United States v. Arnold

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 25 2002
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 01-1583
(D.C. No. 01-CR-148-N)
JOYCE ARNOLD, also known as (D. Colorado)
Joyce Hudson, also known as Pamela
Reed,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , Chief Circuit Judge, ANDERSON , Circuit Judge, and
BRORBY , Senior Circuit Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Joyce Arnold was convicted by a jury of being a convicted felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the
district court rejected the government’s attempt to classify Ms. Arnold as an
armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), but did find, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that she possessed the firearm in question in connection with
another felony offense, i.e., conspiracy to commit the armed robbery of a take-out
restaurant. 1
Pursuant to USSG § 2K2.1(b)(5), the district court accordingly
applied a four-point upward adjustment to the base offense level which, combined
with Ms. Arnold’s criminal history category of V, indicated a Guideline range of
130-162 months. As the statutory maximum sentence for the firearm offense was
ten years, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), the court was constrained to impose a term
of 120 months. United States v. Wilkinson , 169 F.3d 1236, 1239 (10th Cir. 1999).
Ms. Arnold now appeals her sentence, and we affirm.
Ms. Arnold does not dispute that USSG § 2K2.1(b)(5) required a four-point
increase to her base offense level if she possessed the firearm in connection with
another offense. The discrete question raised on appeal is whether the evidence
adduced by the government was sufficient to support the district court’s finding
that she was in fact engaged in a conspiracy to rob the restaurant.
1
Conspiracy to commit armed robbery is a felony under Colorado law.
See C.R.S. §§ 18-2-201, 18-2-206(1), and 18-4-302(1), (3).
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When considering an objection to a sentence enhancement, we review the
district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.
United States v. Norman , 129 F.3d 1393, 1398 (10th Cir. 1997). Thus, we review
the district court’s factual findings “with deference, overturning them only upon
a determination that the findings were clearly erroneous or without factual
support in the record such that our review leaves us with the firm and definite
conviction that a mistake has been made.” United States v. Farrow , 277 F.3d
1260, 1262 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). We consider the evidence and
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the district court’s
determination, United States v. Walters , 269 F.3d 1207, 1214 (10th Cir. 2001),
with due regard for the opportunity of the district judge to assess the credibility of
the witnesses, United States v. Farnsworth , 92 F.3d 1001, 1009 (10th Cir. 1996).
In this case, the district court made the following relevant findings:
The events in this case transpired approximately 1 a.m. on
November 17 of 2000. The defendant and a companion were spotted
by police officers parked in a small station wagon behind this
restaurant, Chubby’s Restaurant at the corner of West 38th Avenue
and Lipan Street. At the time it was initially spotted, the station
wagon had no lights on. Because of the position of the car and the
fact that the car was blacked out, the officers started to investigate.
As soon as the officers approached the station wagon, it pulled out
onto 38th Avenue.
Subsequent events disclosed that there was a shotgun in the
car. There was also paraphernalia in the car which could be used in a
robbery, to wit: not only the shotgun, but the two ski caps and the
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nylon stocking which could readily be used as a mask. It did not
appear that the defendant and her companion were going skiing.
I conclude from a preponderance of the evidence that, as I said
at the outset of this hearing, the only conclusion that can be drawn is
that the defendant and her companion were conspiring or planning to
rob the Chubby’s Restaurant. The location of the car, the fact that it
was blacked out, the time, all support that inference. In addition, the
fact that they immediately left the scene when confronted by police is
inconsistent with the inference that they just happened to arrive for a
bite to eat at 1 a.m. in the morning.
Because I can see no hypothesis that is consistent with
innocence here based on the totality of []these facts, I think the
Government has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant possessed this firearm in connection with another felony
offense; namely, conspiracy to commit armed robbery of a Chubby’s
Restaurant. And accordingly, I will apply the four-point
enhancement.
Tr. of Sentencing Proceedings at 13-14, R. Vol. 6. 2
In addition, it was undisputed
that (1) the car was not parked in the regular space provided for restaurant patrons
but was backed in next to a dumpster behind the restaurant; (2) the rear license
plate was bent down over the bumper so that it could not be read; and (3) the
pump-action shotgun found in the car was loaded and ready to fire.
