Corber v. Massanari

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 11 2001
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JUDY K. CORBER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 00-3390
(D.C. No. 99-CV-4097-DES)
LARRY G. MASSANARI, * Acting (D. Kan.)
Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration ,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT **
Before TACHA , Chief Judge, BALDOCK , Circuit Judge, and BRORBY ,
Senior Circuit Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
*
On March 29, 2001, Larry G. Massanari became the Acting Commissioner
of Social Security. In accordance with Rule 43(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, Mr. Massanari is substituted for Kenneth S. Apfel as the
appellee in this action.
**
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Claimant Judy K. Corber appeals from a memorandum and order of the
district court affirming the Commissioner’s denial of her applications for
supplemental security income benefits and for disability benefits under the Social
Security Act. We affirm.
Mrs. Corber filed her applications alleging disability beginning
February 15, 1995, due to depression, high blood pressure, and back and leg pain.
An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined she had several severe
impairments, as that term is defined in the regulations, but that those impairments,
whether considered singly or in combination, did not rise to the level of a listed,
or a conclusively disabling impairment. After reviewing the evidence and
medical record, the ALJ then found that Mrs. Corber did not meet her burden of
demonstrating she was unable to perform her past relevant work, namely, that of a
retail sales clerk. Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Mrs. Corber was not
disabled under step four of the Commission’s five-step sequential process for
determining disability. See Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-51 (10th Cir.
1988) (setting out process).
Mrs. Corber sought review by the Appeals Council on September 2, 1998.
Subsequently, Mrs. Corber’s attorney submitted additional evidence to the
-2-
Appeals Council, which included a letter from Dr. P. L. Duniven dated August 14,
1997, reporting findings made from an M.R.I. performed on Mrs. Corber. While
dated prior to the date of the ALJ’s decision (August 24, 1998), the M.R.I. report
was not before the ALJ at the time of his decision.
The Appeals Council denied Mrs. Corber’s request for review on July 28,
1999, and she sought further review from the United States District Court for the
District of Kansas, alleging several errors at the administrative level. After an
independent review of the entire record, the district court affirmed the ALJ’s
decision, finding it was supported by substantial evidence. This appeal followed.
We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether his factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence in light of the entire record, and to
determine whether he applied the correct legal standards. Hargis v. Sullivan, 945
F.2d 1482, 1486 (10th Cir. 1991). “Substantial evidence is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Id. (citation omitted). “Evidence is insubstantial if it is overwhelmingly
contradicted by other evidence.” O’Dell v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 855, 858 (10th Cir.
1994) (citation omitted).
-3-
New Evidence
In her summary of issues on appeal, Mrs. Corber makes passing reference
to an argument that the district court acted improperly as a “trier of fact by
evaluating the evidence.” Aplt. Br. at 13. Later, in the context of the analysis of
evaluating allegations of pain, she clarifies this argument by alleging the district
court made a “serious error” when it “evaluated,” and “weighed the evidentiary
value” of the M.R.I. report performed by Dr. Duniven, which, she claims, was not
considered by the Appeals Council. Id. at 16. However, as noted by the district
court, the record is clear that the Appeals Council did consider the M.R.I. in its
denial of review dated June 2, 1999, in which the Council makes particular
reference to Dr. Duniven’s report. This circuit has held that when the Appeals
Council denies review, the ALJ’s decision becomes the Commission’s final
decision that is reviewed for substantial evidence. The record to be considered on
review, however, includes all of the evidence before the Appeals Council,
including new evidence that was not before the ALJ. See O’Dell, 44 F.3d at 858-
59. Consequently, consideration of new evidence for a determination of whether
the record is supported by “substantial evidence” under the overall framework of
evaluating pain prescribed by Luna v. Bowen , 834 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1987), is
entirely proper by a reviewing court. Therefore, we hold that the district court
-4-
did not err when it specifically considered the M.R.I. report as a part of the record.
