United States v. Varnedore

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
AUG 13 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 03-5014
v.
(D.C. No. 02-CR-52-EA)
(N.D. Okla.)
ROBERT LEE VARNEDORE,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL, HENRY and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
Robert Lee Varnedore was convicted by a jury of possession of a firearm
and ammunition after former conviction of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a), and possession of stolen firearms in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(j) and 924(a)(2). Varnedore was sentenced to two concurrent
terms of 115 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Varnedore claims that (1) the
*
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This
Order and Judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be
cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
district court abused its discretion when it replaced a juror with an alternate; (2)
that the district court committed plain error in admitting into evidence weapons
found during two separate searches; and (3) that the district court erred in
refusing to grant his motion for a new trial when, after trial, the Government
learned that one of its witnesses had a prior conviction more than 10 years old
that had not been disclosed to the defense. We conclude that Varnedore’s claims
are without merit, and we AFFIRM his conviction.
BACKGROUND
In December 2001, Varnedore went to a car dealership in Tulsa, Oklahoma
to trade in a pickup truck and purchase a car. A number of his actions at the
dealership caused the staff there to be suspicious of him. He sought to pay cash
for the car, had a large sum of cash on his person, and offered to bribe the
salesman to complete his purchase quickly. (ROA III at 104–05.) The driver’s
license Varnedore produced for identification had a picture that did not resemble
him, and the signature on the license did not match Varnedore’s signature on the
dealership’s paperwork. (Id. at 107–08.) In addition, he wanted to register the
car in another name. (Id. at 108.) Based on this suspicious activity, the
dealership notified the Tulsa police.
-2-
Two police officers arrived at the dealership to investigate what they
thought to be a fraud in progress. (Id. at 120–21.) They inspected the license
Varnedore had used and asked if it was his. Varnedore said “yes.” (Id. at
122–24.) They then asked if he had any other identification, and after Varnedore
said he had none they asked Varnedore for consent to search him. Varnedore
consented to the search. Finding no other identification on Varnedore’s person,
one of the officers asked him where the vehicle was that Varnedore was trading
in. (Id. at 134–35.) The officer then went to the pickup truck and looked inside
for anything else that might confirm Varnedore’s identity. (Id.) While inspecting
the interior of the pickup, the officer noticed the butt of a gun under the passenger
seat and removed a loaded handgun. (Id. at 135.) The officers then arrested
Varnedore. (Id. at 145.)
The day before he was arrested, Varnedore had checked into a Tulsa motel
and rented a room for two days. (Id. at 156–58, 163–65.) On December 31,
2001, two days after he was arrested and also after his rental of the motel room
had expired, a housekeeper cleaning the room discovered four rifles and a pistol
under the mattress. (Id. at 167–68.) The housekeeper notified the police, and
they came and took possession of the guns. (Id. at 168.)
In March 2002, a federal grand jury indicted Varnedore on three counts:
possession of a firearm and ammunition after former conviction of a felony in
-3-
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 942(a), possession of stolen firearms in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(j) and 924(a)(2); and possession of a firearm and
ammunition while a fugitive from justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(2)
and 924(a)(2). (ROA I, Doc. 1.)
The trial was held in July 2002. On the day the trial was scheduled to
begin, a jury, with one alternate juror, was selected and sworn. (ROA III at
20–73.) After the jury was chosen, the court recessed before the trial was to
commence. During the recess, one of the jurors informed the court that she could
not continue with the trial because she was suffering from serious shoulder pain.
(Id. at 76–77.) The court questioned the juror about her pain and was told that the
pain was severe. (Id. at 84–85.) The juror said her pain medication did not
relieve the pain and only made her head feel “fuzzy” and made it difficult to
concentrate. (Id. at 85.) The court then replaced the disabled juror with the
alternate pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c). (Id. at 85.)
Varnedore was convicted by the jury of counts one and two of the
indictment on July 2, 2002. 1 Shortly after trial, the Government discovered that
one of its witnesses, Tom Marrs, had a criminal history that it had failed to reveal
1
Prior to jury selection, the Government filed a motion to proceed to trial
on Counts 1 and 2 only, reserving the right to proceed on Count 3 at a later time.
(ROA I, Doc. 18.) After trial, the district court granted the Government’s motion
to dismiss Count 3 without prejudice. (ROA I, Docs. 23, 24.)
-4-
to the defense. (ROA I, Doc. 30.) The Government immediately notified
Varnedore of this fact, explaining that it had not learned of the conviction before
or during trial because a Government agent failed to correctly formulate a
database query that would have revealed Marrs’s prior conviction. (Id. at 2.)
Marrs had been convicted in 1991 on federal bank fraud charges and sentenced to
ten months in prison. He was released in February 1992, more than ten years
before he testified at Varnedore’s trial. (Id. at 1, 3.) At trial, Marrs had
testified that he worked at the dealership that sold Varnedore the pickup truck.
