Green v. Citigroup, Inc.

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 25 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JAMES W. GREEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 03-7010
CITIGROUP, INC.; COMMERCIAL (D.C. No. 02-CV-463-S)
CREDIT COMPANY, also known as (E.D. Oklahoma)
CCC; PRIMERICA; TRAVELERS;
COMMERCIAL CREDIT SHORT
TERM DISABILITY PLAN, also known
as CCC Short Term Disability Plan;
COMMERCIAL CREDIT LONG TERM
DISABILITY PLAN, also known as CCC
Long Term Disability Plan;
COMMERCIAL CREDIT COMPANY
LIFE INSURANCE PLAN, also known as
CCC Life Insurance Plan;
COMMERCIAL CREDIT COMPANY
MEDICAL BENEFITS PLAN, also
known as CCC Medical Benefits Plan;
COMMERCIAL CREDIT COMPANY
DENTAL BENEFITS PLAN, also known
as CCC Dental Benefits Plan,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders
and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Before KELLY, BRISCOE and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered
submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff James W. Green, appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal
without prejudice of his claims against defendants. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
In August 1987, while employed in the claims department of the Gulf Insurance
Company, Green suffered a retinal hemorrhage which left him blind in his right eye. He
was discharged from his employment with Gulf on September 2, 1987. He worked in the
claims department of Chubb & Son, Inc., from December 9, 1987, until he was
discharged on October 13, 1989.
Following his discharge from Chubb, Green applied for long-term disability
benefits under a disability plan offered through Gulf’s corporate parent, Commercial
Credit Company (CCC). His claim for disability benefits was denied because (1) he had
worked in a similar position for a different employer (Chubb) following his discharge
from Gulf, (2) a court had ruled that Green failed to meet the requirements for disability
benefits under the Chubb plan, and (3) the Social Security Administration had not
2
determined Green was disabled until two years after his discharge from Gulf.
Between September 1989 and October 1999, Green filed at least three federal
lawsuits, all in the Northern District of Texas, alleging ERISA violations and seeking
disability benefits under the CCC plan.1 The first suit, in which Green was represented by
retained counsel, alleged that Green was discharged by Gulf in violation of ERISA § 510.
That suit was dismissed in October 1991 as time-barred. The second suit, in which Green
appeared pro se, included a claim for disability benefits under the CCC plan pursuant to
ERISA § 501(a)(1)(B). That claim was ultimately resolved against Green in federal
district court, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in June 1998.
The third suit, in which Green again appeared pro se, alleged the wrongful denial of
ERISA benefits under the CCC plan. Summary judgment was entered against Green in
that suit on the grounds that his “claims . . . were raised (or should have been raised) and
litigated on the merits in his first two lawsuits.” Aple. App. at 50. Green was also
“cautioned that the filing of another lawsuit against these Defendants in which he
reasserts or alleges any of the claims or causes of action raised in this case or his . . .
earlier lawsuits may subject him to appropriate sanctions.” Id. at 54. Although Green
apparently attempted to appeal the district court’s judgment, the Fifth Circuit denied
relief.
Green also filed at least one unsuccessful lawsuit seeking benefits under the
1
Chubb disability plan.
3
On August 29, 2002, Green, again appearing pro se, filed the instant action in
federal district court in Oklahoma.2 Citigroup, Inc., Primerica, and Travelers were named
as defendants as a result of their status as successors in interest to CCC. The gist of the
complaint was that Green was entitled to relief from the judgments entered against him in
the second and third lawsuits outlined above on the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Varity Corporation v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996) (holding ERISA § 502(a)(3)
authorizes individual plan beneficiary to bring suit against plan administrator for breach
of fiduciary obligations). Defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) or, alternatively, for summary judgment. On December 3, 2002, the district
court granted defendants’ motion and dismissed the case without prejudice. In doing so,
the district court stated:
Plaintiff is basically requesting this court to vacate or overrule the
judgments rendered by other federal district courts and the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals. It is axiomatic that one district court has no jurisdiction
to review the decision of another district court. Celotex Corporation v.
Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 313 (1995). If plaintiff truly believes a holding in a
case could change the outcome of a judgment previously rendered he must
bring that to the attention of the court who rendered that decision or appeal
it to a higher court. “It is for the court of the first instance to determine the
question of the validity of the law, and until its decision is reversed for error
by orderly review, either by itself or by a higher court, its orders based on
its decision are to be respected.” Celotex at 313. This court simply does
not have jurisdiction to grant plaintiff the relief which he seeks.
2
The complaint indicates that Green filed suit in federal district court in
Oklahoma, rather than in Texas, simply because he moved from Texas to Oklahoma prior
to filing suit.
4
Aple. App. at 16-17.
After examining the record on appeal, we find no error on the part of the district
court in dismissing Green’s suit without prejudice. See Ramirez v. Dep’t of Corr., 222
F.3d 1238, 1240 (10th Cir. 2000) (applying de novo standard of review to grant of Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss); see also Treadaway v. Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Sci.,
783 F.2d 1418, 1422 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying abuse of discretion standard to district
court’s decision to decline exercise of jurisdiction over independent action for relief from
judgment of another court).3 As noted, Green is effectively seeking relief from two
judgments entered against him in the Northern District of Texas. Despite the fact he is
currently a resident of Oklahoma, Green clearly could and should have sought relief in
Texas. Thus, the district court properly declined to exercise jurisdiction and dismiss
Green’s claims without prejudice. See Treadaway, 783 F.2d at 1422 (affirming district
court’s declination of jurisdiction over case seeking relief from final judgment of another
court); Carter v. Attorney General of the United States, 782 F.2d 138, 142 n.4 (10th Cir.
1986) (noting “[c]ourts have declined to exercise jurisdiction over” claims seeking relief
from civil judgment issued by another federal court “when they may be brought in the
court which entered the judgment”); Lapin v. Shulton, Inc., 333 F.2d 169, 172 (9th Cir.
1964) (noting considerations of comity and orderly administration of justice demand that
3
We find it unnecessary to conclusively decide the standard of review applicable
to this unique case because, even reviewing the case de novo, we conclude there is no
merit to the appeal.
5
non-rendering court decline to exercise jurisdiction if relief is available in rendering
court).
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
6