Woodruff v. Paulson

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 18 2002
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DAVID ANDREW WOODRUFF,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
(NFN) PAULSON, in his/her official
capacity as Corrections Officer,
Wyoming Department of Corrections
State Penitentiary; (NFN) PHILLIPS,
Officer, in his/her official capacity as
Corrections Officer, Wyoming
Department of Corrections State
No. 02-8027
Penitentiary; (NFN) WILLIAMSON,
D.C. No. 02-CV-024-B
in his/her official capacity as Officer
(D. Wyoming)
at the Wyoming State Penitentiary;
VANCE EVERETT, Warden, in his
official capacity at the Wyoming
Department of Corrections State
Penitentiary; JUDY UPHOFF, in her
official capacity as Director of the
Wyoming Department of Corrections;
Sergeant (NFN) SILWEL, in his/her
official capacity as Corrections
Officer at the Wyoming Department of
Corrections State Penitentiary,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, HENRY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
Mr. David Woodruff, a prisoner at the Wyoming State Penitentiary, brought
various complaints, based on both state and federal law, against the Wyoming
Department of Corrections and various officers at the penitentiary. He asserted
violations of his constitutional rights including access to the courts, due process,
and equal protection, based on his allegation that he has been provided with
insufficient paper for legal work and the pens provided are too difficult to use.
He further alleged he is subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the 8th Amendment, both because the guards wake him during the night, causing
pain, ringing in his ears, stress, insomnia, and angry outbursts, and because the
lights in his cell are too bright, causing his eyes to become red and irritated,
making it difficult for him to watch television while lying on his bed, and
rendering him unable to conduct his legal work. The district court dismissed the
*
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and
judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, or collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of
orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the
terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
-2-
complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim and for being frivolous.
When the district court dismisses a claim as frivolous under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), we review for abuse of
discretion. See Schlicher v. Thomas, 111 F.3d 777, 779 (10th Cir. 1997). When
the district court dismisses under the PLRA § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state
a claim, we review the decision de novo. See Perkins v. Kansas Dep’t of
Corrections, 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir. 1999). The district court did not
delineate precisely which claims it dismissed under which sections, and as the
outcome on all of the claims would be the same under either standard of review,
we will review all of Mr. Woodruff’s claims de novo.
A claim is legally frivolous if the plaintiff asserts the violation of a legal
interest that does not exist, or asserts facts that do not support an arguable claim.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). Because Mr. Woodruff is
proceeding pro se, we construe his complaint liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (1991). However,
even construing the complaint liberally, we agree with the district court that Mr.
Woodruff has failed to provide any facts on the basis of which we might find a
constitutional violation.
On his claim of denial of access to the courts, Mr. Woodruff has not
demonstrated that failure of prison staff to provide him with his requested thirty
-3-
sheets per day of paper has hindered him in pursuing any non-frivolous legal
claims or caused him any other prejudice. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-
53 (1996). On his claim for equal protection violations, he has failed to allege
that he has been treated differently from others. See Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1997) (requiring
allegation of disparate treatment in equal protection cases).
Mr. Woodruff has also failed to allege facts sufficient to support his claim
of cruel and unusual punishment. Cruel and unusual punishment is defined as
punishment that “although not physically barbarous, involves the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain.” Clemmons v. Bohannon, 956 F.2d 1523, 1525 (10th
Cir. 1992) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). A prisoner
claiming that he has suffered such punishment must show officials’ deliberate
indifference to the sufficiently egregious conditions of confinement. Mitchell v.
Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1441-42 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501
U.S. 294 (1991)). Thus, a court considering a conditions of confinement claim
must ask both whether the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of
mind, and whether the alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful enough to rise
to the level of a constitutional violation. Id. at 1442 (citing Hudson v. McMillian,
503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992)). Here we agree with the district court that Mr. Woodruff
has failed to allege facts showing either that the officers’ conduct towards him
-4-
was objectively harmful enough to constitute a violation of the 8th Amendment or
that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference towards him.
We deny Mr. Woodruff’s motion to proceed without prepayment of fees,
remind him he owes the unpaid balance of the filing fee, and DISMISS the
appeal. 1 When a civil action is dismissed as frivolous, it is counted as a “strike”
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Mr. Woodruff is reminded that he will be
prohibited from bringing civil actions or filing appeals if on three or more prior
occasions he has brought an action or an appeal that was dismissed as frivolous or
for failure to state a claim. Id. Based on the present action filed in the district
court and this appeal, Mr. Woodruff now has two strikes against him.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
1
We deny the motions Mr. Woodruff filed while this appeal was pending.
He has not met the standards for mandamus. And with respect to his multiple
motions for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, we do not
consider motions based on new facts or new events asserted on appeal that were
not before the district court.
-5-