984) (“Although
[the officer] did tell [the defendant] . . . that she could be charged as an accessory
. . . that statement alone hardly amounts to duress or coercion . . . .”); see also
United States v. Donaldson, 793 F.2d 498, 502 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding, on similar
facts, that “when an investigation on the scene develops probable cause to arrest
the third party [resident of] those premises for harboring the fugitive, a
warrantless search [incident to the arrest] may then be made . . . .”). In this case,
the officer’s statement did not relate to Ms. Sugura’s refusal to consent to the
search, but only to her statements that Mr. Miles was not in the apartment. The
officers never threatened to punish Ms. Sugura for refusing to consent, they
merely advised her that harboring a fugitive was itself a crime, for which she
could be arrested. Accordingly, the cases in which courts have found an officer’s
threats to negate consent are inapposite. See, e.g., United States v. Bolin, 514
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F.2d 554, 559-60 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding consent not voluntary where police
threatened to arrest defendant’s girlfriend if he refused to sign consent form);
Waldron v. United States, 219 F.2d 37, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (consent not voluntary
where “police ‘said if they had to get a search warrant, that it wouldn’t be their
responsibility of [sic] what happened to what was in the apartment, and if I were
to let them in on my own free will, that they would put everything back where
they got it’”).
The other factors cited in Mr. Miles’ brief are equally unpersuasive. We
see no clear error in the district court’s finding that only three officers were
involved in the encounter at issue. I R., Doc, 32 at 6; cf. supra note 1. There is
nothing unusual or inherently coercive about the presence of three uniformed and
armed officers. Although it is true that pressure on a detainee to consent to a
search may be increased by the presence of more than one officer and by an
officer’s failure to advise the individual of his right to refuse the officer’s
request, United States v. Orrego-Fernandez, 78 F.3d 1497, 1505 (10th Cir. 1996),
Yvette Sugura was not a detainee – she was in her own home. Even in the
detention context, moreover, neither factor is dispositive. Id.; accord United
States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 882 (10th Cir. 1994). Nor it is necessary that
officers obtain a signed consent form in order to insulate an otherwise knowing
and voluntary oral consent against attack. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 231.
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The record indicates that Ms. Sugura chose to come to the door wrapped in
a blanket. II R. at 70. Although a person’s “vulnerable subjective state” is one
factor to consider in determining whether consent was voluntary, Schneckloth,
412 U.S. at 229, we are persuaded that Ms. Sugura’s consent was voluntary
despite her chosen attire – or lack thereof. Cf. United States v. Dickerson, 975
F.2d 1245, 1249 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that naked man “voluntarily consented”
to warrantless entry by four police officers who appeared, weapons drawn, at his
front door, and physically prevented him from shutting it). The brief duration of
the encounter is also unobjectionable. II R. at 60 (two minutes); Aplt. Br. at 20
(“approximately seven minutes”); II R. at 78-79 (five to ten minutes). Finally,
Ms. Sugura’s own testimony contradicts Mr. Miles’ assertion that she believed
she had no choice but to consent. E.g., II R. at 45 (Ms. Sugura: nothing she “did
in discussing anything with the officers” was “done involuntarily”); id. at 53 (Ms.
Sugura: “I didn’t really care if [the officers] came in. I just wanted them to get
[Mr. Miles] and leave my house.”). The district court did not clearly err in
crediting Ms. Sugura’s testimony as to her own state of mind. See United States
v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Evaluation of the credibility
of the witnesses, the weight to be given the evidence, and inference to be drawn
from the evidence are for the district court.”).
Accordingly, the district court’s denial of Mr. Miles’ motion to suppress
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was not error and the judgment is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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