He provided limited testimony with respect to the fact that no gun was present in
the truck when Varnedore purchased it. (ROA III at 184.) This testimony was
cumulative of testimony given by Robbie Mooney, the salesperson at the
dealership who actually sold the pickup to Varnedore. Mooney went on a test
drive with Varnedore in the pickup and testified that he did not notice any guns in
the pickup at that time. (Id. at 190–91.)
After receiving the information about Marrs, Varnedore moved for a new
trial, arguing that the Government violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83(1963), by failing to disclose Marrs’s criminal history before trial. The district
court denied the motion, reasoning that the evidence of Marrs’s prior conviction,
if disclosed, would not have changed the outcome of the trial. (ROA I, Doc. 30,
at 2–4.)
-5-
Varnedore timely filed a notice of appeal and now challenges the
replacement of the disabled juror with the alternate, the admission of the guns
into evidence, and the district court’s refusal to grant him a new trial. We take
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and, finding no merit to Varnedore’s
challenges, AFFIRM his conviction.
DISCUSSION
I. Replacement of juror
We review a district court’s decision to replace a juror for abuse of
discretion. United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1185 (10th Cir. 1998). We
will not disturb a trial court’s decision under the abuse of discretion standard
unless we have a “definite and firm conviction that the lower court made a clear
error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the
circumstances.” Moothart v. Bell, 21 F.3d 1499, 1504 (10th Cir. 1994) (citation
omitted).
Varnedore argues that instead of replacing the disabled juror with an
alternate, the district court should have selected a new jury. However, the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly provide for the empaneling and use of
alternate jurors:
In General. The court may empanel no more than 6 jurors, in addition to
the regular jury, to sit as alternate jurors. An alternate juror, in the order called,
-6-
shall replace a juror who becomes or is found to be unable or disqualified to
perform juror duties. Alternate jurors shall (i) be drawn in the same manner, (ii)
have the same qualifications, (iii) be subject to the same examination and
challenges, and (iv) take the same oath as regular jurors. An alternate juror has
the same functions, powers, facilities and privileges as a regular juror.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c)(1). 2
In the instant case, before the trial began, one juror informed the court that
she could not proceed with the trial because of a painful injury and the effects of
her pain medication. The district judge carefully questioned the juror to
determine the extent of her disability and concluded that she could not fulfill her
responsibilities as a juror. Having excused that juror, the trial judge replaced her
with the alternate. The district trial did not exceed the bounds of permissible
choice in the circumstances, but properly followed the command of Rule 24(c)(1):
“An alternate juror . . . shall replace a juror who becomes or is found to be unable
or disqualified to perform juror duties.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c)(1). The district
court placed on the jury the alternate juror selected by both parties at voir dire
and the trial proceeded. Because the district court properly followed Rule
24(c)(1) in replacing a juror who was found to be unable to perform her duties, it
was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to proceed with the trial
instead of picking a new jury.
2
The district court relied upon the 2002 version of Rule 24(c) that was in
effect at the time of Varnedore’s trial in July 2002. Effective December 1, 2002,
Rule 24(c) was amended as part of the general restyling of the Criminal Rules.
-7-
II. Admission of weapon evidence
Varnedore’s second challenge is to the admission at trial of the guns found
in his pickup truck and in the motel room in which he had been staying. He
forthrightly acknowledges that he did not make an objection to this effect at trial.
(Aplt. Br. at 8.)
“Generally, the failure to object to the admissibility of evidence is a waiver
absent plain error. Therefore, we must determine whether the admission of this
evidence constitutes plain error.” United States v. Gomez, 67 F.3d 1515, 1524
(10th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 875 (10th Cir. 1995),
and Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)). To constitute plain error, the error must be: (1) plain
(2) error (3) that affects substantial rights and (4) that seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See United States
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732–36 (1993).
Turning first to the handgun seized in the pickup truck at the car
dealership, we find that its admission into evidence at trial was not plain error.
Any one of three legitimate justifications could conceivably have been offered by
the Government for the gun’s admission had its admission been challenged. First,
although the record is unclear (due to Varnedore’s failure to object), Varnedore
may actually have consented to the search of his pickup truck at the same time
that he consented to a search of his person. (ROA III at 133–35.) Second, the
-8-
gun could have been admissible as a search incident to a lawful arrest, as the
officers likely would have arrested Varnedore for fraud or attempted fraud and
found the gun after routinely searching his pickup truck after the arrest. See
United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1225 (10th Cir. 2001). Finally, because
Varnedore was attempting to trade in the pickup truck, he may have possessed a
diminished expectation of privacy in the truck. We need not choose among these
three potential justifications for the search, however, for any one of them suffices
to demonstrate that the district court’s decision to admit the gun found in
Varnedore’s truck did not constitute plain error.
