Simms v. Bravo

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
SEP 7 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
STACY SIMMS,
Petitioner-Appellant, No. 03-2286
v. District of New Mexico
ERASMO BRAVO, Warden, (D.C. No. Civ-01-1428)
Guadalupe County Correctional
Facility; ATTORNEY GENERAL
FOR THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL, MURPHY , and McCONNELL , Circuit Judges.
Stacy Simms, a state prisoner proceeding pro se , seeks a certificate of
appealability (COA) that would allow him to appeal from the district court’s order
denying his habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Because we conclude
that Mr. Torres has made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
right,” we grant COA with respect to one issue raised in his application. 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
Because Mr. Simms filed his habeas petition after the effective date of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), our review is governed
by its provisions. McGregor v. Gibson , 248 F.3d 946, 951 (10th Cir. 2001).
Under AEDPA, in order to appeal the district court’s denial of habeas relief in
which the detention arises out of process issued by a state court, a petitioner must
make a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2). He may make this showing by establishing that “reasonable jurists
could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have
been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Simms was convicted in New Mexico state court of two counts of
criminal sexual penetration, two counts of aggravated burglary, one count of
kidnaping, two counts of aggravated battery, one count of tampering with
evidence, and one count of intimidation of a witness. The New Mexico Court of
Appeals reversed on one of the aggravated burglary counts, one of the aggravated
battery counts, and the intimidation of a witness count. The court affirmed the
remaining convictions, and Mr. Simms was sentenced to imprisonment for fifty-
-2-
eight and one half years. In this habeas proceeding, he challenges his
incarceration on two grounds: (1) insufficiency of the evidence, and (2) violation
of his right to a speedy trial.
We conclude that Mr. Simms has failed to make “a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right” with respect to the sufficiency of the
evidence. His argument is based primarily on the fact that fingerprint evidence
introduced against him at trial was based on partial prints, and on challenges to
the credibility of the victim’s identification testimony. Because these claims were
adjudicated on the merits in the state court, Mr. Simms is not entitled to collateral
relief in federal court unless he can show that the state court decision was
“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28
U.S.C. §2254(d)(1). Mr. Simms has not met that difficult standard.
Mr. Simms also raises a speedy trial claim. There was a twenty-seven
month delay between Mr. Simms’s arrest and his trial, resulting from five
continuances. The trial court and the New Mexico Court of Appeals rejected Mr.
Simms’s claim that this lengthy delay violated his right to a speedy trial. Mr.
Simms asserts that the state court’s decision misstated the record and incorrectly
applied the Supreme Court’s speedy trial balancing test. These assertions raise
-3-
questions that are sufficiently substantial to justify considering them on the
merits. We therefore grant a COA on the speedy trial issue.
We turn now to the merits of Mr. Simms’s speedy trial claim. This claim
was adjudicated on the merits in state court, and our review is therefore
deferential. Mr. Simms can only prevail if he can show that the state court’s
decision was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent or was an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented to the
state court. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1).
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.” In Barker v. Wingo ,
407 U.S. 514 (1972), the Supreme Court articulated a four-factor balancing test to
determine whether a defendant has been deprived of his right to a speedy trial.
The four factors to be considered are (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for
the delay, (3) the extent to which the defendant asserted his speedy trial rights,
and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 530-32. In Barker , the Court
emphasized the flexible nature of this test, stating that none of the four factors is
either a necessary or a sufficient condition to a successful speedy trial claim. Id.
at 533. Additional factors might be relevant in any given case. Id. The Court
characterized the right to a speedy trial as “slippery,” “amorphous,”
“imprecis[e],” “necessarily relative,” and “more vague” than other procedural
-4-
rights. Id. at 521-22, 30. Thus, the Court concluded that it could “do little more
than identify some of the factors which courts should assess” and that the
flexibility of its test “necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on
an ad hoc basis.” Id. at 530.
The flexibility of the Supreme Court’s speedy trial test creates a high
hurdle for habeas petitioners claiming that a state court’s speedy trial decision
was unreasonable. AEDPA only allows us to grant the petition if the state court’s
decision falls outside the range of reasonable applications of the Barker test, and
the Supreme Court made it clear in Barker that the range is very broad indeed.
