Vanmeveren v. Whirlpool Corp.

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 29 2003
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
HYLA VANMEVEREN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 02-5071
(D.C. No. 00-CV-744-K)
WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION, (N.D. Oklahoma)
a Delaware corporation,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE , PORFILIO , and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff Hyla VanMeveren appeals from the district court’s grant of
judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) in favor of her employer,
defendant Whirlpool Corporation, on her complaint that it terminated her in
retaliation for exercising her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654. Following a jury verdict in plaintiff’s favor,
the district court granted Whirlpool’s Rule 50(b) motion, ruling that Whirlpool
presented undisputed evidence showing that it had a lawful justification for firing
plaintiff. We affirm.
On February 9, 2000, plaintiff was absent from work all day pursuant to a
previously submitted leave request. On February 15, 2000, plaintiff was five
hours late to work. The next day, plaintiff contacted Whirlpool managers,
seeking to have her February 9th absence counted as FMLA leave and her
February 15th absence counted as a partial, rather than full-day, absence.
Whirlpool investigated plaintiff’s February 9th absence, and terminated her on the
basis that plaintiff had lied about the time of a doctor’s appointment on
February 9th in order to obtain unwarranted FMLA leave time for her absence
that day. Plaintiff then filed a complaint, alleging Whirlpool had terminated her
in retaliation for taking FMLA leave.
To establish a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation, a plaintiff must show
she engaged in activity protected under FMLA, subsequent adverse action by the
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employer, and a causal connection between such activity and the employer’s
action. Richmond v. ONEOK, Inc. , 120 F.3d 205, 208-09 (10th Cir. 1997).
In analyzing FMLA retaliation claims, this court applies the traditional
burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green ,
411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973). Richmond, 120 F.3d at 208. Under this framework,
the defendant has an opportunity to rebut a prima facie case of retaliation by
offering legitimate non-retaliatory reasons for the adverse action. Id. Once
defendant offers such reasons, a plaintiff must present evidence that defendant’s
reasons are unworthy of belief in order to carry his or her ultimate burden of
establishing intentional retaliation. See Gunnell v. Utah Valley State College , 152
F.3d 1253, 1263 (10th Cir. 1998) (explaining that plaintiff asserting retaliation
claim has the ultimate burden to demonstrate that the challenged employment
decision was the result of intentional retaliation).
Whirlpool articulated two legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for its
termination decision: plaintiff lied with respect to the appointment time as to the
February 9th absence, and plaintiff incurred her seventh unexcused partial
absence on February 15th, for which she was subject to automatic termination.
Whirlpool permits its employees four unexcused tardy or early leave absences in a
rolling twelve-month period; each subsequent unexcused tardy or early leave
absence results in a corrective action; any employee who receives a third
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corrective action within the rolling twelve-month period is terminated. It is
undisputed that Whirlpool strictly and consistently enforces this policy.
Plaintiff stipulated that she had been issued two corrective actions in the
twelve months prior to February 15th, that she was late to work on February 15th
and that, if her partial absence that day was not an excused absence, she had
incurred her seventh unexcused partial absence in a year. She further stipulated
that if her absence on the 15th was unexcused, she would have properly received
her third corrective action and would have been properly terminated by
Whirlpool.
The jury returned a verdict in plaintiff’s favor, finding (on special jury
interrogatories) that plaintiff had established a prima facie case of FMLA
retaliation, that Whirlpool had not terminated plaintiff based on its honest belief
that she had falsified the time of the appointment, and that plaintiff’s partial
absence on February 15th was not an alternative legitimate basis for her
termination. On Whirlpool’s renewed Rule 50(b) motion, the district court
granted Whirlpool judgment as a matter of law. It found, and plaintiff does not
dispute, that plaintiff presented absolutely no evidence at trial that her late arrival
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on February 15th was excused. 1
Thus, the district court ruled that, as a matter of
law, Whirlpool had an alternative legitimate basis for terminating plaintiff.
