Coburn v. Nordeen

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 16 2003
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
MERRILY C. COBURN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 02-3249
(D.C. No. 01-CV-2562-JAR)
ROGER A. NORDEEN, (D. Kan.)
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE , PORFILIO , and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Merrily C. Coburn, appearing pro se , appeals the district court’s
order dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. She alleged in her complaint
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
that defendant, Roger A. Nordeen, a Kansas prosecutor sued in his individual
capacity, violated her constitutional rights by making false or misleading
statements in an affidavit of probable cause in support of a state criminal
complaint. The district court concluded that the defendant was entitled
to qualified immunity, and dismissed plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We affirm.
We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Stidham v. Peace
Officer Standards & Training , 265 F.3d 1144, 1149 (10th Cir. 2001). The court
accepts as true all well-pleaded facts, and reads all reasonable inferences in favor
of the plaintiff. See Witt v. Roadway Express , 136 F.3d 1424, 1428 (10th Cir.
1998). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss may be granted only if it appears
beyond a doubt that the plaintiff is unable to prove any set of facts entitling her to
relief under her theory of recovery. Conley v. Gibson , 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
We note that the district court incorrectly applied a heightened pleading standard
to plaintiff’s § 1983 complaint. Although we previously required a plaintiff to
meet a heightened pleading standard when qualified immunity was raised as
a defense, we more recently held, reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, that our
heightened pleading requirement did not survive the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Crawford-El v. Britton , 523 U.S. 574 (1998). Currier v. Doran , 242 F.3d 905,
-2-
916 (10th Cir. 2001). We therefore apply the traditional Rule 12(b)(6) standards
enunciated above in our de novo review of plaintiff’s claim.
Briefly, defendant prepared a sworn affidavit that plaintiff had attempted to
intimidate a juvenile witness by driving by the witness’s home. Plaintiff alleges
the affidavit falsely stated plaintiff was looking for the witness’s vehicle,
mischaracterized a portion of the witness’s mother’s statement, and omitted
information that the witness was not home during the events in question. We do
not further repeat the remaining details of the underlying facts, which are fully
and accurately set forth in the district court’s thorough and well-analyzed
memorandum and order. See Coburn v. Nordeen , 206 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1120-22
(D. Kan. 2002).
Although prosecutors are absolutely immune from suits for damages arising
from the performance of the traditional functions of an advocate, the district court
correctly ruled that the defendant in this case is not entitled to absolute immunity
for his sworn statements made in an affidavit supporting application for an arrest
warrant, but may be entitled to qualified immunity. See Kalina v. Fletcher , 522
U.S. 118, 130 (1997) (“Testifying about facts is the function of the witness, not of
the lawyer.”). The district court further correctly ruled that a public officer, such
as defendant, whose request for an arrest warrant is alleged to have caused an
illegal arrest is shielded by qualified immunity unless “the warrant application is
-3-
so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
unreasonable.” Malley v. Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1986). “Defendants will
not be immune if, on an objective basis, it is obvious that no reasonably
competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue; but if
officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should
be recognized.” Id. at 341.
On appeal, plaintiff first contends the district court failed to afford her
complaint the benefit of all favorable factual inferences, as required when
considering a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. We disagree. Although plaintiff
characterized certain of the defendant’s statements in the affidavit as “false,” and
alleged that probable cause would have been vitiated if certain information had
been included in the affidavit, her characterizations are merely conclusory
allegations, not well-pled facts which must be accepted as true. In conducting a
Rule 12(b)(6) analysis, the court need not accept as true any conclusory
allegations contained in the complaint. S. Disposal, Inc. v. Tex. Waste Mgmt. ,
161 F.3d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 1998). We agree with the district court that there
is nothing to support plaintiff’s allegation that defendant knowingly or recklessly
made false statements or omissions in his affidavit.
Plaintiff next contends that, regardless of any alleged misstatements or
omissions in defendant’s affidavit, it failed to support a finding of probable cause
-4-
that plaintiff intended to intimidate a witness because it was based on mere
supposition. To be entitled to qualified immunity, defendant need only have
possessed a reasonable belief that probable cause existed. Anderson v. Creighton ,
483 U.S. 635, 643-44 (1987). “[I]t is inevitable that law enforcement officials
will in some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is
present, and [the Supreme Court has] indicated that in such cases those
officials--like other officials who act in ways they reasonably believe to be
lawful--should not be held personally liable.” Id. at 641. Even viewing the facts
in the light most favorable to plaintiff, for the purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal, public officials are entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the
facts they possess at the time. Cf. Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690, 699
(1996) (noting that “a police officer views the facts through the lens of his police
experience and expertise”). We agree with the district court that plaintiff did not
demonstrate that no reasonably competent official would have found indicia of
probable cause supporting the complaint and arrest warrant.
Finally, plaintiff contends the district court improperly relied upon an
unsubstantiated history of acrimony between her family and the witnesses’ family
in assessing the reasonableness of defendant’s belief that probable cause existed.
We disagree. The sheriff’s report, which formed the basis of defendant’s
affidvavit and was attached to plaintiff’s complaint, includes evidence of an
-5-
acrimonious relationship between the two families. We do not conclude that the
district court placed any undue or unwarranted reliance on this one factor.
We conclude, for substantially the reasons stated in the district court’s
June 6, 2002 order, that plaintiff’s complaint was properly dismissed for failure
to state a claim. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The mandate
shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
John C. Porfilio
Circuit Judge
-6-