Thompson v. Ramsey

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 21 2001
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TERRY D. THOMPSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 00-7018
(D.C. No. 98-CV-336-S)
DOLORES RAMSEY, D.O.C., (E.D. Okla.)
Designee, Director; GARY GIBSON,
D.O.C. O.S.P. Warden; JIMMY
MARTIN, D.O.C. O.S.P. Unit
Manager; RON WARD, D.O.C. O.S.P.
Warden; ROBERT BERRY, D.O.C.
O.S.P. Case Manager,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL , PORFILIO , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Terry D. Thompson appeals the district court’s dismissal of his
civil rights complaint, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as frivolous.
Because plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim was supported by specific factual
allegations and evidence raising genuine issues of fact, we affirm in part and
reverse in part, and remand the case for further proceedings.
Plaintiff is incarcerated at the Oklahoma State Penitentiary in McAlester,
Oklahoma, serving a 2,000-year sentence after conviction of eight counts of
sexually assaulting his minor children. Because of the nature of his crime,
plaintiff alleges that he is in constant danger if he is required to share a prison
cell, and he seeks to be removed from the general population and assigned to a
single cell.
Plaintiff alleges that since August 1997, he has been requesting prison
officials to place him in protective custody. The evidence shows the following:
(1) On August 25, 1997, plaintiff filed a grievance alleging that on August
1, 1997, he had requested placement in protective custody from prison official
Watson, who informed him that protective custody was full and that he should
have thought about the consequences before he did his crime, but that Watson
eventually helped him with a cell change; that on August 6, he was again required
-2-
to share a cell with a general population prisoner and that his request for
protective custody to prison official Anderson was ignored; and that prison
official Mullin also ignored plaintiff’s August 18, 1997 Request to Staff seeking
protective custody. Plaintiff identified his conviction for a sexual offense as the
reason that he needed protection, but he did not identify any specific threats to his
safety.
(2) On August 28, 1997, plaintiff refused an order to pack his belongings
and move to a general population unit which he felt was dangerous. Plaintiff
informed the guard that he would take a write-up because he was trying to get
into protective custody. During the investigation of this charge, plaintiff
informed investigator Hall that his life had been threatened.
(3) On September 2, 1997, plaintiff’s grievance, requesting protective
custody, was forwarded to Unit Manager Mullin, and on September 8, 1997,
plaintiff repeated his request for protective custody. Plaintiff alleges in his sworn
complaint that he informed defendant Berry on September 9, 1997, that his
cellmate was threatening him based on his sex offense. His request for protective
custody was denied by both the Unit Classification Committee and reviewing
authority John East, because plaintiff had not pointed to a specific threat or filed
separatees against any named inmates.
-3-
(4) On October 2, 1997, plaintiff filed a grievance requesting that prison
officials reconsider their decision to deny him protective custody, attaching
previous grievances and an “Emergency Complaint” to an attorney expressing his
concerns over his safety. This grievance was returned unanswered because he
attached too many pages and failed to attach a request to staff.
(5) On December 1, 1997, plaintiff filed a grievance in which he alleged
that he had notified Warden Ron Ward on October 24, 1997, that his cellmate was
making a “shank”; that after this complaint was ignored, plaintiff’s cellmate cut
him on the neck and raped him repeatedly; that on November 15, 1997, plaintiff
refused to “lockdown” until his complaints were resolved; that on November 17
he was verbally abused by guards Suter, Brown, and Chumly, and that Suter told
him that if he “did not go to the C-Unit, [Suter] would place [plaintiff] on D/U
[disciplinary unit], in a cell with someone that would certainly hurt [plaintiff].”
R. I, Doc. 21 at Ex. F7. Plaintiff was sent to the disciplinary unit on November
17, and his grievance alleged that on November 21, Suter and other officers
provoked another inmate and then locked him in a cell with plaintiff. Plaintiff
concluded that despite his many requests for protective custody, he had been
raped, assaulted, harassed, and threatened. The Warden’s response stated that an
investigation revealed that plaintiff’s allegations were unfounded and that he was
attempting to manipulate the staff.
-4-
(6) On December 10, 1997, plaintiff was transferred back to the general
population. On December 16, 1997, plaintiff alleges that he was threatened by his
cellmate, and that he therefore agreed to return to the disciplinary unit.
Defendants allege that plaintiff was transferred to the disciplinary unit on
December 16 because he refused to lockdown.
