Shell v. Meconi

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 3 2005
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
SUZANNE SHELL,
Plaintiff,
and
APRIL FIELDS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 04-1133
(D.C. No. 03-RB-743 (MJW))
ROCCO F. MECONI, individually and (D. Colo.)
officially; FREMONT COUNTY
COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES, officially;
STEVE CLIFTON, individually and
officially; DAWN RIVAS,
individually and officially; TODD
HANENBERG, individually and
officially; DAN C. KENDER,
individually; ANNA HALL OWEN,
individually and officially,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
FREMONT COUNTY DISTRICT
COURT,
Defendant.
SUZANNE SHELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and No. 04-1155
(D.C. No. 03-RB-743 (MJW))
APRIL FIELDS, (D. Colo.)
Plaintiff,
v.
ROCCO F. MECONI, individually and
officially; FREMONT COUNTY
COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES, officially;
STEVE CLIFTON, individually and
officially; DAWN RIVAS,
individually and officially; TODD
HANENBERG, individually and
officially; DAN C. KENDER,
individually; ANNA HALL OWEN,
individually and officially,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
FREMONT COUNTY DISTRICT
COURT,
Defendant.
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HARTZ and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges, and BRIMMER , ** District
Judge.
Pro se plaintiffs April Fields and Suzanne Shell filed separate appeals
challenging the district court’s order dismissing their civil rights action against
defendants Rocco F. Meconi, the Fremont County Colorado Department of Human
Services (Fremont County DHS), Steve Clifton, Dawn Rivas, and Todd
Hanenberg (collectively, the Fremont County defendants), under, alternatively,
the Younger and Rooker-Feldman doctrines, 1
or Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). These cases
are therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment
is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res
judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of
orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the
terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
The Honorable Clarence A. Brimmer, District Judge, United States District
Court for the District of Wyoming, sitting by designation.
1
The Younger abstention doctrine, a judicially created bar to federal court
interference with ongoing state court proceedings, takes its name from Younger v.
Harris , 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a jurisdictional
prohibition based on 28 U.S.C. § 1257 which holds that federal review of state
court judgments (with the exception of habeas corpus) can be obtained only in the
United States Supreme Court, derives from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. , 263 U.S.
(continued...)
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Plaintiffs’ appeals also challenge the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals of
their claims against defendants Dan C. Kender and Anna Hall Owen. We liberally
construe plaintiffs’ pro se pleadings. Haines v. Keener , 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972) (per curiam).
This court reviews de novo a district court’s decision to abstain from
exercising jurisdiction under the Younger doctrine. Amanatullah v. Colo. Bd. of
Med. Exam’rs , 187 F.3d 1160, 1163 (10th Cir. 1999). We likewise review
de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.
Smith v. Plati , 258 F.3d 1167, 1174 (10th Cir. 2001); Kiowa Indian Tribe of Okla.
v. Hoover , 150 F.3d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir. 1998). Additionally, “[w]e are free to
affirm a district court decision on any grounds for which there is a record
sufficient to permit conclusions of law, even grounds not relied upon by the
district court.” United States v. Sandoval , 29 F.3d 537, 542 n.6 (10th Cir. 1994).
Applying these standards, we agree with the district court’s decision to
adopt the magistrate judge’s recommendation that plaintiffs’ claims against the
Fremont County defendants be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. But the district court’s implicit
1
(...continued)
413 (1923), and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
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determination that it had subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ identical
claims against Mr. Kender and Ms. Owen was misplaced. The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine barred these claims as well. We therefore dispose of the underlying case
on jurisdictional grounds and do not reach its merits. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for
a Better Env’t , 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998). Our disposition, which differs slightly
from the district court’s, is easily accommodated by modifying the district court’s
dismissal to make clear that the underlying case should have been dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. As
modified, the district court’s judgment is affirmed.
I. Background
Ms. Fields’s daughter was the subject of a dependency and neglect
proceeding initiated by the state of Colorado in January 2003. In connection
therewith, the state provided Ms. Fields a court-appointed attorney, Mr. Kender,
but Ms. Fields also hired Ms. Shell, a journalist who researches and documents
child protection agencies’ practices, to act as an expert consultant. Shortly
thereafter, Ms. Fields executed a power of attorney naming Ms. Shell as her
agent. Ms. Fields also agreed to be included in Ms. Shell’s documentary video
project concerning child protection services.
On April 16, 2003, Mr. Meconi, the Fremont County DHS’s attorney, filed
a motion in state court to make Ms. Shell a special respondent in the pending
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dependency and neglect action. The motion sought to prevent Ms. Shell “from
contacting the minor child or [Ms. Fields] . . . and from otherwise being involved
in the proceedings . . . , including, but not limited to, acting as counsel for
[Ms. Fields] or otherwise engaging in the unauthorized practice of law.”
