United States v. Shayesteh

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAN 7 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 02-4061
(D.C. No. 2:01-CV-309-S)
AHMAD R. SHAYESTEH, (D. Utah)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY , BALDOCK , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
Ahmad R. Shayesteh, a federal prisoner convicted of drug possession
charges proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order denying his 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 1
On application to this court,
Shayesteh obtained a certificate of appealability (“COA”) with regard to the
constitutionality of the police roadblock at which the contraband in his car was
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
1
The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument pursuant
to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
discovered. He now seeks relief on the merits of his unconstitutional-roadblock
argument, as well as a COA on his claims that the police officer’s questions at the
roadblock were unconstitutionally intrusive and that his attorney provided
ineffective assistance of counsel. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(a), and affirm the district court on the merits of the roadblock claim and
deny COA on the remaining claims.
I
The facts underlying Shayesteh’s conviction are set out in this court’s order
and judgment affirming his conviction. United States v. Shayesteh , No. 97-4111,
1998 WL 694500 (10th Cir. Oct. 6, 1998) . Briefly, the Utah Highway Patrol had
established a roadblock to check drivers’ licenses and registrations and to look for
impaired drivers. On May 29, 1995, Shayesteh was stopped at this roadblock and
after a brief interaction with the trooper, Shayesteh offered the trooper a search of
his trunk. During the search, a drug-detection dog alerted on his luggage, which
contained the cocaine and methamphetamine for which he was convicted. Before
trial and on direct appeal, Shayesteh sought to suppress the evidence on the
grounds that he was detained in violation of the order authorizing the roadblock,
his consent to the search was tainted by the illegal detention, and he did not
consent and the dog alert did not provide probable cause for a search. Id. at **2.
After a pre-trial suppression hearing, a magistrate judge made findings of fact and
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recommended that the suppression motion be denied. The district court adopted
this recommendation without modification. Id. at **3-5.
A jury convicted Shayesteh of two counts of possessing a controlled
substance with intent to distribute. The district court sentenced him to
262 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, this court affirmed both the conviction
and the sentence. United States v. Shayesteh , No. 97-4111, 1998 WL 694500(10th Cir. Oct. 6, 1998), on reh’g , 1998 WL 839083 (10th Cir. Nov. 24, 1998),
aff’d after remand , No. 99-4032, 2000 WL 121498 (10th Cir. Feb. 1, 2000).
Shayesteh then filed a § 2255 motion, arguing that his conviction was obtained in
violation of the Constitution, but the district court denied relief.
On appeal from this denial, Shayesteh raises the following claims: (1) the
police roadblock had an unlawful purpose, (2) the trooper’s questioning after he
was cleared to leave but before he could merge into traffic was unconstitutional
and so intrusive as to obviate his consent, and (3) his trial and appellate counsel
provided ineffective assistance. He also complains that the district court
improperly denied him leave to file a traverse to the government’s response.
II
As noted above, Shayesteh obtained a COA on the question of the
constitutionality of the police roadblock. Where a COA is granted, we review the
district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.
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United States v. Mora , 293 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 123 S. Ct.
388 (2002). Because Shayesteh appears pro se on appeal, we construe his
pleadings liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Shayesteh
claims the roadblock was unconstitutional because its purpose was general crime
control, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, as announced in City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond , 531 U.S. 32 (2000). Edmond was announced after
Shayesteh’s conviction became final, but before he filed his § 2255 motion.
The government argues that the Fourth Amendment claim is procedurally
barred because Shayesteh had a full and fair opportunity to raise it on direct
review but failed to do so. Shayesteh contends that he did not have a full and fair
opportunity to raise the challenge previously, as it would have been futile until
Edmond was subsequently announced. Assuming without deciding that Edmond
announced a new rule of law, however, Shayesteh could not avail himself of it
here because his conviction became final before the new rule was announced.