Impairment Listing
In his decision, the ALJ found that Mrs. Corber established she was not
currently engaged in substantial gainful activity (step 1 of the five-part sequential
evaluation process for determining disability), and that she had several
impairments which could be potentially disabling (step 2). Specifically, the ALJ
found Mrs. Corber “has major depression, single episode; dysthymic disorder;
anxiety disorder; borderline intellectual functioning; hypertension, with no
evidence of organ damage; and chronic low back pain and right hip and leg pain,
etiology unknown.” Aplt. App. (Soc. Sec. Record) at 32. However, the ALJ also
found that these impairments, whether considered individually or in combination,
did not rise to the level of a Listed Impairment in the regulations, which would
conclusively establish a disability. Id.On appeal, Mrs. Corber disputes the ALJ’s conclusion that she did not meet
Listing 12.04 (Affective Disorder) and Listing 12.06 (Anxiety Related Disorders).
She cites Clifton v. Chater , 79 F.3d 1007 (10th Cir. 1996), to initially argue that
the ALJ’s conclusion was not sufficiently explained, and that the evidence was
not directly associated with his finding that the impairments did not meet the
severity requirements for the regulation’s listings. In Clifton, a panel of this court
reversed the district court and remanded the case for additional proceedings when
-5-
the ALJ made “such a bare conclusion” that it was effectively “beyond
meaningful judicial review.” Clifton, 79 F.3d at 1009. However, as we explained
then, our decision was based on the fact that “the ALJ did not discuss the
evidence or his reasons for determining that appellant was not disabled at step
three, or even identify the relevant Listing or Listings; he merely stated a
summary conclusion that appellant’s impairments did not meet or equal any Listed
Impairment.” Id. This is not the case before us now. Here, the ALJ went to great
lengths to identify the relevant listings, discuss the evidence (including objective
medical reports that discounted the severity of Mrs. Corber’s impairments) and
follow the appropriate procedure for documenting the Psychiatric Review
Technique Form ratings. These findings are far from the type of summary
conclusion we rejected in Clifton, and, therefore, are not beyond any meaningful
judicial review.
Mrs. Corber alternatively argues the ALJ’s conclusion at step three is
not supported by substantial evidence. Both Listing 12.04 and 12.06 require
a finding of severity which is spelled out in detail in the social security
regulations. 1
See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1, §§ 12.04, 12.06. After
determining that Mrs. Corber met the requirements under the first part of each
1
The ALJ also analyzed Mrs. Corber’s condition under § 12.05, however, the
ALJ’s decision regarding that section was not argued before the district court and
is not disputed in this appeal.
-6-
section, namely, the presence of evidence of depression, dysthymic disorder, and
anxiety disorder, the ALJ made findings that these impairments resulted in no
restrictions on her activities of daily living and only slight difficulties in her
maintaining social functioning. Additionally, the ALJ found that she seldom had
deficiencies of concentration, persistence or pace resulting in failure to complete
tasks in a timely manner and that she never had episodes of deterioration or
decompensation in work or work-like settings. All of these findings were well
below the level of severity necessary for a finding of disabled under the
regulations, 2
and we agree with the district court that the ALJ’s conclusion that
Mrs. Corber, although perhaps not symptom-free, is not so severely impaired that
her difficulties rise to a listing level. We have also conducted a thorough review
of the medical record, as we must in these cases, and we hold the ALJ’s decision
2
For an impairment to be considered severe enough to be conclusively
disabling under the relevant versions of either § 12.04 or § 12.06, the impairment
must result in at least two of the following consequences:
(1) Marked restriction of activities of daily living; or (2) Marked
difficulties in maintaining social functioning; or (3) Deficiencies of
concentration, persistence, or pace resulting in frequent failure to
complete tasks in a timely manner (in work settings or elsewhere); or
(4) Repeated episodes of deterioration or decompensation in work or
work-like settings which cause the individual to withdraw from that
situation or to experience exacerbation of signs and symptoms (which
may include deterioration of adaptive behaviors).
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404 Subpt. P., App. 1, §§ 12.04(B), 12.06(B).
-7-
on this point is supported by substantial evidence for substantially the same
reasons as those set forth by the district court.
