United States v. Avila-Sandoval

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 6 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 01-1448
v. (D.Ct. No. 00-CR-436-N)
(D. Colorado)
JOSE AVILA-SANDOVAL,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, MURPHY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant Jose Avila-Sandoval appeals the district court’s denial of his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
1291, and affirm.
On November 30, 2000, Mr. Avila-Sandoval pled guilty to one count of
Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute Methamphetamine in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). In exchange, the government
dismissed four counts against Mr. Avila-Sandoval alleging Possession with Intent
to Distribute Methamphetamine. The plea agreement provided that the statutory
mandatory minimum sentence for the offense was 120 months, and predicted a
guideline range of 108-135 months. Mr. Avila-Sandoval was later sentenced to
121 months imprisonment and five years supervised release.
On June 27, 2001, Mr. Avila-Sandoval, acting pro se, moved to withdraw
his guilty plea, claiming it was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because
counsel performed inadequately in apprising him of the propriety of pleading
guilty. 1 On August 8, 2001, Mr. Avila-Sandoval, through his counsel, Mr. Boston
1
In early November 2000, Mr. Avila-Sandoval filed a motion for change of
counsel, alleging various grievances against his trial counsel; he reiterated his
concerns at the November 16, 2000 status conference. During the status
conference, the district court fully addressed the issue and denied his motion.
However, the district court did appoint advisory counsel, Mr. Boston Stanton, for
the purpose of giving Mr. Avila-Sandoval a second opinion. Mr. Avila-
Sandoval’s discontent with trial counsel was alleviated by the time of his
November 30, 2000 guilty plea. At the change-of-plea hearing, the district court
repeatedly questioned Mr. Avila-Sandoval as to whether he was satisfied with
both his trial counsel and advisory counsel. Mr. Avila-Sandoval clearly
responded that he was satisfied with both. On April 5, 2001, the district court
granted trial counsel’s motion to withdraw as counsel, and appointed Mr. Boston
Stanton. On August 24, 2001, the district court granted Mr. Avila-Sandoval’s
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Stanton, filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P.
32(e), claiming he entered his plea under a mistaken belief he would receive a
prison term of only forty-eight months. On September 4, 2001, through his
counsel, Mr. John Sullivan III, Mr. Avila-Sandoval filed an addendum to his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, reiterating he entered the plea unknowingly
and involuntarily based on the advice of counsel that he would receive only forty-
eight months imprisonment. On September 5, 2001, the district court denied all
motions to withdraw the plea and sentenced Mr. Avila-Sandoval to 121 months
imprisonment.
A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea.
United States v. Siedlik, 231 F.3d 744, 748 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing United States
v. Rhodes, 913 F.2d 839, 845 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1122(1991)). “If a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty . . . is made before sentence is
imposed, the court may permit the plea to be withdrawn if the defendant shows
any fair and just reason." Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(e) (2002). The defendant bears the
burden of demonstrating a “fair and just reason” for the withdrawal of the plea.
Siedlik, 231 F.3d at 748 (quotation marks and citations omitted). “We review the
district court's denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea for an abuse of
motion to substitute counsel, and substituted Mr. John Sullivan III as counsel.
Mr. Sullivan is Mr. Avila-Sandoval’s appellate counsel.
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discretion.” Id. We will not reverse absent a showing the district court acted
unjustly or unfairly. United States v. Graves, 106 F.3d 342, 343 (10th Cir. 1997).
Mr. Avila-Sandoval maintains he did not knowingly and voluntarily plead
guilty because he was not adequately informed by counsel as to the possible
sentence, and he did not understand the process. The record rebukes these
arguments.
First, there is absolutely no reason to believe Mr. Avila-Sandoval was
misinformed by counsel as to the potential sentence he would receive. At the
change-of-plea hearing, Mr. Avila-Sandoval indicated he had read, understood,
and had no questions regarding the terms of the plea agreement, which
specifically provided for a mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months.
Additionally, the court took care to inform Mr. Avila-Sandoval, and he
affirmatively recognized, that unless the government filed a motion for downward
departure, the mandatory minimum sentence for the offense was ten years (120
months), and if certain aggravating factors existed, the court could impose a life
sentence. Mr. Avila-Sandoval indicated he understood that if the court did not
accept the government’s recommended sentence, or if he was otherwise
dissatisfied with his sentence, he would have no right to withdraw his plea of
guilty. When given the chance to withdraw his plea at the November 30, 2000
change-of-plea hearing, Mr. Avila-Sandoval elected not to do so. Finally, Mr.
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Avila-Sandoval’s argument concerning his expectation of a forty-eight-month
sentence appears wholly disingenuous in light of the fact that both he and his
advisory counsel, Mr. Boston Stanton, admitted that Mr. Avila-Sandoval’s trial
counsel had explicitly explained to him prior to entry of the plea that the original
plea agreement for “a term of approximately forty-three months” was no longer
available, and the only plea agreement left was for a minimum of 120 months.
ROA, Vol. 3 at 26-27. 2
Mr. Avila-Sandoval’s second assertion, that his guilty plea was unknowing
and involuntary because he “was extremely confused as to the entire process,” is
also without merit. His unsupported, self-serving, generalized claim of confusion
is insufficient to overcome his apparent comprehension of the process,
effortlessly demonstrated throughout the change-of-plea hearing. To the extent
Mr. Avila-Sandoval claims confusion based on his ability to speak only Spanish,
we find such an argument wanting. The record clearly indicates Mr. Avila-
Sandoval was provided with an interpreter throughout the process, the plea
agreement was translated into Spanish, and his trial counsel at the change-of-plea
hearing spoke Spanish.
2
The terms of the original plea agreement are not in the record.
Nonetheless, at his change-of-plea hearing, Mr. Avila-Sandoval agreed his trial
counsel had informed him that the terms of the original plea agreement were no
longer available and the only plea agreement left was for 120 months.
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In addition to the above considerations, we look to the following seven
factors in determining whether Mr. Avila-Sandoval satisfied his burden of
showing the district court acted unjustly or unfairly in denying his motion to
withdraw his plea: “(1) defendant's assertion of innocence; (2) resulting prejudice
to the government; (3) defendant's delay in filing the withdrawal motion; (4)
inconvenience to the court; (5) defendant's assistance of counsel; (6) knowledge
and voluntariness of the plea; and (7) resulting waste of judicial resources.”
Graves, 106 F.3d at 343 (citing United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1572 (10th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1184 (1994)). Upon our thorough review of the
record and the parties’ briefs, it is apparent each one of these elements weighs in
unfavorably for Mr. Avila-Sandoval. In his brief, Mr. Avila-Sandoval indicates
that if the district court had granted his motion to withdraw, he and his new
counsel could have tried to negotiate a better plea. Mr. Avila-Sandoval has failed
to indicate how a renegotiated plea agreement would be more favorable to him, or
even why the government would be inclined to consider renegotiating his plea.
For the district court to grant a motion to withdraw a plea merely in order to
satisfy a defendant’s hopes of negotiating a more favorable plea agreement would
be an impermissible waste of judicial resources. We note Mr. Avila-Sandoval has
made no assertion of innocence; nor is such a claim supported by the record.
We conclude the district court did not act unjustly or unfairly, and therefore
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did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Avila-Sandoval’s motion to withdraw
his plea of guilty. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
Entered by the Court:
TERRENCE L. O’BRIEN
United States Circuit Judge
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