“Unless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules
of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become
final before the new rules are announced.” Teague v. Lane , 489 U.S. 288, 310
(1989). Teague sets forth two exceptions: A new rule will apply retroactively if it
places “certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of
the criminal law-making authority to proscribe” or if it involves a “watershed rule
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of criminal procedure.” Id. at 311. The first exception does not apply to the
Edmond rule , which prohibits roadblocks whose purposes are general crime
control, because it does not involve protected private conduct. The second
exception does not apply because Edmond does not announce a watershed rule of
criminal procedure. In Mora , this court clarified the meaning of the watershed
exception by stating, “[t]o qualify as a watershed rule of criminal procedure, the
rule must not only improve the accuracy with which defendants are convicted or
acquitted, but also . . . .” Mora , 293 F.3d at 1218-19 (quotations omitted). The
exclusionary rule — excluding evidence drawn from searches found to violate the
Fourth Amendment — does not improve the accuracy with which defendants are
convicted or acquitted, and thus does not fall within the second exception. Thus,
even if we accepted Shayesteh’s position that the Fourth Amendment claim is not
procedurally barred because it was not available until after Edmond was decided,
the Edmond rule would not apply retroactively to Shayesteh’s conviction.
In the alternative, Shayesteh claims that if Edmond did not announce a new
rule, his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to
challenge the constitutionality of the roadblock on direct review. See United
States v. Cook , 997 F.2d 1312, 1318 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that a Fourth
Amendment claim is not procedurally barred if the failure to raise it on direct
appeal is attributable to ineffective assistance of counsel). An ineffective
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assistance of counsel claim is not procedurally barred if it was not raised on direct
appeal. United States v. Galloway , 56 F.3d 1239, 1242-43 (10th Cir. 1995). To
establish that counsel provided ineffective assistance, a defendant must show both
that his attorney’s representation was deficient and that the attorney’s substandard
performance prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984). “When a defendant alleges his appellate counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to raise an issue on appeal, we examine the merits of the
omitted issue.” United States v. Cook , 45 F.3d 388, 392 (10th Cir. 1995). We
conclude that Shayesteh’s attorney was reasonable in declining to raise the Fourth
Amendment challenge because the district court found that the primary purpose of
the roadblock was not general crime control, which would have defeated the claim
under the law as it stood during Shayesteh’s trial and direct appeal.
Even before Edmond was announced, the law in this circuit recognized that
a roadblock established to check drivers’ licenses and registrations would not
withstand a constitutional challenge where the primary purpose was to search for
drugs. United States v. Morales-Zamora , 974 F.2d 149, 151 (10th Cir. 1992). 2
2
Mr. Shayesteh is incorrect in claiming that Morales-Zamora was no longer
good law at the time of his trial because it was overruled by United States v.
Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc). He asserts that because
Botero-Ospina overruled United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir.
1988), and because Morales-Zamora cited Guzman, Morales-Zamora was
overruled. Botero-Ospina specifically had to do with traffic stops and is
(continued...)
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Shayesteh persists in arguing that, contrary to the stated purposes of the
roadblock, the real purpose of the roadblock was general crime control, including
the interdiction of illicit drugs. He points to statements made by the police
officers who were working at the roadblock admitting that the officers were
looking for criminal activity in addition to checking drivers’ licenses. Moreover,
he argues that the presence of the drug-detection dog contributes to the showing
of pretext.
At the suppression hearing, the magistrate judge applied Morales-Zamora
and found that there was no evidence indicating that the primary purpose of the
roadblock was for general law enforcement or for the interdiction of drugs. (R.
Doc. 18, Att. 1 at 22.) The magistrate also concluded that the drug-detection dog
was not being used to check vehicles, but instead, was in the vicinity of
Shayesteh’s car merely because it was taking exercise in an area near the
roadblock. ( Id. at 19.) In denying Shayesteh’s motion to suppress the evidence,
the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s findings of fact and conclusions
of law. In light of these findings, it was reasonable for Shayesteh’s attorney to
decline to raise the Fourth Amendment challenge at trial and on direct review,
given the deferential standard with which this court would have reviewed the
2
(...continued)
inapplicable to roadblocks. 71 F.3d at 786–87.
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district court’s findings. See United States v. Callwood , 66 F.3d 1110, 1112
(10th Cir. 1995) (holding that on an appeal from an order denying suppression,
this court will review a district court’s findings of fact for clear error and
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government).
