Alvarez v. Maye

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS August 25, 2015
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FELIX ALVAREZ,
Petitioner-Appellant,
No. 15-3116
v. (D.C. No.5:14-CV-03106-RDR)
(D. Kan.)
CLAUDE MAYE, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HARTZ, TYMKOVICH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
Felix Alvarez appeals the dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We AFFIRM. Because § 2241 is not the proper
vehicle for his claims, the district court lacked statutory jurisdiction.
I. Background
In 2000, Alvarez was convicted of multiple drug crimes in the District of
Nebraska. The Eighth Circuit affirmed his conviction but remanded for
resentencing, after which he unsuccessfully moved to vacate his sentence under
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
28 U.S.C. § 2255. He was subsequently transferred to a prison located in the
District of Kansas.
Then, in 2011, Alvarez filed a pro se habeas petition under § 2241 in the
District of Nebraska. The court dismissed the petition, observing that a § 2241
petition must be brought in the district of incarceration. The court further noted it
could not consider the petition even if it were construed as a § 2255 petition
(which is brought in the district of sentencing) because Alvarez had not sought or
received permission from the Eighth Circuit to file a second or successive § 2255
motion.
Again acting pro se, 1 Alvarez refiled his § 2241 petition in the District of
Kansas in 2014, purporting to take advantage of the “savings clause” of § 2255(e)
to attack the validity of his sentence in a § 2241 petition. 2 Although the petition
is unclear, it appeared to assert his sentence was invalid under Alleyne v. United
States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), which held that facts increasing a mandatory
minimum sentence must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 2155. 3 The court dismissed the petition on the grounds that (1)
1
We construe his pro se filings liberally. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106,
1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
2
Generally, a sentence’s validity cannot be challenged in a § 2241 petition
absent the use of this “savings clause.” We discuss this point more fully below.
3
Although he appeared to gesture toward other substantive arguments
against the validity of his sentence below, he has waived any such arguments here
(continued...)
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§ 2241 is an improper vehicle for his claims because § 2255 provides an adequate
remedy, and (2) his Alleyne-based claims would in any event fail on the merits
because Alleyne does not apply to cases on federal collateral habeas review.
II. Analysis
We review the dismissal of a § 2241 habeas petition de novo. Brace v.
United States, 634 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 2011).
Section 2241 petitions attack “the execution of a sentence rather than its
validity and must be filed in the district where the prisoner is confined.” Id.
These petitions object to “the nature of a prisoner’s confinement.” Prost v.
Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 581 (10th Cir. 2011). Conversely, federal prisoners who
wish to attack the legality or validity of their sentence or conviction generally are
limited to pursuing that goal through a § 2255 petition filed in the district that
imposed the sentence. Brace, 634 F.3d at 1169 (noting § 2255 petitions are
generally “the exclusive remedy” for these prisoners). Thus, a district court
usually lacks statutory jurisdiction over a § 2241 petition that professes to attack
the legality or validity of the prisoner’s detention, see Abernathy v. Wandes, 713
F.3d 538, 557–58 (10th Cir. 2013), which Alvarez’s § 2241 petition clearly does. 4
3
(...continued)
by only raising Alleyne arguments on appeal. Petrella v. Brownback, 787 F.3d
1242, 1266 n.10 (10th Cir. 2015).
4
Alvarez’s explicit reliance on the savings clause in his brief demonstrates
(continued...)
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In narrow circumstances, however, § 2255(e)’s “savings clause” allows a
federal prisoner to challenge the legality of his detention under § 2241 if he
shows the “remedy by [§ 2255] motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of his detention.” Brace, 634 F.3d at 1169 (alteration in original). But
“[o]nly in rare instances will § 2255 fail as an adequate or effective remedy to
challenge a conviction or the sentence imposed.” Sines v. Wilner, 609 F.3d 1070,
1073 (10th Cir. 2010). Examples of true inadequacy include cases where the
original sentencing court has been abolished, the sentencing court refuses to
consider the § 2255 motion, or a single sentencing court lacks the ability to “grant
complete relief when sentences have been imposed by multiple courts.” Id.
No obstacles of that type exist here. To the contrary, although Alvarez has
already filed one § 2255 petition, the statute expressly provides a mechanism by
which prisoners like him can seek permission from the “appropriate court of
appeals” to file a second or successive petition in the appropriate district relying
on a “new rule of constitutional law” like the one established by Alleyne. 28
U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2). As far as we can tell, Alvarez remains free to request that
permission from the Eighth Circuit. Indeed, he had not done so when he filed his
§ 2241 petition in the District of Nebraska in 2011, see R., Vol. I at 28, and the
record reveals no action on his part between then and the filing of his § 2241
4
(...continued)
that he understands this challenge as one that normally cannot be brought under
§ 2241—i.e., as one that challenges the validity of his confinement.
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petition in the District of Kansas. Whether the Eighth Circuit would grant that
request does not affect our decision here. We only ask whether there is a path
pursuant to § 2255 for Alvarez to attempt his desired attack on his sentence’s
validity. Because one exists, § 2255 is adequate. See Prost, 636 F.3d at 584
(“[T]he [savings] clause is concerned with process—ensuring the petitioner an
opportunity to bring his argument—not with substance—guaranteeing nothing
about what the opportunity promised will ultimately yield in terms of relief.”).
Consequently, the district court lacked statutory jurisdiction, and it properly
dismissed the petition. 5 We thus need not address the merits of Alvarez’s claims.
III. Conclusion
We AFFIRM the dismissal of Alvarez’s § 2241 petition.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
5
Although the court did not explicitly state it was dismissing for lack of
jurisdiction, it did conclude Alvarez failed to satisfy the savings clause. In such
cases, it is plain that the district court lacked statutory jurisdiction, and we
construe a dismissal on these grounds as resting on that rationale. Abernathy, 713
F.3d at 558.
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