Jesse v. Mosier

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAN 24 2002
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
In re:
BLACKRIDGE RANCH, INC.,
Debtor.
DALE R. JESSE; TED W.
CRAWFORD,
Appellants,
v. No. 00-4198
(D.C. No. 00-CV-302-ST)
R. KIMBALL MOSIER, Trustee; (D. Utah)
MONTE D. TIPTON; BRUCE
WHITED; DANIEL W. HUNTER;
INDIAN SPRINGS WATER
COMPANY,
Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , Chief Judge, SEYMOUR , Circuit Judge, and BRORBY ,
Senior Circuit Judge.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellants Dale R. Jesse and Ted W. Crawford challenge the bankruptcy
court’s approval of the settlement of an adversary proceeding brought by appellee
R. Kimball Mosier, trustee, on behalf of the debtor, Blackridge Ranch, Inc.
(Blackridge). The bankruptcy court approved the Settlement Agreement over
appellants’ objections, finding that the proposed settlement represented a fair and
equitable resolution of the Estate’s claims and that the proposed settlement was in
the best interests of the Estate and its creditors. On appeal, the district court
affirmed this order, finding that appellants had failed to show that the bankruptcy
court abused its discretion in approving the Settlement Agreement. We now
affirm the district court.
I.
At the outset we are faced with a jurisdictional question involving the
timeliness of appellants’ notice of appeal. The district court entered its order
affirming the bankruptcy court on October 11, 2000. The thirty-day deadline for
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filing a timely notice of appeal expired on November 13, 2000. 1
The district
court docket sheet indicates that appellants’ notice of appeal was filed on
November 14, 2000, one day past the deadline. The notice of appeal was
file-stamped by the clerk on November 14, 2000 at 2:35 p.m. R. doc. 13.
In response to a show cause order from this court, appellants presented an
electronic tracking receipt, confirming delivery by the United States Postal
Service of an express mail item addressed by them to the district court at
2:24 p.m. on November 13. They also presented a letter from the chief deputy
clerk of the district court, stating that their notice of appeal was incorrectly
file-stamped on November 14th rather than November 13th.
A notice of appeal is considered timely filed if received by the clerk on
time, even if not formally filed until a later date. See, e.g., Houston v. Lack ,
487 U.S. 266, 273 (1988) (explaining general rule). A presumption arises that
a document was received by the clerk on the date it was file-stamped; however,
this presumption may be overcome by a sufficient evidentiary showing. United
States v. Preston , 352 F.2d 352, 353 n.1 (9th Cir. 1965). We are persuaded by
appellants’ evidence that the clerk of the district court received their notice of
1
The thirtieth day actually fell on Friday, November 10, 2000. On
that day, however, the courts were closed for Veterans’ Day, a federal holiday.
Accordingly, the notice of appeal was due on Monday, November 13.
See Fed. R. App. P. 26(a)(3).
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appeal on November 13, 2000, that the notice was timely, and that we therefore
possess jurisdiction over this appeal.
II.
“In reviewing a district court’s decision affirming the decision of
a bankruptcy court, this court applies the same standards of review which
governed the district court.” Tulsa Energy, Inc. v. KPL Prod. Co. (In re
Tulsa Energy, Inc.) , 111 F.3d 88, 89 (10th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted).
“A bankruptcy court’s decision to approve or disapprove a settlement is reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard.” Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line
Pilots Ass’n, Int’l (In re Continental Airlines Corp.) , 907 F.2d 1500, 1520
(5th Cir. 1990). To the extent the bankruptcy court’s decision relies upon
conclusions of law, we review such conclusions de novo . Tulsa Energy , 111 F.3d
at 89.
Having carefully reviewed the briefs, the record and the applicable law
in light of the above-referenced standards, we discern no abuse of discretion or
legal error in the bankruptcy court’s order approving the Settlement Agreement.
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Accordingly, the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of
Utah is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Wade Brorby
Senior Circuit Judge
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