Alexander v. Pushmataha County/Town of Antlers Hospital Authority

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAR 20 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
LESTER ALEXANDER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
PUSHMATAHA COUNTY/TOWN OF
ANTLERS HOSPITAL AUTHORITY,
a political subdivision; JACK
FRANKS, in his individual and
official capacity as County
Commissioner for Pushmataha County;
JACKY DELLINGER, in his
individual and official capacity as
former Chairman of the Board of No. 02-7041
Trustees for the Pushmataha (D.C. No. 01-CV-419-S)
County/Town of Antlers Hospital; (E.D. Oklahoma)
LARRY JOSLIN, in his individual and
official capacity as former Vice-
Chairman of the Board of Trustees for
the Pushmataha County/Town of
Antlers Hospital Authority; GLENN E.
COX, in his individual and official
capacity as former Secretary of the
Board of Trustees for the Pushmataha
County/Town of Antlers Hospital
Authority,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, ANDERSON and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. **
Plaintiff-Appellant Lester Alexander filed suit against Defendants-
Appellees Pushmataha County/Town of Antlers Hospital Authority and individual
members of the Board of Trustees for the Hospital Authority pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1983, contending that termination of Plaintiff’s employment as Hospital
Administrator violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm the district court’s entry of
summary judgment in favor of Defendants.
Background
Plaintiff was employed as Hospital Administrator of the Pushmataha
County/Town of Antlers Hospital from February 1990 until July 26, 1999. An
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel
has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
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audit conducted by the Auditor and Inspector of the State of Oklahoma in 1997
revealed financial discrepancies and raised questions about the performance of
Plaintiff as Hospital Administrator. Aplt. App. at 54-69. Following misdemeanor
charges (later dropped) against Plaintiff and adverse publicity, the Board moved
to terminate Plaintiff in 1998, but the motion failed by one vote. The Board
moved again to terminate Plaintiff on July 26, 1999, and voted to do so by a three
to one vote.
Five days before the Board’s meeting, Plaintiff wrote a letter to the district
attorney accusing the Board of violating the Oklahoma Open Meetings Act by
failing to post proper and timely notice of a meeting. Plaintiff alleges that this
letter precipitated his termination and thereby constitutes retaliatory discharge in
violation of his First Amendment rights. Plaintiff also claims that, upon applying
for a position with another hospital, he was told that derogatory comments about
him were being circulated. According to Plaintiff, he has a protected liberty
interest in his good name and reputation as related to his profession, and the
derogatory comments violate his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process
rights. Finally, Plaintiff claims he was denied his Fourteenth Amendment right to
procedural due process when he was terminated without adequate due process.
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Discussion
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same standard applied by the district court. Amro v. Boeing Co.,
232 F.3d 790, 796 (10th Cir.2000). Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We view the evidence and
draw any inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment, but that party must identify sufficient evidence that would require
submission of the case to the jury. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 251-52 (1986).
A. First Amendment Claim
Alexander claims that he is entitled to relief under § 1983 because
Defendants terminated him in retaliation for “whistle blowing” speech that was
protected under the First Amendment. Following Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391
U.S. 563 (1968), and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), we have set forth a
four-step test for such a claim. First, we “determine whether the employee’s
speech can be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public
concern.” Clinger v. N.M. Highlands Univ., Bd. of Regents, 215 F.3d 1162, 1165
(10th Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Second, we “balance
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the employee’s interest, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern against the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Id. at 1165-
66 (citations and internal quotations omitted). Third, “[i]f the balance tips in
favor of the employee, the employee next must prove that the protected speech
was a substantial factor or a motivating factor in the detrimental employment
decision.” Id. at 1166 (citation omitted). Finally, “[i]f the employee makes this
showing, then the burden shifts to the employer to show that it would have made
the same employment decision in the absence of the protected speech.” Id. The
“first two questions are legal in nature and must be resolved by the court,” but the
third and fourth questions “concern causation and are properly resolved by the
factfinder.” Id.Even if we were to assume that Plaintiff’s letter to the district attorney
constituted speech on a matter of public concern and that the balance between the
hospital’s interest in efficient public service and Plaintiff’s interest in
commenting on matters of public concern weighed in Plaintiff’s favor, summary
judgment was properly granted on Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim. Plaintiff
has produced no evidence, apart from an assertion by his own attorney, that the
letter to the district attorney was “a substantial factor or a motivating factor” in
his termination. Plaintiff is correct that the third element of the Pickering test
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(“substantial or motivating factor in the detrimental employment decision”) is a
“factual decision,” Aplt. Br. at 18, but that does not mandate that every such
claim must be submitted to the jury and that summary judgment was improper;
“[a] dispute about a material fact is genuine only if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Thomas v. IBM,
48 F.3d 478, 486 (10th Cir. 1995) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Where, as here, the plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue as to the material fact of
whether the speech was a substantial or motivating factor in his termination, then
summary judgment is properly granted. A review of the record generally and the
deposition testimony of the Board members and Plaintiff specifically raises no
such genuine issue.
B. Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process
A public employee’s constitutional right to procedural due process is
implicated only where the employee has a protected property interest in continued
employment and was denied constitutionally adequate due process. Property
interests are created by independent, non-constitutional sources, such as state law
or contractual provisions. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
Plaintiff here did not have a protected property interest in his continued
employment as the Hospital Administrator, for (a) Plaintiff did not have a written
employment contract with the hospital, and (b) the express provisions of the
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Policy and Procedure Regulations promulgated by the Hospital rendered Plaintiff
an at-will employee. Oklahoma law states that employment without a written
contract and for an indefinite period can be terminated at will by either party with
or without cause. See Burke v. K-Mart, 770 P.2d 24, 26 (Okla. 1989). Without a
property interest in continued employment, the constitutional safeguards of
procedural due process do not apply.
C. Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process
In order to show that statements by Defendants infringed on Plaintiff’s
liberty interest, he must show that (a) “the statements . . . impugn[ed] [his] good
name, reputation, honor, or integrity,” (b) the statements were false, (c) the
“statements . . .occur[red] in the course of terminating the employee or must
foreclose other employment opportunities,” and (d) the statements were
published. Watson v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 75 F.3d 569, 578-79 (10th Cir.
1996).
We find here that Plaintiff has not provided a “sufficient showing of false
stigmatizing statements entangled with his interest in employment.” Workman v.
Jordan, 32 F.3d 475, 481 (10th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff can recall neither the content
nor the source of the statements. Because Plaintiff cannot even recall who told
him that derogatory statements were being made about him, “there is,” as the
district court noted, “absolutely no way of knowing if the alleged statements
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involved plaintiff’s good name, reputation or integrity.” Aplt. App. at 816. Such
a dearth of evidence fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to Plaintiff’s
substantive due process claim.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the grant of summary judgment by the district
court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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