United States v. Card

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
SEP 16 2002
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 01-4116
(D. Utah)
DANIEL CARD, (D.Ct. No. 2:99-CR-674-B-01)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and
MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
A jury convicted Daniel Card on charges stemming from the armed robbery
of two credit unions. On appeal, Mr. Card presents three challenges to his
convictions: (1) the government failed to give notice of an alibi rebuttal witness;
(2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (3) the
government failed to disclose evidence relevant to the credibility of a police
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
officer who testified for the government. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Sara Beth Blackhurst was working at her desk when two men entered
Alpine Credit Union on October 18, 1996. The shorter of the two, later shown to
be Mr. Card, pulled out a sawed-off shotgun and aimed it at Ms. Blackhurst. The
shorter robber ordered Ms. Blackhurst to get down on the floor and stood over her
with the sawed-off shotgun pointed at her back, while the taller robber, later
alleged to be William Leon, 1 forced one of the tellers to put money from two cash
drawers into a bag. The robbers made off with $16,549.
The credit union employees did not identify the robbers because both men
wore large hooded sweatshirts, large dark sunglasses, and bandanas over their
faces. Ms. Blackhurst thought she saw the hands of the shorter robber, and told
investigators he was Caucasian. However, after viewing the surveillance
photographs, she realized he wore gloves and she could not have seen his hands.
One of the tellers, Stephanie Bringhurst, testified she could see their foreheads
1
The jury did not reach a verdict on the charges against Mr. Leon stemming from
this robbery.
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and both robbers were Caucasian. However, the other teller working at the credit
union during the robbery testified she could not discern the shorter man’s race.
In a separate incident, two armed, masked men entered Beehive Credit
Union on December 13, 1996. The shorter robber, later shown to be Mr. Card,
jumped over the counter into Cari Cooper’s teller station and ordered her to get
off the telephone and on the floor. Then, the taller robber moved behind the
counter and pointed the barrel of a sawed-off shotgun at Ms. Cooper’s head.
The shorter robber held a small pistol in his left hand, when he threatened
two other tellers and a customer, forcing them to get down on the floor. Then he
ordered a teller to put money in a bag. The teller placed a dye pack from each
drawer into the bag. Very shortly after the robbers left the credit union, a
passerby found a grocery bag and money covered in red dye scattered in the road
about one-half block west of Beehive Credit Union. Of the $1,156 stolen from
the credit union, police recovered $1,146.
Once again, the robbers could not be identified. They were covered from
head to toe, with sheets over their heads, masks covering their faces and gloves
on their hands. The shorter robber wore a green mask which the tellers described
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at trial. The tellers and a customer told police the shorter robber was either
African-American or Hispanic, based on his voice and the language he used.
A grand jury indicted Daniel Card and William Leon for the armed
robberies of the two credit unions. Specifically, Mr. Card was charged with two
counts of armed credit union robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d),
two counts of using and carrying a sawed-off shotgun during the robberies in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), and two counts of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
After jury selection, the government dismissed the felon in possession
charges against Mr. Card. At trial, the government introduced the sawed-off shot
gun and a mask used in the second robbery. Mr. Card’s brother also testified Mr.
Card told him about the robberies. After the jury convicted Mr. Card on each of
the four remaining counts, the district court sentenced him to 406 months in
prison, to be followed by five years of supervised release. Mr. Card filed a timely
notice of appeal.
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DISCUSSION
Impeachment of Alibi Witness
In the first challenge to his convictions, Mr. Card argues the district court
erred when it did not exclude testimony and records used to impeach Mr. Card’s
alibi witness. During a motions hearing, Mr. Card requested “the fruits of any
investigation” concerning school records. The district court denied the request
and declined to “require the government to turn over everything they get as a
result of their efforts.” At trial, Mr. Card’s girlfriend, Catherine Cope, attempted
to provide an alibi for him by vouching for his whereabouts on the morning of the
first robbery. Ms. Cope testified they drove to Salt Lake City, Utah, with her
children on October 18, 1996. She testified they left their home in Orem, Utah,
“early in the morning, possibly 8:00, 8:30,” arriving at her sister’s house in Salt
Lake City around 9:00 or 9:30 a.m. The robbery took place at 9:30 a.m. During
its cross-examination, the government attacked her account of the day’s events.