Under this standard, Mr. Simms’s petition must be denied because the New
Mexico court’s resolution of the speedy trial claim was a reasonable application
of the Barker test. 1 The New Mexico Court of Appeals specifically applied
Barker ’s four factors. It first considered the length of the delay and agreed with
Mr. Simms that the 27-month delay was sufficiently lengthy to be “presumptively
1
We note that the New Mexico courts provided Mr. Simms with an ample
opportunity to litigate his speedy trial claim and it is evident that they considered
the claim carefully. The trial court twice considered Mr. Simms’s contention that
his case be dismissed on speedy trial grounds, holding two separate hearings on
the question. (R. doc. 10, at 12-14). The New Mexico Court of Appeals then
upheld the trial court’s denial of Mr. Simms’s motion, devoting 11 pages to a
discussion of the speedy trial claim. Although a state court that fails to articulate
any reasons for its decision is still entitled to deference under AEDPA, a carefully
reasoned state court decision is more likely to withstand judicial scrutiny because
it ensures that we do not misconstrue the basis for the state court’s decision.
Aycox v. Lytle , 196 F.3d 1174, 1178 n.3 (10th Cir. 1999).
-5-
prejudicial,” thereby requiring the state to show that, on balance, the four factors
do not weigh in favor of dismissal. Op. at 3.
In analyzing the “reasons for delay” prong, the court divided the twenty-
seven months between arrest and trial into three periods of delay. The first
continuance, from July to December, 1996, was made at the behest of the State
and stipulated to by defense counsel in order to enable defense counsel, who had
been appointed only one month earlier to replace Mr. Simms’s original attorney,
to prepare for trial. Because the delay was stipulated to by defense counsel and
was for the defendant’s benefit, the court weighed the first delay “slightly” in
favor of the State.
The State sought the second extension, from December 1996 to June 1997,
because DNA evidence implicated Mr. Simms in two other unsolved rape cases
and the State needed time to complete the testing and investigation of those cases
in order to consider joining them with the current one. The State court found that
this was an appropriate reason for delay and that this period was neutral for
purposes of the Barker test.
The State then moved for a third extension, from June to December, 1997,
on the same ground, namely, its ongoing DNA investigation into other rapes. The
trial court rejected this ground, but granted the extension anyway because the
victim was in the hospital awaiting surgery and would be unavailable to testify for
-6-
the next few months. The New Mexico Court of Appeals therefore did not weigh
this delay against the State. Op. 5, quoting Barker , 407 U.S. at 531 (“[A] valid
reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.”).
In November, the State requested a fourth extension. The trial court
granted the extension until April, 1998, on the grounds that the prosecutor and
judge had a scheduling conflict with another trial and the victim remained ill and
unable to travel. The New Mexico Court of Appeals held that this delay was
partially neutral, because victim illness is a valid reason, and partially attributable
to the state, because, under Barker , the state is ultimately held responsible for
scheduling problems.
Considering the four periods of delay together, the New Mexico court
concluded that the State was responsible for some delay, the defendant
responsible for some, and the rest was neutral. The court therefore held that the
second Barker factor did not favor either party.
The third Barker factor is the extent to which the defendant asserted his
speedy trial rights. The New Mexico court noted that the defendant’s first
counsel demanded a speedy trial in his initial form entry of appearance, that trial
counsel verbally objected to the State’s extension requests, and that Mr. Simms
moved to dismiss the charges on speedy trial grounds. However, the court also
pointed out that Mr. Simms never filed formal written responses to the State’s
-7-
continuance motions and never, other than in the form entry of appearance,
affirmatively demanded a speedy trial. The court therefore concluded that this
factor did not weigh significantly in favor of Mr. Simms.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals then considered the fourth Barker
factor, prejudice to the defendant. The Court acknowledged the hardships Mr.
Simms endured during 27 months of pretrial incarceration and found that he was
prejudiced, although the weight of this prejudice was diminished somewhat
because his incarceration was due, at least in part, to a probation violation based
on charges unrelated to the rape prosecution. Mr. Simms also contended that his
defense at trial was impaired by the delay because the prosecutor, in front of the
jury, questioned his failure to call witnesses to support his alibi defense. The
New Mexico court, however, was unimpressed with this contention, because Mr.
Simms failed to identify who, if anyone, could have supported his alibi and he did
not present any evidence that he attempted to obtain such witnesses or that their
unavailability was related to the delay.