Shayesteh has failed to demonstrate that his counsel’s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness. Therefore, we need not address
the prejudice prong. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 697. We hold that Shayesteh is not
entitled to relief under § 2255 on his claim that the police roadblock was
unconstitutional.
III
Shayesteh raises additional claims on appeal for which a COA was not
granted. First, he asserts that the district court erred in refusing to let him file a
traverse to the government’s pleading. Second, he maintains that the intrusive
nature of the trooper’s questions at the roadblock violated the Fourth Amendment.
Finally, he asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for various reasons
unrelated to the roadblock issue, and that the cumulative effect of his counsel’s
errors deprived him of a fair trial.
We will not grant a COA unless the petitioner makes a “substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). He must do so
“by demonstrating ‘reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter,
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agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the
issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’”
United States v. Espinoza-Saenz , 235 F.3d 501, 502 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting
Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000)) (further quotation omitted).
A
We first dispose of the claim of error in refusing Shayesteh leave to file a
traverse. We review the district court’s decision to deny a reply brief for
an abuse of discretion. See Beaird v. Seagate Tech., Inc. , 145 F.3d 1159, 1164
(10th Cir. 1998). The proffered traverse was substantially cumulative to
Shayesteh’s eighty-two-page brief in support of his § 2255 motion, and the
district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the traverse.
B
Mr. Shayesteh seeks a COA on his claim that his Fourth Amendment rights
were violated by the intrusive nature of the questions the trooper asked him as he
waited to merge safely into traffic after he had been cleared to proceed. The
questions pertained to travel plans. See Shayesteh , 1998 WL 694500, at **1.
Shayesteh argues that under United States v. Holt , 264 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir.
2001), police questioning may be unconstitutionally intrusive even if it does not
extend the length of an otherwise lawful detention. Moreover, he argues that this
claim is not procedurally barred because it relies on an intervening change in the
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law. United States v. Prichard , 875 F.2d 789, 791 (10th Cir. 1989) (“Absent an
intervening change in the law of a circuit, issues disposed of on direct appeal
generally will not be considered on a collateral attack by a motion pursuant to §
2255.”). Even if Holt applies retroactively on collateral review, which we do not
address, Holt does not apply to the present case because it involved questioning
about a loaded weapon while the defendant was not free to go. Holt , 264 F.3d at
1218-19.
Shayesteh also alleges that he made this claim on direct appeal, but this
court reviewed it under an incorrect standard of review. In fact, the direct appeal
did not include the claim that the trooper’s questions were impermissibly
intrusive. Rather, the issue raised on appeal he claims was improperly reviewed
was whether the trooper’s questioning exceeded the scope of the roadblock
authorization by detaining him after he was cleared to proceed. See Shayesteh ,
1998 WL 694500, at **3. Therefore, we deny a COA because “[s]ection 2255
motions are not available to test the legality of matters which should have been
raised on direct appeal,” and Shayesteh has not shown cause and prejudice
for failing to raise the issue there. United States v. Warner , 23 F.3d 287, 291
(10th Cir. 1994). The appeal is dismissed as to this claim.
C
Finally, we consider Shayesteh’s allegations that his trial counsel provided
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ineffective assistance for failing to discuss a plea bargain, for continuing the trial
for no good reason, for failing to investigate and prepare for trial, and for failure
to object to the admission of evidence. He also claims that the cumulative effect
of his counsel’s errors deprived him of a fair trial. We have carefully reviewed
the briefs and the record, and we have applied the Strickland standard set forth
above. For substantially the same reasons underlying the district court’s January
25, 2002 order denying relief under § 2255, we conclude that Shayesteh is not
entitled to a COA because he has not “made a substantial showing of the denial of
a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The appeal is dismissed as to this
claim.
IV
Shayesteh’s request to proceed without prepayment of costs or fees
is GRANTED . His motion to reconsider his request for a COA is DENIED . The
judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Utah is
AFFIRMED as to the roadblock claim. The appeal is DISMISSED as to the
remaining claims. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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