Navarrete-Carrillo v. United States

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 22 2002
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent - Appellee,
v. No. 01-8068
(D.C. No. 01-CV-29-B,
MIGUEL NAVARRETE-CARRILLO, 97-CR-106-B)
(D. Wyoming)
Petitioner - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR , PORFILIO , and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Federal prisoner Miguel Navarrete-Carrillo, proceeding pro se , seeks to
appeal from the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his sentence.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Mr. Navarrete-Carrillo pleaded guilty on January 30, 1998, to one count of
conspiring to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 846. He was sentenced to serve seventy-seven months in prison and
did not appeal from his conviction.
Over two years later, on February 16, 2001, Mr. Navarrete-Carrillo filed a
§ 2255 motion, contending for the first time that his plea was involuntary and he
would not have pleaded guilty if counsel had advised him that the government’s
evidence was invalidly obtained by use of a wiretap or that under Apprendi v. New
Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000), “quantity under 21 U.S.C. § 841 would have to be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” R. Vol. 1, Doc. 1 at 5. The district court
denied his § 2255 motion as untimely filed. See § 2255(1) (providing that
one-year period of limitation generally runs from the date the judgment of
conviction becomes final). The court also noted that “[n]either the Supreme
Court nor the Tenth Circuit . . . has applied Apprendi retroactively,” R. Vol. 1,
Doc. 7 at 2, foreclosing any tolling of the statute of limitations. See § 2255(3)
(providing tolling of one-year statute of limitation when the right asserted was
newly recognized by the Supreme Court after appellant’s conviction and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review).
Mr. Navarrete-Carrillo must obtain a certificate of appealability (COA) by
making a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
-2-
§ 2253(c)(2). When, as here, the district court has dismissed the case on
procedural grounds without considering the underlying constitutional claim, the
appellant must demonstrate that “jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and
that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct
in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
Mr. Navarrete-Carrillo does not argue for a tolling of the limitations period,
and we have no reason to question the district court’s holding that his § 2255
motion was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Therefore, we
conclude that jurists of reason would not “find it debatable whether the district
court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id.
Further, if we were to reach the merits, the record demonstrates that
Mr. Navarrete-Carrillo’s decision to plead guilty was based on the fact that his
co-conspirator “decided to plead [guilty] on that last day [before trial] and turned
State’s evidence on [him],” and not on any alleged wiretap evidence the
government had obtained. Aplt. Br., App. A at 7 (Tr. of Sentencing Hr’g). In
addition, the indictment alleged that Mr. Navarrete-Carrillo “possessed with
intent to distribute and/or distributed at least six ounces of methamphetamine
during the course of the conspiracy,” R. Supp’l Vol. 1, Doc. 15 at 2, and he
conceded at his sentencing hearing that “there were two instances in which [a
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witness] saw [him] deliver three ounces.” Aplt. Br., App. A at 7. Under these
circumstances, even if Apprendi applied retroactively, there would be no violation
because Mr. Navarrete-Carrillo pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess and
distribute at least six ounces of methamphetamine and the maximum sentence for
that offense is twenty years under § 841(b)(1)(C). See United States v. Wilson,
244 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir.) (noting that reversible Apprendi error arises only
when drug quantity causes sentence to exceed the statutory maximum), cert.
denied, 533 U.S. 962 (2001); United States v. Thompson, 237 F.3d 1258, 1262
(10th Cir.) (holding that, because neither § 841 nor § 846 require a specific
quantity of drugs as an element of the offense and the maximum sentence under
these statutes was twenty years, no Apprendi violation occurred where defendant
sentenced to less than twenty years), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 987 (2001).
Mr. Navarrete-Carrillo’s request for a COA is DENIED and the case is
DISMISSED. His motion to proceed in forma pauperis in this court is
GRANTED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
John C. Porfilio
Circuit Judge
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