Evaluation of Pain
Mrs. Corber next claims that the ALJ erred by failing to properly evaluate
her subjective complaints of disabling pain. First, Mrs. Corber argues that the
ALJ erred in his application of the framework for evaluating disability based on
pain found in Luna , 834 F.2d 161. Specifically, she states that the ALJ “fails to
lay out his decision in a fashion which portrays his analysis . . . [and instead] the
ALJ intermingles his credibility analysis with his review of the objective
evidence.” Aplt. Br. at 14. We disagree. Under the first prong of the Luna
analysis , the claimant has the burden to demonstrate a pain-producing impairment
by objective medical evidence. Luna, 834 F.2d at 163. In connection with this
requirement, we have said, “[t]he first component of this inquiry, the objective
impairment prerequisite, is fulfilled without regard to subjective evidence” and
without assessing the claimant’s credibility. Williams, 844 F.2d at 753. Pursuant
to this requirement, the ALJ in this case specifically stated that there was no
objective evidence to document a pain-inducing impairment. His finding that the
medical evidence establishes pain, albeit with an unknown cause, is in complete
-8-
accord with that statement and is amply supported by the record. 3
Therefore it is
clear that the ALJ did not err by allowing his credibility assessment to affect the
initial determination of whether there was objective proof of some pain-inducing
impairment.
The ALJ separately found Mrs. Corber’s testimony about her subjective
level of pain not credible, based, in part, on the absence of documented objective
evidence of a disabling impairment. This is not the same as using a credibility
assessment to preclude, at the outset, consideration of existing objective evidence
in order to avoid further analysis of a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain.
Indeed, an ALJ is obligated to evaluate those subjective complaints, even if they
are unsubstantiated by objective medical evidence. See Nieto v. Heckler, 750
3
That particular finding, which states “[t]he medical evidence establishes
that claimant has . . . chronic low back pain and right hip and leg pain, etiology
unknown,” was made under step two of the five-step sequential process for
determining disability. See, Aplt. Br. Supp. at 32. That step requires a claimant
to make a “threshold showing that [her] medically determinable impairment or
combination of impairments significantly limits [her] ability to do basic work
activities . . . .” Williams, 844 F.2d at 751. The showing in step two is a de
minimis showing of severity which is designed to identify “those claimants whose
medical impairments are so slight that it is unlikely they would be found to be
disabled . . . .” Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 153 (1987). We note that, due to
the incremental nature of the sequential process, a finding at step two that
medical evidence establishes an impairment, does not preclude, and may be
entirely consistent with, a contrary finding in an evaluation of severity of
disabling pain under Luna, or a finding at step four that there is no objective
evidence of a disabling impairment that prevents the claimant from performing
past relevant work.
-9-
F.2d 59, 61 (10th Cir. 1984). Thus, we find that there was no improper
“intermingling” of any credibility and objective evidence analyses as alleged by
Mrs. Corber. Furthermore, we agree with the district court that the ALJ applied
the Luna framework sufficiently in this case by making detailed findings that
specifically related to the required showings, such that his final conclusion was
capable of review and ultimately supported by substantial evidence.
Mrs. Corber next argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating her subjective
complaints of pain under the final prong of Luna. Under that prong, the ALJ is to
consider “all the evidence presented to determine whether the claimant’s pain is
in fact disabling.” Luna, 834 F.2d at 163. This evidence includes “all medical
data presented, any other objective indications of pain, and subjective accounts of
the severity of the pain.” Williams, 844 F.2d at 753. “At this point, the decision
maker may assess the claimant’s credibility.” Id.In Luna, as in other cases, this court described the factors an ALJ should
consider in evaluating subjective allegations of pain. See 834 F.2d at 165-66.