2
Ms. Arnold asserts that in once referring to a blue nylon scarf found
together with a knit ski cap in the car as a “‘nylon stocking which could readily
be used as a mask,’” the district court “misstat[ed]” the evidence. Appellant’s
Opening Br. at 7 n.2 (quoting Tr. of Sentencing Proceedings at 13-14, R. Vol. 6).
While defendant is technically correct as to this minor detail, her point is not
significant because the nylon scarf, in combination with the knit ski cap, could
easily have been used as a mask to conceal most of her or her companion’s face
during a robbery.
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Ms. Arnold does not challenge the basic operative facts summarized above,
but argues strenuously that these facts lead only to a speculation that she
possessed the shotgun in connection with a conspiracy to rob the restaurant, and
that mere speculation is insufficient. Appellant’s Reply Br. at 2 (quoting United
States v. Jones , 49 F.3d 628, 632 (10th Cir. 1995) (further quotations omitted)).
She notes that “[a]n inference is only reasonable where there exists a probability,
not a mere possibility, that the conclusion flows from the proven facts,” id. (citing
United States v. Rahseparian , 231 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir. 2000)), and asserts that
any plan to rob the restaurant was nothing more than a possibility on the evidence
presented. We disagree. 3
The evidence supporting a sentence enhancement may be circumstantial.
See, e.g. , United States v. Carty , 264 F.3d 191, 194 (2d Cir. 2001); United States
v. Graham , 162 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1998); cf. United States v. Silvers ,
84 F.3d 1317, 1327 (10th Cir. 1996) (“either direct or circumstantial evidence”
may establish drug quantity by necessary preponderance). The circumstances
shown here were clearly indicative of a foiled attempt on the part of Ms. Arnold
and her companion to rob the restaurant with the shotgun found in the car.
3
We note in passing that Ms. Arnold relies inaptly here on cases involving
sufficiency of the evidence for conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, see Jones ,
49 F.3d at 629, Rahseparian , 231 F.3d at 1260, rather than sufficiency of the
evidence for application of a sentencing enhancement, which requires only a
preponderance of the evidence, see, e.g. , Farnsworth , 92 F.3d at 1009.
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However, Ms. Arnold argues that there are other, “innocent” explanations
of the circumstances. 4
The only such explanation that accounts for most of the
critical facts–the presence of the gun, the location and condition of the car, and
the manner in which Ms. Arnold reacted to the arrival of the police–is that she
was trying to dispose of the shotgun in the dumpster but abruptly curtailed the
effort and drove away when the officers pulled into the parking lot. The gaping
hole in this story, however, is the condition of the weapon; it is certainly more
likely that a shotgun loaded and ready to fire has been prepared for use than for
disposal.
Not every one of Ms. Arnold’s various contentions warrants explicit
discussion here. We have, however, considered all of her arguments in light of
the record and concluded that the district court properly found, by a
4
Ms. Arnold also argues that to the extent this case turns on her inability to
articulate a persuasive explanation in this regard, her Fifth Amendment right not
to testify is impermissibly burdened, citing Mitchell v. United States , 526 U.S.
314, 328-29 (1999) (extending “normal rule . . . that no negative inference from
the defendant’s failure to testify is permitted” to sentencing phase of criminal
proceeding), and United States v. Constantine , 263 F.3d 1122, 1128-29 (10th Cir.
2001) (discussing Mitchell ). This objection is meritless; simply noting that a
defendant, through counsel, has been unable to suggest by way of legal argument
an innocent interpretation of the facts of record to undercut a facially obvious
inference of guilt, does not implicate her right not to testify about such facts.
Further, we note that Ms. Arnold actually took the stand at sentencing to supply
facts she hoped would counter the government’s case under § 2K2.1(b)(5). Thus,
“[a]lthough we find [Ms. Arnold’s] Fifth Amendment rights were not violated, in
addition [s]he arguably waived [them].” Constantine , 263 F.3d at 1128 n.4.
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preponderance of the evidence, that she possessed a firearm while engaged in
a conspiracy to commit robbery. Accordingly, the sentence imposed by the
district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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