Harris v. Morales

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
February 2, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
RO BERT HARR IS,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 05-1225
v. (D. Colorado)
JOE M ORALES, in his official (D.C. No. 98-K-2501)
capacity and as an individual; SCOTT
TEETSEL, in his official capacity and
as an individual,
Defendants,
and
M ONTE GORE, in his official
capacity and as an individual,
Defendant - Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before HA RTZ, O’BRIEN, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent w ith Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Robert Harris w as an inmate at the jail of Summit County, Colorado, in
1998. He brought a civil-rights action seeking compensatory and punitive
damages from officials at the jail and from Summit County. Among his claims
was that Captain M onte Gore violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment. He contends that his right eye was injured by
pepper foam during his incarceration and that Captain Gore acted with deliberate
indifference in denying him needed medical care. Captain Gore moved for
summary judgment. The district court denied the motion as to the inadequate-
medical-care claim but did not fully address Captain Gore’s qualified-immunity
argument. Captain Gore appeals the denial of qualified immunity. M r. Harris
argues that the denial was proper and that w e lack jurisdiction over the appeal.
W e conclude that we have jurisdiction and remand the case to the district court to
address in full the issue of qualified immunity.
I. B ACKGR OU N D
For purposes of this appeal Captain Gore does not dispute the following
account of what occurred: W hile M r. Harris w as a prisoner in the Summit County
jail in June 1998, he had a confrontation with Deputy Scott Teetsel, who sprayed
him with pepper foam. M r. H arris was taken to a shower to wash out his eyes.
The warm water of the shower failed to reduce the burning sensation, so Deputy
Teetsel removed him from the shower and sprayed a counterreactant in his eyes.
Captain G ore, Deputy Teetsel’s supervisor, was not present during these events.
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M r. Harris sent several messages to Captain Gore complaining about
Deputy Teetsel’s handling of the matter and, in at least one message, requesting
medical attention. M r. Harris and Captain Gore met one week after the incident,
and then a few days later the two met with Sheriff Joe M orales. In the second
meeting (and perhaps in the first) M r. Harris said that he was experiencing
blurred vision and had discoloration of his right eyelid and a spot in his right eye.
He said that he needed medical attention, but he received no response to his
request.
The spot in M r. Harris’s right eye is a scar in the form of a black dot on his
eyeball. The scar and the discoloration of his right eyelid both appear to be
permanent. The nature of his blurry vision is less clear. In his deposition he said
that for two weeks following the pepper-foam incident, he could not watch
television because “the light was affecting my eye,” Aplt. App. at 170, and that
even now, when he w atches television for a period of time, his “eye w ill . . . start
to water[],” id. at 163.
M r. Harris filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado against Summit County, Sheriff M orales, Captain Gore, and Deputy
Teetsel under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986. The defendants filed
motions for summary judgment on all claims. M ost of the claims— the claims
under §§ 1981, 1985, and 1986, and race-discrimination claims under
§ 1983— were then dismissed without prejudice by stipulation of the parties; and
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the district court granted summary judgment on the remaining claims except for
the Eighth Amendment claim against Deputy Teetsel for using excessive force
and the Eighth Amendment claims against Captain Gore and Deputy Teetsel for
failure to provide medical treatment. This appeal concerns only the denial of
Captain Gore’s motion on the inadequate-medical-care claim.
II. D ISC USSIO N
W hen a defendant invokes the defense of qualified immunity, “we require a
plaintiff to satisfy a heavy two-part burden to avoid summary judgment: (1) that
the defendant’s actions violated a constitutional or statutory right and (2) that the
right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s unlawful conduct.”
Serna v. Colo. Dep’t of Corrs., 455 F.3d 1146, 1150 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The constitutional right at issue in this case is the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. To
establish an Eighth Amendment claim based on inadequate medical care, the
prisoner must prove “both an objective component and a subjective component.”
M ata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 751 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The objective component is that “the alleged harm . . . [w as]
sufficiently serious.” Id. at 753. The subjective component is that the prison
official had a “culpable state of mind”— namely, deliberate indifference to the
prisoner’s serious medical needs. Id. at 751. The prisoner must also prove that
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the acts performed with the culpable state of mind caused the serious harm. See
id. at 751, 753.