When the New Mexico court balanced all of the Barker factors together, it
concluded that the delay did not violate Mr. Simms’s right to a speedy trial. The
court acknowledged that the delay was lengthy and that Mr. Simms was
prejudiced. On the other hand, the prejudice was not overly severe, some of the
delay was attributable to the defendant, and none of it was attributable to attempts
-8-
by the State to gain an advantage or otherwise harm the defendant. The court
ruled that, on balance, the Barker factors did not tip sufficiently in favor of Mr.
Simms to warrant dismissal of the charges on speedy trial grounds.
Mr. Simms contends that the state court decision was unreasonable for
several reasons. First, he argues that the continuance which was granted to allow
his second lawyer to prepare for trial was not attributable to him, because he was
not responsible for the delay in appointing initial counsel or for the replacement
of his first lawyer. We cannot determine from the record the causes for the delay
in appointing initial counsel and for replacing the first lawyer. Nevertheless, it
was not unreasonable for the state court to attribute this delay to the defendant.
The delay was stipulated to by defense counsel, it was given for the benefit of Mr.
Simms, and, in his briefs before the New Mexico Court of Appeals, Mr. Simms’s
appellate counsel conceded joint responsibility for the delay. It is not
unreasonable for a state court to weigh slightly against the defendant a delay that
was for his own benefit and to which trial counsel stipulated and appellate
counsel conceded joint responsibility.
Mr. Simms also claims that the state court misstated the record when it said
that Mr. Simms failed to file formal objections to the continuances or to demand a
speedy trial. Mr. Simms claims that he demanded a speedy trial twice, once in his
first lawyer’s form entry of appearance and again orally through a motion to
-9-
dismiss a year and a half later. The New Mexico Court of Appeals acknowledged
these facts, but discounted somewhat their importance. The court, relying on
Barker , correctly pointed out that the assertion of the right to a speedy trial is to
be given less weight when the defendant does not request a speedy trial but only
moves to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. See 407 U.S. at 535. Otherwise,
defendants could get charges dismissed based on delays that they acquiesced in at
the time. In this case, it seems that Mr. Simms genuinely opposed most of the
continuances, but it was not unreasonable for the state court to discount somewhat
his assertion of the right due to failure to file formal oppositions and failure, in
the motion to dismiss, to demand in the alternative an immediate trial.
Finally, Mr. Simms contends that the state court unreasonably concluded
that his defense was not prejudiced by the delay. The court rejected Mr. Simms’s
contention that the delay hindered his ability to produce alibi witnesses because
Mr. Simms failed to state specifically whose testimony was lost and how the
witness’s unavailability was caused by the delay. To establish prejudice, a
defendant must provide some specific evidence. See United States v. Villano , 529
F.2d 1046, 1060 (10th Cir. 1976). On appeal, Mr. Simms now refers to a specific
alibi witness, a Mr. Spicer, who allegedly would have testified that he was
together with Mr. Simms at a nightclub on the night of the crime. Mr. Simms
alleges further that defense counsel’s investigator had spoken with Mr. Spicer
-10-
before trial but due to the lengthy delay Mr. Spicer could not be found to testify at
trial. According to Mr. Simms, Mr. Spicer’s unavailability was the subject of an
in camera hearing before the trial judge.
It was not unreasonable for the New Mexico Court of Appeals to have
failed to consider the specific claim of prejudice arising from the loss of Mr.
Spicer’s testimony because the record does not reflect that any allegations or
evidence related to Mr. Spicer was before the court. Mr. Simms’s briefs to the
New Mexico Court of Appeals make no mention of Mr. Spicer or any other
specific alibi witness. Thus, although Mr. Simms now makes more specific
allegations in his habeas appeal, this does not change the fact that he failed to
provide specific evidence to the state court regarding the impairment of his alibi
defense. It cannot be unreasonable for the state court to reject Mr. Simms’s
argument for failure to provide specific evidence when in fact he failed to provide
any specific evidence.
Mr. Simms has not demonstrated that the decision of the New Mexico
Court of Appeals was an unreasonable application of the Barker test. In so
concluding, we do not wish to minimize the hardships that surely resulted from
such a long delay. Twenty-seven months is a long time to wait in jail, and were
we considering this case de novo , perhaps we might have weighed the factors
more heavily in Mr. Simms’s favor. Nevertheless, the state court’s application of
-11-
the “difficult and sensitive balancing process,” Barker , 407 U.S. at 533, was well
within the limits established by the Supreme Court for consideration of speedy
trial claims.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of
Mr. Simms’s habeas petition.
Entered for the Court
Michael W. McConnell
Circuit Judge
-12-