Sanders v. Nelson

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 16 2002
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
LYLE CRAIG SANDERS,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 02-3057
D.C. No. 98-CV-3404-DES
MICHAEL A. NELSON; ATTORNEY (D. Kansas)
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
KANSAS,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges, and BRORBY , Senior Circuit
Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Petitioner Lyle Craig Sanders, a state inmate appearing pro se, seeks
a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s denial of his
petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (providing that no appeal may be taken from the
denial of a § 2254 habeas petition unless the petitioner first obtains a COA).
Because Sanders has not demonstrated “a substantial showing of the denial of
a constitutional right,” this court denies his request and dismisses the appeal.
Id. § 2253(c)(2).
In March 1996, Sanders was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and
for unlawful use of a weapon after conviction of a felony. 1
He was sentenced
under the Kansas habitual criminal statute to three consecutive life terms for
the murder and one-to-five years for the aggravated weapons violation. On
direct appeal, Sanders argued that (1) the trial court erred by disallowing
cross-examination of a police detective on his subsequent resignation from the
police force on a matter unrelated to Sanders’ trial; (2) the court erred by
allowing the prosecution to introduce evidence of Sanders’ post-Miranda warning
silence; (3) the prosecution unlawfully used its peremptory challenges to
1
Sanders was previously convicted on the same charges, however, the
Kansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial after it concluded
the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included charge of
second-degree murder. See State v. Sanders , 904 P.2d 951, 957 (Kan. 1995).
-2-
systematically exclude minorities from Sanders’ jury; (4) the court unlawfully
imposed a triple-life sentence; and (5) the prosecution failed to prove the
aggravated weapons violation. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the
convictions and sentences in State v. Sanders , 949 P.2d 1084, 1093 (Kan. 1997).
Sanders then filed a motion for state post-conviction relief pursuant to
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1507, alleging fourteen grounds of trial error including
ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court summarily denied that
motion. On appeal, Sanders limited his arguments to the issues of whether he
received effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, and whether the trial
court erred in admitting certain DNA evidence used to obtain his conviction. The
court of appeals noted that although he had raised the issue of ineffective trial
counsel in his post-conviction motion, Sanders further limited that argument to
the issue of whether trial counsel was ineffective by failing to have the DNA
evidence independently tested.
After a lengthy discussion of trial counsel’s “diligent and aggressive[]”
actions concerning, among other things, the admission of the DNA evidence, the
court of appeals concluded that trial counsel’s decision to refrain from
independent testing of the DNA samples was a tactical one, which did not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Sanders v. State , 995 P.2d 397,
399-400 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999). In addition, the court concluded that Sanders
-3-
failed to show that his case was prejudiced by the lack of independent testing.
The court refused to address the issues of whether the trial court erred by
admitting the DNA evidence, and whether Sanders was denied effective appellate
counsel during his direct appeal because those issues were not properly preserved
under Kansas law. See id. at 400. The Kansas Supreme Court denied Sanders’
petition for review.
In his federal habeas petition, Sanders made the following claims: (1) the
trial court erred by disallowing cross-examination of the police detective
concerning the circumstances surrounding his resignation from the police force;
(2) the court erred by allowing the prosecution to introduce evidence of Sanders’
post-Miranda warning silence; (3) the prosecution unlawfully used its peremptory
challenges to exclude minorities from Sanders’ jury; (4) the prosecution failed to
prove the aggravated weapons charge; (5) ineffective trial counsel; (6) ineffective
appellate counsel; (7) the trial court improperly admitted certain DNA evidence
used to obtain his conviction; and (8) the court unlawfully imposed a triple-life
sentence.
The district court denied Sanders’ petition, rejecting his constitutional
arguments for claims one through five, above, on the merits. The court found that
Sanders failed to exhaust his final three claims, concluding that the claims were
defaulted on state law grounds, and thus procedurally barred for purposes of
-4-
federal habeas review pursuant to Coleman v. Thompson , 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.*
(1991). The court further found that Sanders had shown neither cause for the
defaults or prejudice in his case, nor any fundamental miscarriage of justice. The
court refused to issue Sanders a COA.
As noted above, to obtain a COA, Sanders must make “a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When
the district court denies a habeas petition on the merits of the constitutional
claims, “[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the
district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.”
Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). When the court denies a petition
on procedural grounds, the petitioner must show “that jurists of reason would
find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of
a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether
the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id.In light of these governing legal standards, we have conducted a
comprehensive de novo review of Sanders’ request for a COA and accompanying
brief, the district court’s memorandum and order, and the entire record on appeal.
Based on this review, and for substantially those reasons stated by the district
court in its thorough memorandum and order dated February 8, 2002, we conclude
that Sanders has not shown his habeas petition is deserving of further
-5-
proceedings, debatable among jurists of reason, or subject to a different resolution
on appeal. See id. Sanders’ request for a COA is DENIED. The appeal is
DISMISSED.
Entered for the Court
Wade Brorby
Senior Circuit Judge
-6-