Smith v. Mullarkey

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 11 2003
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
KENNETH L. SMITH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 02-1481
(D.C. No. 00-N-2225 (OES))
MARY J. MULLARKEY, personally (D. Colo.)
and in her representative capacity as
Justice of the Colorado Supreme
Court; REBECCA LOVE KOURLIS,
personally and in her representative
capacity as Justice of the Colorado
Supreme Court; GREGORY J.
HOBBS, JR., personally and in his
representative capacity as Justice of
the Colorado Supreme Court; ALEX
J. MARTINEZ, personally and in his
representative capacity as Justice of
the Colorado Supreme Court;
MICHAEL L. BENDER, personally
and in his representative capacity as
Justice of the Colorado Supreme
Court; NANCY E. RICE, personally
and in her representative capacity as
Justice of the Colorado Supreme
Court; GREGORY KELLUM
SCOTT, in his personal capacity
only; NATHAN B. COATS, in his
representative capacity as Justice of
the Colorado Supreme Court; ALAN
K. OGDEN, personally and in his
representative capacity as agent of
the Colorado Board of Law
Examiners; SUSAN B.
HARGLEROAD, personally and in
her representative capacity as agent
of the Colorado Board of Law
Examiners; SHARI FRAUSTO,
personally and in her representative
capacity as agent of the Colorado
Board of Law Examiners; LES
WOODWARD, personally and in his
representative capacity as agent of
the Colorado Board of Law
Examiners; CARLOS SAMOUR,
personally and in his representative
capacity as agent of the Colorado
Board of Law Examiners; JAMES
COYLE, III, personally and in his
representative capacity as agent of
the Colorado Board of Law
Examiners; LINDA DONNELLY,
personally and in her representative
capacity as agent of the Colorado
Board of Law Examiners; MELANIE
BACKES, personally and in her
representative capacity as agent of
the Colorado Board of Law
Examiners; and John Does 1-9,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE , BARRETT , and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
-2-
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Kenneth L. Smith, appearing pro se, appeals from a final judgment
entered by the district court dismissing his complaint against defendants, which
he brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. The district court ruled that it did not have subject
matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s case. We affirm.
The facts of this case are well known to the parties and will not be repeated
at length here. The dispute surrounds plaintiff’s application to practice law in the
State of Colorado. Plaintiff graduated from law school, passed the state bar
examination, and passed the professional ethics examination, all prerequisites to
obtaining a license to practice law in Colorado. When plaintiff was ordered to
submit to a mental status examination by the Board of Law Examiner’s Hearing
Panel, however, plaintiff refused. Primarily because plaintiff refused to submit to
that examination, the Hearing Panel recommended to the Colorado Supreme Court
that plaintiff’s application be denied. After consideration of the record, including
plaintiff’s application, the Hearing Panel’s report and recommendation, plaintiff’s
-3-
exceptions to that report, and the responses filed by the Board of Law Examiners,
the Colorado Supreme Court denied plaintiff’s application for admission to the
State Bar.
Plaintiff did not seek review of that denial with the United States Supreme
Court, as he is permitted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Instead, ten months later,
plaintiff filed a complaint in federal district court setting forth twenty claims for
relief for alleged violations of federal law and of plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Plaintiff sought declarations that the Colorado bar admissions process and certain
admissions rules were unconstitutional, as well as money damages “resulting from
the wrongful deprivation of [plaintiff’s] property interest in the right to practice
law.” R. Vol. I, doc. 5 at 63.
Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and, alternatively, on grounds of absolute judicial and
quasi-judicial immunity. The district court granted that motion ruling, inter alia,
that “[t]he United States District Court for this district does not have subject
matter jurisdiction over this case because it is a challenge by the plaintiff to
a judgment entered in a quasi-judicial adjudicatory proceeding in his case, and is
an improper attempt to review that judgment in this court, as opposed to seeking
review in the United States Supreme Court.” Id., doc. 32 at 2. Plaintiff has
-4-
appealed, disputing the district court’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction. 1
We review that determination de novo. Johnson v. Rodrigues, 226 F.3d 1103,
1107 (10th Cir. 2000).
