Rouse v. Romero

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 22, 2013
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
XEZAKIA ROUSE,
Petitioner - Appellant, No. 13-2121
v. (D. N.M.)
ANTHONY ROMERO, (D.C. No. 1:11-CV-00405-JCH-SMV)
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER DENYING
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before TYMKOVICH, ANDERSON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this matter. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant and applicant, Xezakia Rouse, proceeding pro se, seeks a
certificate of appealability (“COA”) to enable him to appeal the dismissal of his
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order may be cited under the
terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for failure to exhaust state remedies. Finding that he
has failed to meet the requirements for the issuance of a COA, we deny him a
COA and dismiss this appeal.
Mr. Rouse pled no contest in state court and was found guilty of unlawfully
taking a motor vehicle, a third degree felony, in March 2011. He was further
found to be an habitual offender and was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment,
with three of the years suspended. Mr. Rouse apparently pursued neither a direct
appeal nor any state post-conviction remedies. 1
Mr. Rouse then filed the instant 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition on May 5, 2011.
Respondent argued simply that the petition should be dismissed because Mr.
Rouse failed to exhaust his state court remedies. The magistrate judge to whom
the matter was referred issued proposed findings and a recommended disposition,
concluding that the case should be dismissed on its merits, without making any
ruling on exhaustion. Then, on March 6, 2012, the district court adopted the
proposed findings and dismissed the case with prejudice. On appeal, our court
granted a COA on two claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and
denied a COA on Mr. Rouse’s other claims. 2 After Respondent sought a remand
1
Mr. Rouse claims that he attempted, pro se, to file a direct appeal, but his
appeal was never docketed because it was not notarized.
2
The two ineffective assistance of counsel claims on which our court
granted a COA were Mr. Rouse’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to honor his (Mr. Rouse’s) request to appeal his conviction, and for failing
(continued...)
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for a “hearing and consideration of the state court record,” our court granted the
uncontested remand. Respondent supplemented the record and, after further
proceedings, the magistrate judge ultimately recommended that the case be
dismissed because Mr. Rouse had failed to exhaust his state court remedies on the
two ineffective assistance of counsel claims because he had failed to present them
to the New Mexico Supreme Court.
Mr. Rouse filed objections 3 to the magistrate judge’s proposed findings.
The district court subsequently dismissed Mr. Rouse’s case without prejudice,
finding that he had not met his burden of showing that his ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claims were exhausted. The court also denied all of Mr. Rouse’s other
motions and requests. This request for a COA to allow an appeal followed. 4
“A COA is a prerequsite to appellate jurisdiction in a habeas action.”
Lockett v. Tramel, 711 F. 3d 1218, 1230 (10th Cir. 2013). It may issue “only if
the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected . . .
2
(...continued)
to pursue an argument that the charge against him should be dismissed for failure
to comply with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act.
3
We note that the district court observed that, along with Mr. Rouse’s
objections, he also “[t]rue to form, . . . filed a slew of unnecessary and repetitive
documents, which have done nothing but increase the delay in this case.” Mem.
Op. & Order at 4 n.5.
4
It appears that the district court did not address the issue of the availability
of a COA. Mr. Rouse has, nonetheless, sought a COA in our court.
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constitutional claims on the[ir] merits,” the applicant “must demonstrate that
reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional
claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
Where a district court’s ruling rests on procedural grounds, the applicant must
prove both “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition
states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural
ruling.” Id.; Woodward v. Cline, 693 F.3d 1289, 1292 (10th Cir. 2012).
The district court carefully and thoroughly explained why Mr. Rouse’s case
must be dismissed for failure to exhaust. It explained the exhaustion requirement
and correctly applied it to Mr. Rouse’s case. We cannot improve on the district
court’s explanation and analysis. 5 Mr. Rouse has failed to develop any ground
for disagreeing with or questioning that court’s discussion, reasoning and holding.
We therefore agree with the district court that, for substantially the reasons stated
by the court in its order of dismissal, Mr. Rouse has failed to establish that he is
entitled to the issuance of a COA.
5
We only note that no one, including the district court, specifically
addressed the issue of anticipatory default. See Anderson v. Sirmons, 476 F.3d
1131, 1139 n.7 (10th Cir. 2007). As we explained, “‘[a]nticipatory procedural
bar’ occurs when the federal courts apply procedural bar to an unexhausted claim
that would be procedurally barred under state law if the petitioner returned to
state court to exhaust it.” Id. (quoting Moore v. Schoeman, 288 F.3d 1231, 1233
n.3 (10th Cir. 2002)).
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For the foregoing reasons, we DENY Mr. Rouse a COA and DISMISS this
matter. We also DENY all pending motions, including Mr. Rouse’s motion for
release on personal recognizance without surety.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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