R. Vol. I, Doc. 1 at 8-9.
On April 25, in anticipation of a state court hearing on the motion to make
Ms. Shell a special respondent, Ms. Shell, who is not an attorney, and Ms. Fields,
through Ms. Shell (pursuant to the power of attorney), filed a “Complaint and
Motion for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages,” alleging
impediments to Ms. Shell’s involvement in Ms. Fields’s dependency and neglect
action. 2 Id. Citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3), plaintiffs asserted that
defendants–through their “actions and inactions . . . under the color of law and/or
conspiring to act with the defendants who are acting under the color of law”–were
depriving plaintiffs of their freedom to associate (in order to advocate and
educate about child protection practices); right to contract (by attempting to
invalidate the power of attorney and by filing a motion to make Ms. Shell a
2
The federal district court, in an order dated May 14, observed that
Ms. Shell had signed plaintiffs’ federal complaint on Ms. Fields’s behalf. The
court ruled that there was no showing that Ms. Shell is an attorney, and
notwithstanding the power of attorney, Ms. Shell could neither represent
Ms. Fields nor sign any documents on Ms. Fields’s behalf. The court directed
Ms. Fields to correct the omission of her signature on the complaint, which she
did.
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special respondent); freedom of the press (by attempting to block the parties’
contact and thus prevent Ms. Fields from being included in Ms. Shell’s
documentary video project); and due process (by not allowing plaintiffs “the right
to a fair hearing by an impartial judge, the right to present all the evidence . . . [,]
the right to cross examine . . . , [and] the right to effective assistance of
counsel.”). R. Vol. I, Doc. 1 at 10-13. Plaintiffs also asserted that
defendants–again, through their “actions and inactions . . . under the color of law
and/or conspiring to act with the defendants who are acting under the color of
law,” id. at 13,–were discriminating against Ms. Shell (and defaming her) due to
her viewpoint; specifically, her opinion that in Fremont County “routine
violations of rights and rampant abuses permeat[e] every aspect of . . . child
protection,” id. at 3. As for relief, plaintiffs asked the federal district court to
“[a]ssume jurisdiction over th[e] action,” and to enter declaratory and injunctive
relief (1) restraining defendants from conducting a hearing on the state court
motion to make Ms. Shell a special respondent; 3
(2) “prohibiting . . . defendants
from engaging in any future conduct which would impair or deny plaintiffs’
rights ”; and (3) “ensur[ing] the fair and appropriate handling” of Ms. Fields’s
3
Plaintiffs duplicated their request that defendants be restrained from
conducting a hearing on the motion to make Ms. Shell a special respondent in an
“Emergency Motion for Injunctive Relief,” R. Vol. I, Doc. 2, that they filed
simultaneously with their federal complaint. The federal district court denied the
Emergency Motion on April 25, the same day it was filed.
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dependency and neglect case by “chang[ing] the venue,” by appointing a “DHS
agency other than [the] Fremont County DHS,” and by “replac[ing] the GAL
[guardian ad litem].” Id. at 14. Plaintiffs also sought monetary damages.
On May 9, after a hearing on the motion to make Ms. Shell a special
respondent, the state court issued an order granting the motion, vesting legal
custody of Ms. Fields’s daughter with the Fremont County DHS, and scheduling a
jury trial. In making Ms. Shell a special respondent the court observed that
Ms. Shell, “in the guise of acting as the agent” for Ms. Fields, has “essentially
been providing legal advice to [Ms. Fields].” App. to Shell’s Aplt. Br. at 56. The
state court further ordered Ms. Shell
specifically prohibited from:
a. Preparing, providing or otherwise generating any legal
documents;
b. Providing any legal advice to [Ms. Fields], regardless of
whether she (Suzanne Shell) characterizes it as legal advice or
counseling;
c. . . . having any relationship or contact with [Ms. Fields] at all; [and]
d. . . . exercising, in any way, the rights or authority expressed in
the power of attorney given to her by [Ms. Fields] . . . .
Id.On July 10, plaintiffs filed separate supplements to their federal complaint.
Neither plaintiff raised any new claims. But Ms. Shell’s supplement observed
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that “the action the plaintiffs wanted restrained [had] occurred, and further
irreparable deprivations were accomplished by the actions of the defendants.”
Aplee. App. at 56. Ms. Shell also claimed that “[s]ince the filing of the [federal
complaint], the defendants have continued committing actions which constitute
ongoing and irreparable deprivations of the plaintiffs’ rights.” Id.On February 11, 2004, a magistrate judge recommended that plaintiffs’
claims against the Fremont County defendants be dismissed pursuant to both the
“Younger [doctrine] and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” R. Vol. I, Doc. 92 at 17.
In the alternative, the magistrate judge considered the merits of plaintiffs’ claims
against the Fremont County defendants and recommended that each claim against
each Fremont County defendant be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). The
magistrate judge then turned to the 12(b)(6) motions filed by Mr. Kender and
Ms. Owen and recommended that each claim against each defendant be dismissed
under Rule 12(b)(6).
The federal district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation
and dismissed plaintiffs’ case in its entirety. In so doing, the district court did not
indicate whether its dismissal was based on the “ Younger [doctrine] and the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine,” R. Vol. I, Doc. 92 at 17, the merits, or both.