Because federal review of state court judgments may be obtained only in
the United States Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257, “[t]he Rooker-
Feldman doctrine prohibits a lower federal court from considering claims actually
decided by a state court, and claims ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a prior
state-court judgment.” Kenmen Eng’g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 473
(10th Cir. 2002) (citing Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923);
Dist. of Columbia Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n.16 (1983)). Under
this doctrine, a party who loses in a state court proceeding is barred “‘from
seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a
United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state
judgement itself violates the loser’s federal rights.’” Kiowa Indian Tribe of Okla.
1
The district court stated that there were three bases for dismissing
plaintiff’s complaint: (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) absolute
immunity; and (3) failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Because
we agree that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s
claims, we do not address plaintiff’s arguments concerning the district court’s
alternative bases for its ruling. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,
523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it
ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the
fact and dismissing the cause.”).
-5-
v. Hoover, 150 F.3d 1163, 1169 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Johnson v. DeGrandy,
512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994)).
In his appeal, plaintiff argues that his federal court complaint includes
general constitutional challenges to Colorado state law that fall outside this
jurisdictional bar. 2
In an opinion released during the briefing of this appeal, this
court discussed the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and, most relevant to the appeal,
addressed the contours of the phrase “inextricably intertwined” as it has been
articulated by the Supreme Court. See Kenmen Eng’g, 314 F.3d at 475-477.
In that opinion, the court stated:
Thus, the Supreme Court has identified two categories of cases that
fall outside Feldman’s ‘inextricably intertwined’ umbrella. First,
under Feldman, a party may bring a general constitutional challenge
to a state law, provided that: (1) the party does not request that the
federal court upset a prior state-court judgment applying that law
against the party, and (2) the prior state-court judgment did not
actually decide that the state law at issue was facially constitutional.
Second, under Pennzoil [Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987)], a
party may challenge state procedures for enforcement of a judgment,
where consideration of the underlying state-court decision is not
required.
2
The implication of plaintiff’s argument is that these challenges were neither
actually decided by the state court, nor inextricably intertwined with the state
court judgment. Because we conclude plaintiff’s federal claims are inextricably
intertwined with the prior state court judgment denying his application to practice
law, we need not reach the question of whether the state court actually decided
the issues raised in plaintiff’s claims.
-6-
Id. at 476 (citations and footnote omitted). Noting the difficulty in formulating a
“foolproof test” for guiding the courts in deciding the inextricably intertwined
question, the court articulated the following inquiry:
in general we must ask whether the injury alleged by the federal
plaintiff resulted from the state court judgment itself or is distinct
from that judgment. Three related concepts – injury, causation, and
redressability – inform this analysis. In other words, we approach
the question by asking whether the state-court judgment caused,
actually and proximately, the injury for which the federal-court
plaintiff seeks redress. If it did, Rooker-Feldman deprives the
federal court of jurisdiction.
Id. (citations, quotation, and footnote omitted).
Using these principles as a guide, we are convinced that the district court
did not have jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims. After a careful reading of
plaintiff’s complaint, affording him the liberality given to all pro se litigants, we
conclude that each of plaintiff’s claims is inextricably intertwined with the state
court’s denial of his application for admission to the state bar; thus, under
Rooker-Feldman, those claims may not be reviewed by the district courts.
Plaintiff’s continuing attempts to re-frame the issues so that his claims fall
outside the ambit of Rooker-Feldman are unavailing. Despite his protests to the
contrary, it is clear that plaintiff’s injury resulted from the state-court judgment,
that his complaint in federal court sought only to upset that judgment, and that the
resolution of his federal claims necessarily required consideration of the
underlying state-court decision. See Kenmen Eng’g, 314 F.3d at 476.
-7-
Accordingly, the district court correctly dismissed plaintiff’s complaint for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.
We have reviewed plaintiff’s remaining arguments concerning the
jurisdictional issue and we conclude that they are without merit. The judgment of
the United States District Court for the District of Colorado is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
-8-