United States v. Whitener

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 31 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 02-1524
v. (D. Colorado)
ANTHONY L. WHITENER, (D.C. No. 02-CR-010-02-D)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL , HENRY , and HARTZ , Circuit Judges.
Defendant Anthony Whitener pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a
felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court determined that
Defendant had a total offense level of 19 and a criminal history category of VI
under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. It then sentenced him to 63
months in prison, the minimum sentence in the guideline range. Defendant
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
challenges the sentence on two grounds: that the district court (1) improperly
relied on a presentence report (PSR) produced by a prejudiced probation officer
and containing several errors, and (2) abused its discretion when it refused to
grant a downward adjustment (or departure) from the offense level for
Defendant’s minor role in the offense. Exercising jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(a) and 28 U S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
1. PSR
Defendant makes several objections to the factual assertions in the PSR.
He fails to indicate, however, how any of the alleged factual errors affected his
sentence. None had any bearing on the calculation of his offense level or criminal
history category. For instance, Defendant objects to the characterization of the
incident leading to his 1994 conviction for second-degree assault on a peace
officer, but his criminal history category is calculated on the basis of sentences
served for prior convictions, no matter the nature of the underlying incident. See
USSG § 4A1.1(a–f) & comments. Nor did any alleged factual error adversely
affect the district court’s exercise of discretion, because the court sentenced
Defendant at the bottom of the guideline range.
2. Downward Adjustment
Defendant contends that he was entitled to a two-point offense-level
reduction under USSG § 3B1.2(b) because he was a “minor participant” in the
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offense. “The sentencing court's determination that [the defendant] was not a
minor participant is a finding of fact which we review for clear error, giving due
deference to the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts.”
United States v. Smith, 131 F.3d 1392, 1399 (10th Cir. 1997). Defendant in
essence argues that he was a minor participant in the sale of the weapon during
which his possession occurred. See Aplt’s Br. at 9–10. But he makes no
argument that he was a minor participant in the possession of a firearm, the crime
that formed the basis of his offense-level calculation. Nor could he. He either
possessed a gun or did not. There were no other participants in his possession of
the gun. This is apparently how the district court analyzed the matter. See
Aplee’s App. at 38 (“[T]he [D]efendant’s charged with possession of a firearm
after having been previously convicted of a felony. . . . [H]e was previously
convicted, he was holding [the gun] on his person . . . , and he admitted those
things happened. So I’m confused about how a role adjustment is appropriate on
this record.”). The district court’s finding that Defendant was not a minor
participant is not clearly erroneous.
3. Downward Departure
Defendant, perhaps as a result of confusion over terminology, also urges
that the district court abused its discretion in declining to depart downward from
the sentence prescribed by the Sentencing Guidelines on the basis of Defendant’s
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minor role. See Aplt’s Br. at 8. This court lacks jurisdiction to review a district
court’s refusal to depart downward from the Sentencing Guidelines, “except in the
very rare circumstance that the district court states that it does not have any
authority to depart from the sentencing guideline range for the entire class of
circumstances proffered by the defendant.” United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d
874, 887 (10th Cir. 1998). Because Defendant did not seek in district court a
downward departure on the basis of his minor role, see Aplt’s App. Vol. I at 56
(seeking downward departures for “exceptional remorse” and “lesser harm” only),
the district court had no occasion to consider whether it lacked the authority to
depart from the Guidelines on that basis. This issue not having been preserved
below, we have no jurisdiction to address it on appeal.
We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment and sentence. We DENY
Defendant’s motion for appointment of counsel.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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