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II. Analysis
At the time plaintiffs filed their federal action, in April 2003, questions
loomed about whether the federal district court should abstain pursuant to the
Younger doctrine. See Amanatullah , 187 F.3d at 1163. But after the state court
granted the motion to make Ms. Shell a special respondent, in May 2003, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine came to the forefront.
“[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits a lower federal court from
considering claims actually decided by a state court, and claims inextricably
intertwined with a prior state-court judgment.” Kenmen Eng’g v. City of Union ,
314 F.3d 468, 473 (10th Cir. 2002) (citations and quotations omitted). “In other
words, Rooker-Feldman precludes a party losing in state court . . . from seeking
what in substance would be appellate review of [a] state judgment in a United
States district court . . . .” Id. (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). “This
prohibition extends to all state-court decisions–final or otherwise.” Id. at 475.
In this case, plaintiffs’ federal causes of action were not decided by the
state court; indeed, plaintiffs did not raise them in the state court. We therefore
consider whether they are inextricably intertwined with a prior state court
judgment, such that the federal district court here was divested of subject matter
jurisdiction.
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“Although it is difficult to formulate a foolproof test” to determine when a
federal plaintiff’s claims are inextricably intertwined with a prior state court
judgment, “we approach the question by asking whether the state-court judgment
caused , actually and proximately, the injury for which the federal-court plaintiff
seeks redress . If it did, Rooker-Feldman deprives the federal court of [subject
matter] jurisdiction.” Kenmen Eng’g , 314 F.3d at 476 (footnote omitted). In
conducting this inquiry, our focus is on “the relief sought by the federal-court
plaintiff.” Id. ; see also Crutchfield v. Countrywide Home Loans , 389 F.3d
1144, 1148 (10th Cir. 2004).
The relief sought by Ms. Fields and Ms. Shell stems from the state court
motion to make Ms. Shell a special respondent. And, when Ms. Shell was made a
special respondent by state court order, the injury “plaintiffs wanted restrained
[had] occurred.” Aplee. App. at 56. That is, the state court order making
Ms. Shell a special respondent caused the injury for which plaintiffs sought relief
in federal court. Moreover, plaintiffs’ supplements to their federal complaint
essentially asked the federal district court to perform appellate review of the state
court’s order–review that is barred by Rooker-Feldman . Notwithstanding,
plaintiffs make two attempts to avoid this result. Both are unavailing.
First, plaintiffs assert that Ms. Shell (in Ms. Fields’s words) “has never
been” a party to the underlying dependency and neglect action and that
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Rooker-Feldman is therefore inapplicable. Fields’s Aplt. Br. at 8 (citing Johnson
v. De Grandy , 512 U.S. 997, 1006 (1994)); but see Kenmen Eng’g , 314 F.3d at
480 (rejecting the “contention that the absence of a full and fair opportunity to
litigate a claim in the prior state-court proceeding bars application of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine”). Plaintiffs’ assertion that Ms. Shell “has never been”
a party to the underlying case, Fields’s Aplt. Br. at 8, is false. The state court
made Ms. Shell a party to the dependency and neglect action by order dated
May 9, 2003, at which point Ms. Shell could have appealed the state court order
that made her a special respondent and raised her federal claims.
Second, plaintiffs contend that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “does not bar
federal court actions raising federal claims that were not litigated in the state
court proceedings,” Fields’s Aplt. Br. at 9, and that plaintiffs’ federal causes of
action “were never raised in the [state] court and were not the subject of the state
court hearing,” Shell’s Aplt. Br. at 13-14. On the facts of this case, this claim is
without merit. Although plaintiffs did not raise their federal claims in state court,
these claims are inextricably intertwined with the state court order; moreover,
plaintiffs’ prior omission of their federal claims cannot now be used to
circumvent application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Taylor v. Fed. Nat.
Mortgage Ass’n , 374 F.3d 529, 532-33 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[F]ederal claims
presented to the district court that were not raised in state court . . . may still be
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subject to Rooker-Feldman if those claims are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a
state court judgment.”); Strasen v. Strasen , 897 F. Supp. 1179, 1183 (E.D. Wis.
1995) (“A district court may not entertain an argument that, even if not argued in
state court, is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state court judgment.”).
III. Conclusion
The district court properly concluded that it was without subject matter
jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to entertain plaintiffs’ claims
against the Fremont County defendants. For the same reason, the district court
did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’ identical claims against
Mr. Kender and Ms. Owen. The district court should have sua sponte dismissed
the claims against Mr. Kender and Ms. Owen for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction rather than address the merits of plaintiffs’ claims against these two
defendants. See Tafoya v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 748 F.2d 1389, 1390
(10th Cir. 1984) (“Insofar as subject matter jurisdiction is concerned, it has long
been recognized that a federal court must, sua sponte , satisfy itself of its power to
adjudicate in every case and at every stage of the proceedings . . . .”). Because
the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over any of the claims
raised by plaintiffs, we MODIFY the district court’s dismissal of all claims
against all defendants to be for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the
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Rooker-Feldman doctrine. As modified, the district court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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