And we emphasize, once again, that “credibility determinations are peculiarly the
province of the finder of fact,” and should not be upset if supported by substantial
evidence. Kepler v. Chater , 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995) (quotation
omitted). The opportunity to observe and evaluate the demeanor of a witness in
cases like this “is invaluable, and should not be discarded lightly. Therefore,
-10-
special deference is traditionally afforded a trier of fact who makes a credibility
finding.” Williams, 844 F.2d at 755 (quotation and citations omitted). Our
review of the record reveals that the ALJ considered a number of factors which
were relevant to the credibility of Mrs. Corber’s allegations of pain as well as
several “subjective measures of credibility that are peculiarly within the judgment
of the ALJ.” Kepler, 68 F.3d at 391 (quotations omitted). To recite them again
would be duplicitous of the memorandum of the district court which articulated,
in great detail, its reasons for finding the ALJ had not erred. We add only that
during the hearing, the ALJ spent time questioning Mrs. Corber on both her
psychological as well as her physical limitations. His evaluation of the evidence
reflects the fact that he thoroughly considered the psychological evidence in
relation to her subjective complaints of pain, and he specifically found that
evidence to be exaggerated and inconsistent with her objective medical history.
The ALJ linked his determination of credibility to specific findings of facts in
evidence which are fairly derived from the record. Thus, in light of our narrow
scope of review, we are compelled to accept that determination. We therefore
agree with the district court that the ALJ’s determination as to Mrs. Corber’s
-11-
credibility, and his conclusion that her allegations of pain were not disabling
under the final prong of Luna, are supported by substantial evidence. 4
RFC Assessment
At step four of the sequential process for determining disability, the ALJ
found that, despite her impairments, Mrs. Corber had the residual functional
capacity (RFC) to perform work she had done in the past as a retail sales clerk.
Mrs. Corber argues that her mental impairments, along with evidence of physical
ailments and pain, met her burden of proving that she is unable to perform that
work and that, therefore, the ALJ erred in his RFC determination. In Winfrey v.
Chater , 92 F.3d 1017 (10th Cir. 1996), we discussed the three phases of step four.
In the first phase, the ALJ must evaluate a claimant’s physical
and mental residual functional capacity (RFC), and in the second
phase, he must determine the physical and mental demands of the
claimant’s past relevant work. In the final phase, the ALJ determines
whether the claimant has the ability to meet the job demands found in
phase two despite the mental and/or physical limitations found in
phase one.
4
This is true despite the existence of Dr. Duniven’s M.R.I., discussed
previously, which was not before the ALJ, but which was, nevertheless,
considered by the Appeals Council and the district court. We have already
concluded that it was proper for the district court to review the report. Now we
agree with that court that consideration of its substance does not change the fact
that the ALJ’s determination is supported by substantial evidence as the report
does not contradict the ALJ’s finding of a limited, but not disabling impairment.
See O’Dell, 44 F.3d at 859.
-12-
Id. at 1023 (citations omitted). The ALJ must make specific findings at each of
these phases, and those findings must be supported by substantial evidence. See
id.
Mrs. Corber’s specific argument on appeal is that the ALJ erred in making
his assessment by relying on raw medical data, and that he should have obtained
some analysis or opinion by a treating or examining physician, or by an expert
medical source. Again, we disagree. The determination of RFC is an
administrative assessment, based upon all of the evidence of how the claimant’s
impairments and related symptoms affect her ability to perform work related
activities. See Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *2, *5. The final
responsibility for determining RFC rests with the Commissioner, and because the
assessment is made based upon all of the evidence in the record, not only the
relevant medical evidence, it is well within the province of the ALJ.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(2); 404.1546; 404.1545; 416.946.
Moreover, the record in this case includes numerous reports from treating
and consultative physicians, all of which contributed to the body of
understandable evidence upon which the ALJ could draw to make his assessment.
Mrs. Corber was questioned by her own counsel, as well as the ALJ, concerning
her mental and physical RFC, the mental and physical demands of her past
relevant work and her ability to do that work. Additionally, the ALJ had the
-13-
benefit of properly elicited testimony from a vocational expert concerning the
second and third phase of the analysis, including testimony specifically directed at
the combined effect of Mrs. Corber’s mental and physical limitations on her
ability to work. Therefore, it is clear from our reading of this record that the ALJ
performed the proper analysis under step four, and that his findings are specific
and supported by substantial evidence.
Finding Mrs. Corber not disabled under step four, the ALJ was not required
to proceed in the sequential analysis, and therefore he was not obligated to use the
Medical-Vocational Guidelines. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 2, §200
(guidelines apply where impairments preclude performance of past relevant
work).
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas
is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
-14-