In his qualified-immunity argument in district court, Captain Gore raised,
albeit sparsely, a challenge to the subjective component of M r. Harris’s claim (on
appeal he makes no argument on this issue), and the contention that M r. Harris’s
alleged constitutional right had not been clearly established. He omitted any
mention of the causation element in his opening brief below, but his reply brief
claimed that M r. Harris had not shown that his injuries w ere caused by Captain
Gore’s actions. See Pippin v. Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co., 440 F.3d 1186,
1192 (10th Cir. 2006) (district court may not rely on new materials or new
arguments in a summary-judgment movant’s reply brief unless it permits the
nonmovant to respond).
Captain Gore’s most extensive argument in district court concerned the
objective component of M r. Harris’s claim. He argued that the eye injuries
simply were not sufficiently serious. He cited four cases, only one of which
involved an alleged eye injury— Clemmons v. Bohannon, 956 F.2d 1523, 1526
(10th Cir. 1992) (en banc), in which we held that a prisoner’s exposure to
secondhand tobacco smoke did not constitute a serious medical need because he
had alleged only throat, eye, and nose irritation, see id. at 1526–27 (prisoner had
“alleged no adverse physical symptoms from cigarette smoke different from those
suffered by everyone in society”), and the potential for more serious carcinogenic
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effects in the future, see id. at 1527. But see Helling v. M cKinney, 509 U.S. 25,
30 (1993) (allowing prisoner’s secondhand-smoke claim to proceed). 1
The district court denied summary judgment to Captain Gore on
M r. Harris’s inadequate-medical-care claim. But it addressed only whether
M r. Harris had produced evidence of a constitutional violation. The court
concluded that “for purposes of summary judgment . . . Gore should have
recognized the need for medical attention in Plaintiff’s case” and that the
evidence supported a “finding that [Gore] had enough information to infer
Plaintiff was at substantial risk of injury and disregarded it . . . .” Aplt. App. at
219 (Order on M ot. for Summ. J., April 6, 2005). The court did not address
1
W e note that other courts have occasionally addressed Eighth Amendment
claims for eye injuries. See Koehl v. D alsheim, 85 F.3d 86, 87–88 (2d Cir. 1996)
(prisoner requiring “specially prescribed, tinted eye-glasses” to prevent double
vision and loss of depth perception asserted a sufficiently serious medical need
when removal of his glasses led to loss of sight in one eye and shifting of that eye
into the corner of his socket); M itchell v. M aynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1443 (10th Cir.
1996) (removal of prescription eyeglasses from a prisoner “could constitute a
violation of his right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment[]”); Kersh v.
Derozier, 851 F.2d 1509, 1510, 1513 (5th Cir. 1988) (evidence sufficient for a
jury finding of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs when piece of hay
in eye caused redness, tearing, bleeding, and eventual loss of sight); Freeman v.
Lockhart, 503 F.2d 1016, 1017 (8th Cir. 1974) (prisoner with tuberculosis that
had settled in his eyes and that eventually led to permanent impairment of his
vision alleged a sufficient injury for claim of failure to provide medical treatment;
optometrist had recommended surgery to address the “hazard to his vision”
caused by the disease); cf. United States v. Woodlee, 136 F.3d 1399, 1409 (10th
Cir. 1998) (impairment of vision is a “serious bodily injury” under the United
States Sentencing Guidelines); United States v. Talamante, 981 F.2d 1153, 1158
(10th Cir. 1992) (loss of eye that had some residual vision is a “serious bodily
injury” under the United States Sentencing Guidelines).
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whether the constitutional right at issue was clearly established at the time of the
incident.
On appeal Captain Gore contends that M r. Harris’s claimed injury is not
sufficiently serious and that M r. Harris has not established that his injury was
caused by the delay in receiving medical care. He further argues that the alleged
Eighth Amendment right at issue was not clearly established at the time of the
pepper-foam incident.
Before we can address the merits of Captain G ore’s appeal, we must
address our jurisdiction, which M r. H arris challenges. “Although appellate courts
typically do not have jurisdiction to review denials of summary judgment
motions, we have jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals where . . . the
defendant raises a qualified immunity defense and the issue appealed concerns
whether or not certain given facts showed a violation of clearly established law.”