(7) In mid-January 1998, plaintiff was required to share a cell with inmate
Coward. According to plaintiff, his cellmate was mentally unstable and was not
receiving proper medication. Plaintiff filed grievances on Coward’s behalf with a
prison doctor and defendants Berry and Martin, requesting that Coward receive
the care he needed and noting Coward’s violent nature. On February 2, Coward
allegedly strangled plaintiff to the point that plaintiff had a “near death”
experience. Plaintiff did not report the incident until February 10, at which time
he was transferred to a different cell.
(8) On February 17, 1998, plaintiff filed another grievance requesting that
he be placed in protective custody or administrative segregation. He alleged that
his former cellmate had strangled him because other inmates told him to do so
based on plaintiff’s sex offense, and that defendant Berry and another guard had
purposely antagonized Coward. His request was denied first by defendant Martin,
based on the unit’s earlier decision and plaintiff’s continued inability to give
specific names, and later by defendants Gibson and Ramsey.
-5-
(9) On March 10, 1998, plaintiff filed a grievance complaining about
a prison guard making him share a cell with another inmate after his bad
experience with inmate Coward. Unit Manager Martin reiterated that plaintiff
would have to share a cell and that he should make an effort to get along with his
cellmate.
(10) On April 6, 1998, plaintiff again refused an order to move to a general
population unit, and he was returned to the disciplinary unit. On April 13, 1998,
plaintiff filed another grievance seeking protective custody or administrative
segregation. Defendant Martin again denied the request, stating that his decision
would not be changed by additional grievances, and defendants Gibson and
Ramsey again agreed, and warned plaintiff that he would be placed on grievance
restriction if he continued to abuse the grievance process.
(11) On May 11, 1998, plaintiff filed a grievance alleging that one of the
prison guards was provoking the inmates and relating a problem over a tray of
food. Plaintiff asked to have a separatee filed against the guard, which was
denied. This decision was affirmed by the warden, and on June 30, 1998, plaintiff
was placed on grievance restriction by defendant Ramsey.
(12) At some point, plaintiff received two threatening notes from fellow
inmates which he presented to the district court. There is no evidence, however,
that the notes were shown to prison authorities.
-6-
On July 8, 1998, plaintiff filed this civil rights action alleging violations of
the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment, and
the First Amendment guarantee of religious freedom. Plaintiff requested an
injunction ordering prison officials to place him in a single cell in protective
custody or administrative segregation, five million dollars in compensatory
damages, and five million dollars in punitive damages. On September 18, 1998,
plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint, in which he alleged that his Eighth
Amendment rights were still being violated by forcing him to share a cell, that he
had been exposed to tobacco smoke, and that he had been deprived of his legal
materials. The district court ordered defendants to file a Martinez report. 1 After
examining the parties’ submissions, the district court dismissed plaintiff’s claims
as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Plaintiff appealed.
Before we consider the merits of plaintiff’s appeal, we must examine
whether we have jurisdiction over this case. Although the district court issued its
order dismissing plaintiff’s complaint on September 18, 1999, the court did not
enter a separate judgment as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.
Further, because the September 1999 order contained detailed legal analysis, it
could not operate as a final judgment that started the time to appeal. Clough v.
Rush , 959 F.2d 182, 185 (10th Cir. 1992).
1
See Martinez v. Aaron , 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978).
-7-
On October 18, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
denied by minute order on December 13, 1999. This minute order was sufficient
to start the period within which to file an appeal. Because plaintiff’s notice of
appeal was filed on January 28, 2000, which was beyond the thirty-day period
allowed for an appeal, we asked the parties to file briefs regarding our
jurisdiction. Based on their responses, we conclude we have jurisdiction.
On December 18, 1999, plaintiff mailed a “Motion for Final Order to
Recuse” to the district court, which was received on January 3, 2000. The motion
identified the parties, the September 1999 dismissal of the complaint, and the
December 1999 minute order, and stated that plaintiff intended to appeal these
decisions as soon as the district court entered a final order in the case. This
document then, was the equivalent of a notice of appeal under Smith v. Barry , 502
U.S. 244, 248-49 (1992), preserving our jurisdiction over this appeal.
Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in dismissing his Eighth
Amendment claim as frivolous because he presented detailed evidence regarding
specific events and people. The district court found that plaintiff’s allegations
were conclusory and failed to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment.
