Saleh v. Ray

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
AUG 19 2004
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
MOHAMMED SALEH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 03-3364
(D.C. No. 02-CV-3241-CM)
M. E. RAY, Warden, United States (D. Kan.)
Penitentiary, Leavenworth; WALTER
WOODS, Captain; UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA; R. DARROW,
Lieutenant, United States Penitentiary,
Leavenworth,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , Chief Judge, MURPHY , Circuit Judge, and CAUTHRON , **
Chief District Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
The Honorable Robin J. Cauthron, Chief District Judge, United States
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation.
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Mohammed Saleh, a federal prisoner appearing pro se, appeals the
district court’s dismissal of his civil rights complaint. Plaintiff filed suit against
the United States and the individual defendants, all prison officials working at the
United States Penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas, alleging they violated his
First and Eighth Amendment constitutional rights by placing him in
administrative detention because of his Muslim faith and using excessive force in
placing him in ambulatory restraints.
The district court dismissed plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims, finding
no evidence in the record to suggest that plaintiff suffered any injury at all as a
result of the restraints and that the placement of plaintiff in ambulatory restraints
in order to quell a prison disturbance did not amount to cruel and unusual
punishment. The district court dismissed plaintiff’s First Amendment claims,
finding that plaintiff had failed to articulate any interference with the practice of
his Muslim beliefs or any evidence of religious retaliation. It also found nothing
in the record tending to show that defendants’ actions burdened the free exercise
of plaintiff’s religion in violation of Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).
The district court also dismissed the claims against the United States and the
defendants in their official capacities.
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On appeal, plaintiff contends the district court erred in granting summary
judgment without first allowing him to conduct discovery and in concluding his
constitutional rights were not violated. We review the district court’s grant of
summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as did the district court.
Amro v. Boeing Co. , 232 F.3d 790, 796 (10th Cir. 2000). We view the evidence
and draw any inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing
summary judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 255
(1986). The nonmoving party must, however, identify sufficient evidence that
would require submission of the case to the jury, and factual disputes about
immaterial matters are irrelevant to a summary judgment determination. See id .
at 248-49.
We affirm for substantially the same reasons set forth by the district court
in its comprehensive and well-reasoned decision. The evidence, viewed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, does not support a reasonable inference that
he was subjected to unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, see Whitley v.
Albers , 475 U.S. 312, 320, 322 (1986), nor does it support any violation of his
First Amendment or RFRA rights. Further, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by deciding the summary judgment motion without first allowing
plaintiff to complete discovery. Because defendants raised a qualified immunity
defense, the district court properly stayed discovery while that defense was
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resolved. See Workman v. Jordan , 958 F.2d 332, 336 (10th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff
failed to file an affidavit explaining his need for additional discovery, as required
by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f), and his motion seeking to compel discovery never
informed the district court with any specificity how additional information would
help him oppose defendants’ motion for summary judgment. See Ben Ezra,
Weinstein & Co. v. Am. Online Inc. , 206 F.3d 980, 987 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding
that, under Rule 56(f), nonmoving party seeking additional discovery must
demonstrate precisely how additional discovery will lead to a genuine issue of
material fact); DiCesare v. Stuart , 12 F.3d 973, 979 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that
Rule 56(f) applies to pro se litigants).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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