Serna, 455 F.3d at 1150 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and ellipsis omitted).
As the Supreme Court has stated, an interlocutory appeal of the denial of
qualified immunity may be appropriate because qualified immunity entitles the
defendant to avoid the burdens of litigation. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S.
299, 306 (1996). An interlocutory appeal may even be appropriate despite the
district court’s failure to rule on a qualified-immunity motion. See Lowe v. Town
of Fairland, 143 F.3d 1378, 1380 (10th Cir. 1998) (Otherwise, “if we deny
appellate review, a defendant loses the right not to stand trial.”).
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But interlocutory appeals of orders denying qualified immunity are limited
to those that raise solely an issue of law . The appeal must relate only to
“resolv[ing] a dispute concerning an abstract issue of law relating to qualified
immunity,” Behrens, 516 U.S. at 313 (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted), not a “determination[] of evidentiary sufficiency,” id. Nonetheless,
despite the presence of disputed factual issues, an interlocutory order may still be
appealable if the defendant seeking qualified immunity claims on appeal that even
accepting the plaintiff’s allegations as true, he is still entitled to qualified
immunity. See id.; Johnson v. M artin, 195 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 1999)
(“[I]f a defendant’s appeal of the denial of a motion for summary judgment is
based on the argument that, even under the plaintiff’s version of the facts, the
defendant did not violate clearly established law, then the district court’s
summary judgment ruling is immediately appealable.”).
M r. Harris contends that the conditions for an interlocutory appeal have not
been satisfied in this case. W e disagree. W e recognize that the district-court
order denying summary judgment to Captain Gore appeared to address only
evidentiary sufficiency. On appeal, however, Captain Gore does not dispute
M r. Harris’s account of what happened. Accordingly, the only issue on appeal is
whether Captain Gore is entitled to qualified immunity on M r. Harris’s version of
events. See Behrens, 516 U.S. at 313.
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Furthermore, as we have stated, it is not dispositive that the district-court
order did not explicitly address Captain Gore’s qualified-immunity argument. To
hold otherwise would be to deny Captain Gore the precise entitlement— namely,
the right not to be burdened by litigation— afforded by qualified immunity. See
Lowe, 143 F.3d at 1380. M r. Harris tries to distinguish Lowe on the ground that it
involved a denial of qualified immunity on a motion to dismiss, not a motion for
summary judgment, and that the factual issues involved in a summary-judgment
motion are considerably more complex. But qualified immunity can undoubtedly
be raised in a motion for summary judgment as well as in a motion to dismiss, see
Peterson v. Jensen, 371 F.3d 1199, 1201 (10th Cir. 2004) (qualified-immunity
defense is typically raised in a summary-judgment motion), and a defendant
should not be deprived of the protection of this doctrine simply because a district
court fails to rule on the merits. In any event, there is no great complexity arising
from consideration of factual issues in this case because Captain Gore does not
dispute the facts on appeal.
That we have jurisdiction, however, does not mean that we must, or should,
resolve the merits of the appeal. The district court did not fully consider
qualified immunity; it did not address whether the applicable constitutional right
was “clearly established” at the time of Captain Gore’s actions. “As a general
rule an appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below.” Lowe,
143 F.3d at 1381. The situation here is like that in Lowe, in w hich we elected to
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remand the issue of qualified immunity to the district court because it had failed
to address it in the first instance. See id.; see also Workman v. Jordan, 958 F.2d
332, 337 (10th Cir. 1992) (when district court postponed decision on defendants’
motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity, appellate court remanded to
district court to decide the motion).
W e therefore remand to the district court for further consideration on the
issue of qualified immunity. On remand the court should address qualified
immunity before proceeding further on the Eighth A mendment claim against
Captain Gore. The court may consider any new arguments or evidence on the
qualified-immunity issue so long as the opposing party is given an opportunity to
respond.
IV . C ON CLU SIO N
W e DENY M r. Harris’s motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. W e REM AND for the district court to determine whether qualified
immunity protects Captain Gore from Eighth Amendment liability.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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