Bradley v. Gray

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 14 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ALFORD RAY BRADLEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 03-6172
v. (D.C. No. CIV-03-143-M)
TWYLA MASON GRAY, (W.D. Oklahoma)
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL , HENRY , and HARTZ , Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Alford R. Bradley, a prisoner acting pro se, brought suit in federal
district court against Defendant Oklahoma County District Judge Twyla M. Gray
under 42 U.S.C. §1983, for acting in a partial and biased manner in imposing a
$200.00 sanction on Plaintiff in a state post-conviction hearing, and for
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
sanctioning him without providing a “due process hearing” or court-appointed
counsel. Proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(i) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), the
district court dismissed his complaint as frivolous on May 27, 2003, on the
ground that it is clear from the face of the complaint that Judge Gray is absolutely
immune from liability on Plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff appeals the district court’s
dismissal of his complaint. We affirm.
The standard of review for dismissal of a complaint on judicial-immunity
grounds is generally de novo. Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, 318 F.3d 1183, 1187
(10th Cir. 2003). This court has not yet resolved, however, whether a dismissal
of a complaint as frivolous should be reviewed for abuse of discretion or de novo.
See Plunk v. Givens, 234 F.3d 1128, 1130 (10th Cir. 2000). Thus, the standard of
review is somewhat open to question. In any event, this matter need not be
resolved in the instant case, because there is no reversible error under either
standard.
It is firmly established that judges enjoy absolute immunity from suit for all
“judicial acts” unless they have acted “in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978). This immunity “protect[s]
judicial independence by insulating judges from vexatious actions prosecuted by
disgruntled litigants.” Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988) (citing
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 348 (1872)).
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The “judicial acts” for which judges enjoy immunity include all functions
normally performed by a judge when the parties deal with the judge in her judicial
capacity. Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. Plaintiff’s suspicions that Judge Gray was
biased against him are unavailing. Immunity for judicial acts cannot “be affected
by the motives with which [they] are performed.” Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at
347. Nor does the fact that Plaintiff brought a § 1983 action alter the
applicability of this doctrine. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554–55 (1967).
The acts for which Plaintiff sued Judge Gray—namely the manner in which
she conducted a state post-conviction hearing and the sanctions she handed down
therein—are clearly “judicial acts.” Further, Judge Gray was acting within her
jurisdiction. As a county judge, she has jurisdiction over all local criminal
matters. Judge Gray therefore enjoys absolute immunity in this case.
For the foregoing reasons, and in the absence of any relevant contrary
showing in Plaintiff’s appellate brief, we conclude that Plaintiff’s appeal is
frivolous. We therefore DISMISS his appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i),
and DENY his motion to proceed without prepayment of costs or fees.
The district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint counts as a strike for
the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Our dismissal of this appeal also counts as
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a strike against Plaintiff for the purposes of § 1915(g). See Jennings v. Natrona
County Detention Ctr. Med. Facility, 175 F.3d 775, 780 (10th Cir. 1999).
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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