National Labor Relations Board v. CHS Community Health Systems, Inc.

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
AUG 23 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD,
Petitioner,
No. 02-9569
v.
(NLRB Case Nos. 28-CA-15948,
28-CA-16291)
CHS COMMUNITY HEALTH
SYSTEMS, INC., doing business as
Mimbres Memorial Hospital and
Nursing Home,
Respondent.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL, ANDERSON, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
I. INTRODUCTION
United Steelworkers of America (“the Union”) filed unfair labor practice
charges against CHS Community Health Systems, Inc. (“CHS”). The complaint
alleged that CHS violated the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(5) and (a)(1), by unilaterally changing terms and conditions of
employment, including, in relevant part, its absence and sick leave policy. The
Union also alleged that CHS instituted the policy changes, issued a new policy
manual which it refused to furnish to the Union despite the Union’s request, and
improperly withdrew recognition of the Union as the bargaining representative of
its employees.
During trial before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), CHS sought to
submit “Employee Status Reports” (“ESRs”) containing information about
employee turnover. CHS claims that it could not get the ESRs into evidence in a
timely fashion because the head of its human resources department quit her job.
CHS requested an extension of time to submit the ESRs after trial, which the ALJ
denied because CHS offered “[n]o persuasive reason . . . why . . . these
documents have not been produced” and the ESRs “...add[] nothing of substance
to alter [his] ruling.” CHS argues the employee turnover evidence would have
been probative of whether the Union lost its majority status.
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The ALJ concluded, in relevant part, that the CHS unilateral changes to its
absence and sick leave policy were changes to the “terms and conditions of
employment” in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). The ALJ also concluded that
the CHS refusal to provide the Union with a copy of the new policy manual
violated § 158(a)(5). The ALJ found that the Union in fact represented a majority
of CHS employees during the relevant time period, and that CHS did not
withdraw recognition from the Union. The ALJ reasoned that the Union’s failure
to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement and to thereby accept CHS
employees into membership, CHS employees’ scarce attendance at a Union
meeting in the fall of 1999, and the alleged turnover of employees proved neither
that a majority of CHS employees had renounced the Union as their bargaining
representative nor that CHS had a reasonable good-faith doubt 1 about the Union’s
majority status.
A three-member National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) panel affirmed
the ALJ’s conclusion that the absence and sick leave policy changes violated §
158(a)(5). The NLRB adopted the portion of the ALJ’s findings of fact relevant
1
The NLRB has recently ruled that an employer must show that the Union
in fact lost its majority status in order to be relieved of its statutory obligation to
bargain with the Union. See Levitz Furniture Co., 333 NLRB 717 (2001). At the
time this case was tried before the ALJ, however, an employer could refuse to
bargain with the union if it had a reasonable good-faith doubt about the Union’s
majority status. Id. As a result, this court has reviewed the record and considered
this case under the more lenient, reasonable good-faith doubt standard.
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to this appeal. The NLRB ordered CHS to cease and desist from refusing to
bargain with the Union and from making unilateral changes to the terms and
conditions of employment. It further ordered CHS to rescind the unilateral
changes to the absence and sick leave policy at the Union’s request and to provide
the Union with a copy of the new policy manual.
CHS appeals. This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 29
U.S.C. § 160(f). We AFFIRM the NLRB’s order.
II. BACKGROUND
In 1995, the employees of Mimbres Memorial Hospital voted for
representation by the Union. The Union was certified as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the employees and the employees selected a Union
representative. The representative attended negotiation sessions, met with
employees individually or in small groups, fielded complaints, and helped
employees with grievances. In 1996, CHS purchased the hospital and continued
to negotiate with the Union.
In April 1999, CHS issued a new absence and sick leave policy without
consulting with the Union. The Union objected to the change in writing. CHS
nevertheless implemented the policy.
After the new absence and sick leave policy was issued, the Union asked
CHS to meet and finalize the collective-bargaining agreement. By September
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1999, despite 15 to 20 bargaining sessions over four years, the Union had failed
to negotiate a collective-bargaining agreement with CHS. Because a collective-
bargaining agreement is a prerequisite to Union membership, CHS’ employees
never became Union members.
In August 1999, two employees circulated petitions to decertify the Union
but acquired only six signatures of the approximately one-hundred and ten
employees. CHS’ Director of Human Resources was aware of the unsuccessful
petition for decertification. In November 1999, CHS canceled two scheduled
negotiation sessions with the Union. The Union nevertheless continued to send
written requests to bargain.
In January 2000, the hospital created a revised manual reflecting the policy
changes. In March 2000, the Union sent CHS a letter requesting a copy of the
new manual and demanding to bargain over any policy changes reflected in that
manual. The hospital neither responded to this letter nor provided the Union with
a copy of the new policy manual. CHS first stated its alleged doubt regarding the
Union’s continued majority status in response to this litigation, more than one
year after it unilaterally changed its policy.
III. DISCUSSION
Whether an employer has established a reasonable good-faith doubt as to
the Union’s majority status is a question of fact. See Allentown Mack Sales and
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Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 367 (1998). The NLRB’s findings of fact must
be upheld if supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 29
U.S.C. § 160(e); Webco Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 217 F.3d 1306, 1311 (10th Cir.
2000). Upon review of the record, this court is convinced that the findings below
must be upheld. We AFFIRM the NLRB’s order for substantially the reasons
stated in the NLRB’s Decision and Order.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this court AFFIRMS the NLRB’s order.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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