United States v. Merriam

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAR 1 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 03-4114
(D. Ct. No. 2:02-CR-235-TC)
KURT MERRIAM, also known as (D. Utah)
Kurt Merricam,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , Chief Circuit Judge, McKAY and McCONNELL , Circuit
Judges.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel
has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant-Appellant Kurt Merriam entered a conditional plea of guilty to
one count of possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
§ 922(g)(1), reserving his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion
to suppress evidence of the handgun found in his car. He now appeals the denial
of this motion. We take jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and AFFIRM .
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to a dispute with two adolescent boys, Mr. Merriam chased the
boys, who were on bicycles, in his car. This chase led through side streets, an
apartment complex parking lot, into traffic, and eventually to a restaurant parking
lot. During this time, Mr. Merriam’s wife and young child accompanied him in
the backseat of his car. Once at the restaurant, the boys ran inside. Mr. Merriam
then exited his car and attempted to place one of the boys’ bicycles into his trunk.
At this time, two Granite School District Police Officers exited the
restaurant and stopped Mr. Merriam. The officers, upon confronting Mr.
Merriam, noted that he “was very agitated . . . , very mad . . . [and] almost hyper .
. . .” Additionally, Mr. Merriam’s “appearance, his demeanor, and everything
indicated that he was under the influence of some type of controlled substance.”
While questioning Mr. Merriam regarding his actions, the officers frisked
him for weapons and requested identification. Mr. Merriam informed the officers
that his identification was in the front seat of his car and moved toward the
driver’s door. One of the officers stopped Mr. Merriam, informed him that the
officer would retrieve the identification, and confirmed with Mr. Merriam that the
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identification was on the front seat of the car. The officer picked up the only item
on either front seat, a black case. Immediately upon lifting the case, a velcro flap
on its bottom opened, revealing the butt of a handgun. The officer then placed
the case back in the car and arrested Mr. Merriam for theft and possession of a
concealed weapon.
Before the district court, Mr. Merriam filed a motion to suppress evidence
of the handgun. He alleged that the officer’s entry into the car and handling of
the black case constituted an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. The district court denied his motion, finding the search justified
under the officer safety exception as set forth in Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 (1968),
and its progeny.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we accept the
factual findings of the district court, and its determination of witness credibility,
unless they are clearly erroneous.” United States v. Cervine, 347 F.3d 865, 868
(10th Cir. 2003). We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
finding of the district court and make the ultimate determination of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment de novo. Id.III. DISCUSSION
Mr. Merriam claims that the officer’s search of the passenger compartment
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of Mr. Merriam’s car was not necessary to protect officer safety under Michigan
v. Long , 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). In Long , the Supreme Court held that
the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to
those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is
permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based
on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the officers
in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain
immediate control of weapons. Id. at 1049 (internal quotation
omitted).
We reject Mr. Merriam’s argument, holding that a reasonable officer could have
reached the conclusion that Mr. Merriam was dangerous and may have gained
immediate control of a weapon. Similar holdings from other circuits heavily
influence our decision.
In United States v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 126, 131-32 (5th Cir. 1992), the
defendant, a suspected drug trafficker, exited his automobile after being stopped
by police officers. Id. When asked for his identification, the defendant stated
that it was in a leather pouch in the passenger seat of his automobile. Id. Rather
than allow the defendant to get the pouch himself, the officers reached into the
automobile and retrieved the pouch. Id. The officers then opened the pouch,
finding a gun. Id. The Fifth Circuit held that, given the circumstances in that
case, officer safety concerns justified the officers’ actions in retrieving the pouch
themselves. Id.Similarly, in United States v. Cardona-Rivera, 904 F.2d 1149, 1154 (7th
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Cir. 1990), the Seventh Circuit held that:
[t]he officers were entitled to demand identification from [the
defendant], and when he told them that they would find it, in the
form of a ticket, in his car, they were entitled to enter the car and
look for it. It would have been reckless for them, suspecting what
they did, to let him enter the car and rummage for the ticket, for he
might have had a gun under the seat or in the glove compartment. So
the action of the police in entering the car was lawful[.] Id.We face a situation similar to those in Coleman and Cardona-Rivera .
Here, as in those cases, the officers had ample reason to view Mr. Merriam as a
threat to their safety, thus justifying their retrieval of Mr. Merriam’s
identification. First, the officers’ believed Mr. Merriam to be under the influence
of an intoxicant. While suspicion of alcohol or illegal drug use on its own does
not justify a search premised on officer safety, see United States v. Wald , 216
F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir. 2000), when combined with Mr. Merriam’s other
actions, it enhances officer safety concerns, see Long , 463 at 1050 (noting, as one
of the justifications for the weapons search, that the defendant “appeared to be
‘under the influence’ of some intoxicant”).
Second, Mr. Merriam, based only on a verbal altercation with two boys,
chased them with his car prior to his encounter with the officers. Third, the
officers saw Mr. Merriam attempt to steal one of the boys’ bicycles and throw it
to the ground when he was unable to fit the bicycle into his trunk. Given this
volatile and potentially intoxicant-induced behavior, we find that a reasonable
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officer, evaluating all of the facts before him, would have reasonably believed
that Mr. Merriam was dangerous and that he could have gained immediate control
of a weapon, thereby justifying the officer’s retrieval of Mr. Merriam’s
identification from the passenger compartment of his car.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Mr.
Merriam’s motion to suppress entry of the handgun into evidence.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Deanell Reece Tacha
Chief Circuit Judge
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