We also reject Varnedore’s challenge to the admissibility of the guns found
in his motel room. Although a motel guest does have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his room, United States v. Gordon, 168 F.3d 1222, 1225–26 (10th Cir.
1999), that expectation or privacy is lost when the rental period for the room
expires. United States v. Croft, 429 F.2d 884, 887 (10th Cir. 1970); United States
v. Rahme, 813 F.2d 31, 34 (2d Cir. 1987). Here, the motel housekeeper entered
Varnedore’s room and discovered the guns after the rental period had expired.
“Since after the rental period expires a guest has no right of privacy, there can be
no invasion thereof.” Croft, 429 F.2d at 887.
Moreover, the guns were discovered by the motel’s housekeeper, not by a
state actor. “Although the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search or
-9-
seizure, even an arbitrary one, effected by a private party on his own initiative,
the Amendment protects against such intrusions if the private party acted as an
instrument or agent of the Government.” Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989). Here, there is no allegation, much less any
evidence, that the housekeeper was acting as a Government agent or instrument
when she entered Varnedore’s room and discovered the guns. Accordingly, it was
not error, much less plain error, for the district court to admit into evidence the
guns discovered in Varnedore’s motel room.
III. Motion for new trial
Finally, Varnedore argues that the Government’s failure to disclose until
after trial the criminal record of its witness Tom Marrs constituted a violation of
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and that the district court thus
erroneously denied Varnedore’s motion for a new trial on that ground. We review
de novo the district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial based on an alleged
Brady violation. United States v. Pearl, 324 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2003).
“To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show ‘1) that the
prosecution suppressed evidence; 2) that the evidence was favorable to the
accused; and 3) that the evidence was material.’” Id. (quoting Smith v. Sec’y of
N.M. Dep’t of Corr., 50 F.3d 801, 824 (10th Cir. 1995)). We find that
- 10 -
Varnedore’s argument fails on the first and third Brady prongs. With respect to
the first prong, the record does not support a finding that the Government
suppressed the evidence of Marrs’s criminal history. Rather, the Government
informed the district court that its failure to produce that evidence was the result
of an innocent data entry error made during the check of Marrs’s criminal history;
Varnedore has not even alleged on appeal, much less established, that the
Government’s explanation is false or that its reason for not turning over the
evidence before trial was nefarious. (ROA I at Doc. 30.) When the error was
discovered, the Government immediately notified defense counsel, who then
moved unsuccessfully for a new trial based on the discovery. (ROA I at Doc. 25.)
Even if the Government had actively suppressed the evidence, however,
Varnedore’s challenge would still fail under the third prong of Brady because the
evidence of Marrs’s criminal history was not material. For the evidence of
Marrs’s prior conviction to be material, “there must be a reasonable probability
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Scott v. Mullin, 303 F.3d 1222, 1230
(10th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Our review of
the record leads us to conclude, as did the district court, that there is not a
- 11 -
reasonable probability that disclosure of Marrs’s bank fraud conviction would
have changed the result of the Varnedore’s trial.
First, Marrs’s conviction would not likely have been admitted by the
district court even if it had been disclosed to defense counsel. Federal Rule of
Evidence 609(a)(2) allows the admission of prior convictions to impeach a
witness when those convictions, like Marrs’s, were for crimes involving
dishonesty or false statement. But Rule 609(b) states that evidence of such prior
convictions is generally not admissible if more than ten years have elapsed since
the conviction or release from confinement of the witness—which is the case
here. Marrs was convicted for bank fraud in March 1991, sentenced to 10 months
in prison and released on February 6, 1992, more than ten years before
Varnedore’s trial in July 2002. Rule 609(b) contains a caveat that the court may,
despite the ten-year time limit, admit evidence of a prior conviction beyond that
limit if the court “determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value
of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially
outweighs its prejudicial effect.” Nothing in the record, however, leads us to
believe that the district court would have so concluded.
Even if the district court had admitted the evidence of Marrs’s prior
conviction, there is not a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would
have been different. Marrs was a minor witness who testified that he worked at
- 12 -
the dealership that sold Varnedore the pickup truck and that no gun was present in
the truck at the time it was sold to Varnedore. (ROA III at 184.) That testimony
was cumulative of testimony given by Robbie Mooney, the salesperson at the
dealership who actually sold the pickup to Varnedore. (Id. at 190–91.) Marrs
was by no means central to the Government’s case; thus, even if his prior
conviction had been admitted, and the jury had discounted his testimony based on
that conviction, we cannot conclude that there is a reasonable probability that its
verdict would have been different. As a result, we reject Varnedore’s Brady
challenge.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Varnedore’s conviction.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
- 13 -