This court reviews de novo the grant of a motion for judgment as a matter
of law under Rule 50(b). Arndt v. Koby , 309 F.3d 1247, 1250 (10th Cir. 2002),
cert. denied , 71 U.S.L.W. 3589 (U.S. May 5, 2003) (No. 02-1313). A court
should grant a defendant judgment as a matter of law “if there is no legally
sufficient evidentiary basis with respect to [the plaintiff’s] claim . . . under the
controlling law.” Id. (quotation omitted). Judgment as a matter of law under
Rule 50(b) “is warranted only if the evidence points but one way and is
susceptible to no reasonable inferences supporting the party opposing the
motion.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Plaintiff contends the district court improperly reweighed the jury’s finding
that her seventh unexcused partial absence was not an alternative legitimate basis
for her termination. However, because of plaintiff’s pre-trial stipulations and
admissions at trial, the only issue before the jury was whether her absence on
February 15th was an excused absence. The record supports the district court’s
finding, and plaintiff does not otherwise now argue, that plaintiff failed to present
1
Plaintiff testified during her pre-trial deposition that her absence on
February 15th had been an excused absence and the district court denied
Whirlpool’s motion for summary judgment on this basis.
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any evidence at trial that her absence was excused. Thus, the district court did
not improperly weigh the evidence.
Plaintiff next asserts that her unexcused absence is not a legitimate basis
for terminating her because Whirlpool did not articulate this alternative basis until
after she filed her complaint, more than a year after her firing. Plaintiff provides
no authority for this proposition. Whirlpool presented undisputed testimony at
trial that it was aware of plaintiff’s seventh unexcused absence when it terminated
her and would have terminated her for that absence, regardless of the alleged
falsification, but chose instead to rely upon the claimed falsification because of
the importance of honesty in Whirlpool’s work and personnel operations. This
uncontested testimony is entirely consistent with plaintiff’s stipulation that she
was subject to automatic termination as of February 15th, when she incurred her
seventh unexcused absence. We agree with the district court that the fact that
Whirlpool did not specifically articulate the unexcused absence as an additional
basis for plaintiff’s termination at the time of discharge does not mean that it was
not a legitimate reason behind its termination decision. See Grottkau v. Sky
Climber, Inc. , 79 F.3d 70, 73 (7th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff maintains that the seventh unexcused absence constitutes
after-acquired evidence under McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. ,
513 U.S. 352, 362-63 (1995) (holding that after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing
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can serve only to limit remedy, not to preclude liability altogether). The district
court properly rejected this argument because Whirlpool is not relying on
after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing. Again, Whirlpool presented undisputed
testimony that it was aware of plaintiff’s seventh unexcused absence when it
terminated her.
Plaintiff also relies upon Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. ,
298 F.3d 955, 960 (10th Cir. 2002) for the proposition that, once the jury found
that she had established a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation, the intent of the
employer becomes immaterial. She misconstrues Smith . Smith explains that
intent is immaterial in FMLA interference cases, where the employee claims the
employer interfered with FMLA leave to which he or she was entitled. Plaintiff
has neither asserted nor proved a FMLA interference claim; rather, she has
asserted a FMLA retaliation claim, for which the employer’s intent is relevant.
See King v. Preferred Technical Group , 166 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 1999) (cited
with approval by Smith , explaining differences between FMLA interference and
FMLA retaliation claims). Moreover, as Smith makes clear, even under FMLA
interference claims, “‘an employee who requests FMLA leave would have no
greater protection against his or her employment being terminated for reasons not
related to his or her FMLA request than he or she did before submitting the
request.’” 298 F.3d at 960 (quoting Gunnell , 152 F.3d at 1262).
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In summary, because plaintiff stipulated she was subject to automatic
termination if her seventh absence was unexcused and presented no evidence
at trial that this absence was excused, no reasonable jury could have found that
Whirlpool did not have a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for terminating her.
Thus, the district court properly granted Whirlpool judgment as a matter of law.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
John C. Porfilio
Circuit Judge
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