Even though the government was armed with a school record signed by Ms. Cope
that showed she checked her son out of school at 11:39 a.m., October 18, 1996,
Ms. Cope denied checking her son out of school at 11:39 a.m. that day.
The government then called the school secretary as a rebuttal witness. The
secretary authenticated and laid foundation for the school record and testified she
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checked Ms. Cope’s son out of school at 11:39 a.m. on October 18, 1996. By
impeaching Ms. Cope’s testimony concerning their whereabouts, the government
was able to refute Mr. Card’s alibi for the first robbery, which occurred at 9:30
a.m. on October 18, 1996.
Mr. Card argues the government violated Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 12.1 by failing to give Mr. Card notice of the secretary’s testimony and
the school record. Rule 12.1(a) requires the defendant to give notice of his
intention to offer an alibi defense and the names and addresses of alibi witnesses
within ten days of a written demand from the government. United States v.
Pearson, 159 F.3d 480, 483 (10th Cir. 1998). “Rule 12.1(b) places a reciprocal
witness identification requirement on the government, requiring it to disclose
witnesses it intends to use to ... rebut the testimony of the defendant’s alibi
witnesses.” Id. The rule places a continuing duty to disclose on the parties. Id.Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.1, the court “may” exclude the testimony of any
witness not disclosed in accordance with the rule. Pearson, 159 F.3d at 483. We
review the district court’s decision to allow the alibi rebuttal evidence for an
abuse of discretion. See id.; United States v. Bissonette, 164 F.3d 1143, 1145 (8th
Cir. 1999).
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Mr. Card’s claim the district court committed structural constitutional error
when it ruled “the government has no duty to give notice of its alibi rebuttal
witnesses” is without merit. First, he misapprehends the district court’s ruling.
The district court merely ruled the government was not required to provide the
defense with a copy of the school record indicating Mr. Card’s girlfriend checked
her child out of school at 11:39 a.m. on the day of the first robbery. The court did
not make any ruling as to whether Mr. Card was entitled to notice of a rebuttal
witness. Second, the government did disclose the rebuttal witness. It included
the custodian of records for Alpine School District in its Notice of Alibi Rebuttal
Witnesses on December 1, 2000. Therefore, contrary to Mr. Card’s polemic,
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.1(b), requiring disclosure of witnesses, is
not implicated.
We turn next to whether the district court improperly admitted the school
records. Rule 12.1 does not require the production of alibi rebuttal documents.
Although Fed. R. Crim P. 16 sometimes requires the voluntary production of
documents, there is no general duty to produce documents that may be offered
solely as rebuttal evidence. The Rules require disclosure of rebuttal evidence
only if the evidence is material to the preparation of a defense for the defendant.
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(C). Rebuttal evidence is only material to the
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defense “if it could be used to counter the government’s case or to bolster a
defense,” and is not “deemed material merely because it would have dissuaded the
defendant from proffering easily impeached testimony.” United States v. Stevens,
985 F.2d 1175, 1180 (2d Cir. 1993).
Furthermore, Mr. Card knew the government subpoenaed the school record
to rebut his alibi and he had access to the same record. Indeed, contrary to Mr.
Card’s claim he had “no means of knowing that the alibi defense he presented was
untrue or inaccurate in any way,” Mr. Card’s girlfriend obtained a copy of the
school record the week before she testified. Based on the record before us, we
are satisfied the district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the
school record into evidence and Mr. Card suffered no prejudice by its admission.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In the second challenge to his convictions, Mr. Card argues the evidence
was insufficient to sustain the guilty verdicts. “Our standard of review is well
established. The sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is a
question of law to be reviewed de novo. In doing so, however, we view the
evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the
jury verdicts.” United States v. Higgins, 282 F.3d 1261, 1274 (10th Cir. 2002).