Although it is not clear whether the district court dismissed this claim pursuant to
§ 1915(e)(2) or pursuant to defendant’s request under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),
our review is the same. We review the ruling de novo to determine whether “it is
-8-
obvious that plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it would be
futile to give him an opportunity to amend.” Curley v. Perry , 246 F.3d 1278,
1281-82 (10th Cir.) (comparing § 1915(e)(2) standard with that of Rule 12(b)(6)),
cert. denied , 2001 WL 884152 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2001) (No. 01-5423) (quotation
omitted). We agree with plaintiff that his allegations are sufficiently specific, and
assuming they are true, they suffice to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment.
Our analysis does not end here, however.
After submitting the Martinez report, defendants filed a motion to dismiss,
or in the alternative for summary judgment, based on the materials submitted with
the report. Plaintiff responded with a motion for summary judgment, to which he
attached evidentiary material in support. In dismissing the action, the district
court relied heavily on the submitted material. Because the district court
considered evidentiary materials outside the pleadings, the court should have
treated the motion as one for summary judgment, as directed by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b), which states, “[i]f, on a motion . . . to dismiss for failure
of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside
the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment . . . .” See Miller v. Glanz , 948 F.2d 1562,
1565 (10th Cir. 1991).
-9-
Ordinarily, the district court’s failure to convert the motion and to give
plaintiff notice and an opportunity to be heard would require reversal, unless the
dismissal could be justified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Jackson v.
Integra Inc. , 952 F.2d 1260, 1261 (10th Cir. 1991). In this case, however,
plaintiff had notice that defendants were seeking summary judgment, and availed
himself of the opportunity to respond with his own motion and supporting
materials. Therefore, exercising our plenary power, we will treat the district
court’s order as one granting summary judgment in favor of defendants. See
Pringle v. United States , 208 F.3d 1220, 1223 (10th Cir. 2000).
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo . McBride v. Deer ,
240 F.3d 1287, 1289 (10th Cir. 2001). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
An Eighth Amendment claim for failure to protect is comprised of two
elements. First, an inmate “must show that he is incarcerated under conditions
posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 834
(1994). Second, the inmate must establish that the prison official has
a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” i.e., that he or she is deliberately
-10-
indifferent to the inmate’s safety. Id. (quotation omitted). The prison official’s
state of mind is measured by a subjective, rather than an objective, standard. Id.
at 837. That is, the official must “both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he
must also draw the inference.” Id.Viewing the evidence in plaintiff’s favor, we conclude that he has raised
genuine issues of material fact regarding defendants’ responses to his requests for
protection. The evidence raises the issue of whether defendants were aware of a
substantial risk to plaintiff which they disregarded, in light of his convictions for
child sexual assault, his specific complaints about particular cellmates, and the
alleged comments made to plaintiff by prison staff. On this basis, summary
judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim is not
appropriate. For the same reasons, plaintiff’s request for an injunction must be
reexamined. Because the propriety of an injunction should be determined in the
first instance by the district court, we deny his motion to this court for an
injunction.
Plaintiff also argues that the district court erred in dismissing his
First Amendment claim that the prison has infringed on his religion by requiring
him to share a cell with inmates who desire homosexual contact with him. The
district court dismissed plaintiff’s claim on the ground that the Religious Freedom
-11-
Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (RFRA) has been declared unconstitutional.
See City of Boerne v. Flores , 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). Although plaintiff is
correct in arguing that his complaint also raised a direct First Amendment claim,
the district court’s error in not addressing this claim was harmless, as plaintiff has
failed to state a claim under the First Amendment.
Plaintiff’s allegations do not demonstrate a connection between the
requirement that he share a cell and homosexual contact. In fact, his allegations
of a single experience despite his numerous cellmates over the years undermines
his claim. Further, plaintiff has not alleged facts which demonstrate that the
double celling requirement is unreasonable. See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz , 482
U.S. 342, 348-53 (1987) (setting out reasonableness standard for free exercise
challenges by prisoners and applying factors).
Finally, plaintiff argues that his motion for the district court to recuse itself
should have been granted. We review the denial of a motion to recuse only for an
abuse of discretion. United States v. Burger , 964 F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir.
1992). The only grounds upon which plaintiff relies to show bias are that the
district court erroneously ruled against him and did not properly docket his
recusal motion. Adverse rulings alone are insufficient to show bias. See Willner
v. Univ. of Kan. , 848 F.2d 1023, 1028 (10th Cir. 1988). The district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s recusal motion.
-12-
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Oklahoma is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and remanded for further
proceedings.
Entered for the Court
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
-13-