Berry v. State of Oklahoma

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 9 2003
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TIMOTHY GORDON BERRY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 01-6281
(D.C. No. 01-CV-237-M)
STATE OF OKLAHOMA; (W.D. Okla.)
OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS DIRECTOR;
JAMES L. SAFFLE; PATRICK
CRAWLEY; NORMA BULLOCK;
ANITA WOOTEN; WACKENHUT
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION;
DAYTON J. POPPELL,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
SCOTT BIGHORSE and MARY
WOOTEN,
Defendants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR , KELLY , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Timothy Gordon Berry, a state prisoner appearing pro se, appeals
the district court’s order and the supporting judgment dismissing fifteen of the
sixteen claims he asserted in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint. Our
jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we conclude that the district court
entered a final judgment that is appealable to this court even though the district
court did not certify its judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). 1
Nonetheless,
1
With respect to Count Three in Mr. Berry’s Complaint, the magistrate judge
concluded that Mr. Berry had stated a claim against defendants Scott Bighorse
and Mary Wooten based on his allegation that he was transferred to a private
prison in retaliation for exercising his constitutional rights. The magistrate judge
also concluded that venue over Count Three was not proper in the Western
District of Oklahoma, and the magistrate judge recommended that the claim be
transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) to the Northern District of Oklahoma. The
district judge adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, and, in the same
order dismissing the fifteen additional claims asserted by Mr. Berry, the district
judge “transfer[red] the claim raised in Count Three . . . to the . . . Northern
District of Oklahoma.” R., Doc. 9 at 2. Although the district judge did not
expressly sever Count Three under Fed. R. Civ. P. 21, we conclude that the
district judge intended to sever Count Three as indicated by her language
transferring only “the claim raised in Count Three.” As a result of the severance,
it was not necessary for the district judge to certify her judgment dismissing
Mr. Berry’s other claims under Rule 54(b), and this court has jurisdiction to hear
(continued...)
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because Mr. Berry’s appeal to this court is frivolous, we dismiss the appeal under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
In his complaint, Mr. Berry claimed that: (1) he was wrongfully terminated
from his prison work assignment as a legal research assistant; (2) he was not paid
the federally mandated minimum hourly wage for work he performed in prison
and was denied the opportunity to work for a wage; (3) he was punished and
denied certain privileges for refusing to work for no compensation; (4) he was
subjected to involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment;
(5) he was denied certain statutory earned credits and has therefore been subjected
to a lengthier term of imprisonment; (6) the conditions of his confinement were
unconstitutional; (7) certain rules and regulations and related administrative
procedures of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections were unlawful; (8) an
assistant attorney general of the State of Oklahoma misrepresented the controlling
law and committed malpractice during a state-court habeas proceeding; and (9) he
has been denied access to the courts.
After thoroughly analyzing each of Mr. Berry’s claims in light of the
governing legal authorities, the magistrate judge concluded that Mr. Berry had
failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted and/or that his claims were
1
(...continued)
this appeal without a Rule 54(b) certification.
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frivolous. The magistrate judge therefore recommended to the district judge that
Mr. Berry’s claims be dismissed under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii), 2
and the
district judge adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismissed
Mr. Berry’s claims. The district judge also determined that the dismissal counts
as a “prior occasion” or “strike” for purposes of the “three strikes” provision in
§ 1915(g). In addition, the district judge denied Mr. Berry’s motion for leave to
proceed on appeal in forma pauperis, concluding, under § 1915(a)(3), that this
appeal was not taken in good faith.
We review the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo.
See Gaines. v. Stenseng , 292 F.3d 1222, 1224 (10th Cir. 2002). We review the
district court’s § 1915(e) frivolousness dismissal for an abuse of discretion. See
McWilliams v. Colorado , 121 F.3d 573, 574-75 (10th Cir. 1997). The standard of
review is not determinative of this appeal, however, because we reach the same
conclusions under either the de novo or the abuse-of-discretion standard of
review.
2
As noted by the magistrate judge, filing restrictions have been imposed on
Mr. Berry due to his extensive history of filing frivolous lawsuits in the Western
District of Oklahoma. See Berry v. Fields , No. 94-6281, 1994 WL 697314 at **1
(10th Cir. Dec. 13, 1994) (unpublished). The magistrate judge concluded that Mr.
Berry substantially complied with the filing restrictions, and she therefore
examined the merits of his claims.
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For substantially the same reasons set forth in the magistrate judge’s report
and recommendation dated May 10, 2001, see R., Doc. 6 at 7-24, we agree that
Mr. Berry’s claims are frivolous and/or fail to state a claim. We also agree with
the district judge that this appeal was not taken in good faith. Accordingly, we
deny Mr. Berry’s motion under § 1915(a)(1) for leave to proceed on appeal in
forma pauperis; we order Mr. Berry to render immediate payment of the unpaid
balance due on the filing fee; and we dismiss this appeal as frivolous. Further,
the dismissal of this appeal counts as a “prior occasion” or “strike” for purposes
of the “three strikes” provision in § 1915(g). 3
This appeal is DISMISSED. We also DENY Mr. Berry’s “Motion and
Brief to Expand/Supplement the Record and for Leave to Amend/Supplement Pro
Se Civil Rights Complaint,” which he filed in this court on March 24, 2003.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
3
We note that Mr. Berry has two prior strikes in the Western District of
Oklahoma based on the dismissals of his § 1983 complaints in Case Nos. 92-CV-
174 and 94-CV-790. The district court’s dismissal in this case also counts as a
separate strike, giving Mr. Berry a present total of four strikes for purposes of
§ 1915(g) and any future civil actions he files in federal court.
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