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Mr. Card contends the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his
conviction because: 1) both robbers of Alpine Credit Union were white and Mr.
Card is African-American; 2) the shorter robber in the Beehive Credit Union
robbery was left-handed and Mr. Card is right-handed; 3) none of the witnesses
saw Mr. Card with any red dye on his person or his clothing and there was no red
dye on his shotgun; 4) the shotgun “was not exclusively tied to [Mr.] Card;” 5)
there were no prints or other forensic evidence indicating Mr. Card had ever been
in the recovered truck or used or touched any of the disguises worn by the
robbers; and 6) the government’s witnesses “suffered from well known biases,”
they were not credible and their testimony was inconsistent.
The majority of Mr. Card’s contentions invite us to enter the province of
the jury. This we will not do. “[O]ur function as a court of review prevents us
from re-weighing the testimony and coming to a conclusion at odds with the one
reached by the jurors.” Higgins, 282 F.3d at 1275. We must uphold a conviction
if “any rational jury could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Smith, 131 F.3d 1392, 1399 (10th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1141 (1998). We will not, as a matter of law, hold
testimony incredible unless it is unbelievable on its face, i.e., facts that were
physically impossible for the witness to observe or “events that could not have
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occurred under the laws of nature.” Tapia v. Tansy, 926 F.2d 1554, 1562 (10th
Cir.) (quotation marks and citations omitted), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 835 (1991).
The inconsistent testimony, biases and credibility issues were all before the jury
when it deliberated. The jury was free to accept the government witnesses’
testimony and to disbelieve Mr. Card’s “protestations of innocence.” Higgins,
282 F.3d at 1275. The apparent inconsistencies in the witness accounts of the
robberies, and the criminal background and motive to lie of some key government
witnesses, were for the jury, not this court, to resolve. Tapia, 926 F.2d at 1562;
Smith, 131 F.3d at 1399.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational
jury could conclude Mr. Card committed both robberies. The jury did not have to
embrace the assumptions advanced by Mr. Card. In light of the credit union video
tape and all the witnesses’ testimony, the jury could reasonably believe the tellers
saw the fair skin of the taller robber and mistakenly assumed both robbers were
Caucasian. The jury did not have to assume the shorter robber was left-handed
simply because he held the gun in his left-hand. And, the alleged paucity of
direct evidence of Mr. Card’s guilt is not dispositive in a sufficiency of the
evidence claim. See Smith, 131 F.3d at 1399 (holding a verdict may be based
solely on testimony of allegedly unreliable witnesses even if it is not corroborated
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by physical evidence).
Our independent review of all the evidence also satisfies us the evidence
linking Mr. Card to the robberies is more than sufficient. Mr. Card’s girlfriend
presented an apparently false alibi at trial concerning his whereabouts during the
first robbery. And, an eyewitness identified the mask found behind a coffee table
in Mr. Card’s home as the one worn by the taller robber during the second
robbery. Mr. Card purchased a shotgun from VanWagon Finance two days before
the first robbery. When Mr. Card’s brother saw him with a sawed-off shotgun,
Mr. Card told his brother he purchased it from VanWagon’s. Police recovered the
shotgun from a man who testified he bought the gun from Mr. Card for $35.
Witnesses identified this sawed-off shotgun as the one used in both robberies.
Perhaps most damaging, Mr. Card’s brother testified Mr. Card told him about
both robberies, the details of which were corroborated by eyewitness testimony.
Based on this evidence, we conclude the government presented sufficient
evidence to sustain Mr. Card’s convictions and reject his challenge to the verdict
based on the sufficiency of the evidence.
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Brady Material
In the final challenge to his convictions, Mr. Card contends the government
violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and the district court erred when
it denied his motion for a new trial. Specifically, he claims the government
improperly failed to disclose evidence he could have used to impeach the
credibility of a police detective who testified for the government.
After the trial, but before sentencing, the prosecutors notified defense
counsel that a Provo city police detective and a defendant “testified discrepantly”
at a suppression hearing in another case. The judge in the unrelated case found
the defendant’s version of the events during an interview was more consistent
with the extrinsic evidence than the detective’s version and granted the
defendant’s motion to suppress evidence.
Mr. Card filed a motion to set aside the jury verdict and for a new trial,
arguing he would have moved to suppress all evidence obtained by the detective
and would have aggressively challenged the detective’s credibility if he had been
aware of the detective’s “perjured testimony” in the other case. After a hearing,
the district court denied the motion.
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Mr. Card claims “[t]he Brady doctrine and due process of law entitle him to
a new trial wherein he can use [the evidence undermining the detective’s
credibility] in his defense.” Brady v. Maryland held “the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.” Brady, 373 U.S.
at 87. “When the ‘reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of
guilt or innocence,’ nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within
this general rule.” Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (quoting
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)). To establish a violation under
Brady and Giglio, the defendant must demonstrate “(1) the prosecution
suppressed evidence, (2) the evidence was favorable to the defendant, and (3) the
evidence was material.” United States v. Combs, 267 F.3d 1167, 1172 (10th Cir.
2001). We review the district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial based on
allegations of a Brady violation de novo. Id.The government concedes it suppressed evidence in this case. 2 However,
the parties disagree on whether the evidence was favorable to Mr. Card and
2
The government recognizes neither bad faith nor culpability is required and
knowledge of evidence on the part of one Assistant United States Attorney is imputed to
the entire office.
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whether the evidence was material. According to Mr. Card, “under Brady, [Mr.
Card] is entitled to reversal, because there is a reasonable probability that the
jurors would have acquitted or failed to reach a verdict in [Mr. Card]’s case, had
they known of the government’s key investigator’s past violation of the
Constitution, dishonesty under oath, and lack of professional integrity.” On the
other hand, the government argues “absent any suggestion that [the detective]
committed perjury,” a different trial court’s decision to grant a motion to suppress
evidence obtained by the detective does not bear on the detective’s credibility and
therefore is not “impeachment evidence subject to disclosure under Giglio.”
We will first consider whether the evidence was favorable to Mr. Card.
Impeachment evidence is favorable to an accused if it may make the difference
between conviction and acquittal. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676
(1985). The Brady claimant must demonstrate a reasonable probability the
evidence suppressed would have changed the outcome of the proceeding. Id.Perjury requires intentionally false testimony United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S.
87, 94 (1993).
The district court aptly noted Mr. Card was making “quite a leap” to argue
the detective committed perjury or lied. A court may discount witness testimony
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even though the witness was not dishonest or intentionally misleading if, for
example, the falsity was “a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.” Id.The district court concluded Mr. Card did “not establish[] that the alleged
misconduct of [the detective] was of the level as suggested, namely perjury or
some kind of intentional wrongdoing.” 3 (Vol. XII at 22.)
After a careful review of the record, we agree with the district court. Mr.
Card did not prove the detective committed perjury or any intentional
wrongdoing. Therefore, Mr. Card failed to prove the evidence concerning the
detective was impeachment evidence at all. It did not bear on the credibility or
reliability of the detective’s testimony in Mr. Card’s case and therefore was not
“favorable to” him. See Combs, 267 F.3d at 1172. As such, Mr. Card did not
prove a Brady violation.
We need not reach the materiality issue because Mr. Card did not prove the
impeachment evidence was favorable to his defense. The district court did not err
when it denied Mr. Card’s motion for a new trial based on the evidence
3
In what appears to be an abundance of caution and charity, the district court
delayed its final ruling, allowing Mr. Card to present additional briefing on the issue and
affording him the opportunity to request an evidentiary hearing. Counsel failed to submit
additional briefing or to request an evidentiary hearing.
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concerning the detective.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, we AFFIRM Mr. Card’s conviction and sentence.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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