United States v. Cervantes

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
AUG 12 2004
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 03-2229
v. (D.C. No. CR 01-1309)
(D.N.M.)
DANNY CERVANTES,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HENRY and LUCERO, Circuit Judges, and FIGA, District Judge. **
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Danny Cervantes pled guilty to a one count
indictment charging possession of more than 100 kilograms of marijuana with the
intent to distribute and aiding and abetting in violation of federal law. By the
terms of that agreement, Cervantes waived his right to challenge the sentence
imposed by the court so long as it made no upward departure. While the
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
The Honorable Phillip S. Figa, United States District Judge for the
District of Colorado, sitting by designation.
government agreed to consider filing a downward departure motion, it ultimately
did not file the motion. Prior to sentencing Cervantes moved to withdraw his
guilty plea or, in the alternative, for a downward departure from the applicable
federal sentencing guideline range imposed under the plea agreement. After oral
argument, Cervantes’ motions were denied and the court sentenced him to one
hundred and eighty-eight months imprisonment and five years supervised release.
Notwithstanding the appeal waiver, Mr. Cervantes appeals his sentence.
On appeal, Cervantes frames three issues for review. First, he contends
that the government breached its plea agreement by failing to afford him an
opportunity to cooperate and earn a motion for downward departure for
substantial assistance pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. He claims a government
representative told him that the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 altered the
mission of the United States Customs Service from primarily smuggling control to
homeland security. While Cervantes claims he fully cooperated with the
government, the resulting shift of federal resources and personnel, he asserts,
prevented the government from following up on valuable information he
provided. The government declined to file a motion for downward departure.
Second, Cervantes argues the district court abused its discretion in denying his
motion to withdraw his plea in those circumstances in which “performance of the
agreement became impossible because of circumstances outside his, or the
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government’s, control.” Third, he contends the district court abused its discretion
by refusing to consider his cooperation with the government in the imposition of
his sentence. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and AFFIRM the
judgment of the district court.
BACKGROUND
A. The underlying offense and charges
On July 3, 2001, New Mexico state police officers stopped a vehicle
traveling northbound on Highway 180 in Deming, New Mexico, which was being
operated by Danny Cervantes. (Earlier that day the Luna County, New Mexico,
Sheriff’s Office had received information from a cooperating source that a vehicle
matching that operated by Cervantes would be used in transporting an unspecified
quantity of marijuana through the state.) During the course of the traffic stop,
officers detected the smell of raw marijuana emitting from the vehicle and
observed numerous square shaped, plastic wrapped packages in the rear seat of
the vehicle. When they questioned Cervantes about the suspicious smell, he
admitted that he was transporting more than one pound of marijuana and was
immediately taken into custody. An inspection of Cervantes’ vehicle uncovered
60 sealed packages of marijuana with a net weight of more than 537 pounds (243
kilograms). While in custody, Cervantes directed law enforcement officials to
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where he had picked up the marijuana, which resulted in subsequent seizures of
over 800 pounds of marijuana that same day.
On October 4, 2001, a federal grand jury returned a one count indictment
charging Cervantes with Possession With Intent to Distribute 100 Kilograms and
more of Marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(B) and aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2. On October
19, 2001, Cervantes moved to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle,
arguing it was obtained subsequent to an illegal investigatory stop. This motion
was denied on October 23, 2001.
B. The plea
On January 7, 2002, pursuant to a plea agreement with the United States,
Cervantes pled guilty to the charge returned in the federal indictment. By the
terms of that agreement, Cervantes agreed to waive enumerated constitutional
rights, to “cooperate with the United States by giving truthful and complete
information” of his knowledge of the criminal activity underlying the indictment
and to provide witness testimony, if required, in any grand jury investigation or
court proceeding. In addition, Cervantes acknowledged the agreement “conferred
a benefit upon him” and, that “no downward departure from the applicable
sentencing guideline range is appropriate.” He, therefore, agreed not to “seek a
downward departure from the applicable guideline range as determined by the
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Court . . . .” Cervantes also “waive[d] the right to appeal the sentence imposed”
so long as the court made no upward departure from the applicable sentencing
guidelines.
In return, the government promised to bring no further charges against
Cervantes relating to his known criminal conduct and stipulated he was a minor
participant in the criminal activity underlying the indictment, had demonstrated a
personal acceptance of responsibility and was therefore entitled to certain
reductions from his base offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 3E1.1 and 3B1.2.
These stipulations were not binding on the court. Additionally, the government
agreed to consider moving for a downward departure based on Cervantes’
cooperation pursuant U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. The decision of whether to seek a
substantial assistance departure rested solely in the discretion of the United States
Attorney for the District of New Mexico.
The plea agreement further provided that the following positions would be
taken in regard to sentencing:
“The United States has made, and will make, NO AGREEMENT . . . that a
specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of this case. [¶] The United States
has made, and will make, NO AGREEMENT to approve, to oppose, or not to
oppose . . . any request made by the defendant or on behalf of the defendant for a
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particular sentence in this case other than the stipulations” agreed upon elsewhere
in the plea agreement.
Moreover, the agreement states that Cervantes “fully understands that
determination of the sentencing range or guideline level, as well as the actual
sentence imposed, is solely in the discretion of the Court” and agrees that “[t]here
have been no representations or promises from anyone as to what sentence the
Court will impose.” The agreement also provides that Cervantes “will not be
allowed to withdraw the plea if the applicable guideline range is higher than
expected or if the Court departs from the applicable guideline range.”
Prior to accepting Cervantes’ plea, the district judge, adhering to the
requirements of Rule 11, Fed. R. Crim. P., probed Cervantes regarding his
understanding of the terms of the plea agreement. The court informed Cervantes
of his constitutional rights and his waiver of those rights, that he faced a
maximum penalty of not less than five years and not more than forty years, that
the government made no agreement as to the actual sentence he would receive and
that he would not be allowed to withdraw his plea if the sentence imposed was
longer than he expected. Cervantes acknowledged that his sentence would be
determined by the court and that any representations made by counsel of a
particular sentence were only “best estimate[s].” Furthermore, the court advised
Cervantes of his obligation to cooperate with the government in future criminal
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investigations and of the government’s return promise to consider moving for
downward departure based upon Cervantes’ assistance. Cervantes was
specifically told that the decision of whether to move for a substantial assistance
departure was in the discretion of the United States Attorney. The court also
explained the consequences of Cervantes’ appeal waiver and the various
implications of being adjudged guilty of a felony offense. After being advised of
these facts, Cervantes pled guilty. Cervantes then provided sworn testimony
establishing that he was guilty of the offense charged. The district judge,
determining Cervantes’ plea was made knowing and voluntarily, accepted his plea
of guilty and adjudged him guilty of possession with intent to distribute 100
kilograms or more of marijuana, in violation of federal law.
C. The assistance
On at least three occasions, Cervantes debriefed federal agents regarding
his knowledge of drug trafficking activities. Cervantes contends he provided the
government with various pieces of information, all of which they accepted,
including identifying photographs of the individuals who had provided the
marijuana for him to transport. Cervantes reportedly expressed a willingness to
obtain information as a confidential informant under supervised release; however,
his extensive criminal record prevented federal agents from employing his active
cooperation. In addition, Cervantes claims he told agents that both his friend and
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his brother were willing to work as confidential informants on his behalf. The
government maintains that despite several attempts by agents, they were unable to
contact the friend. (Why the brother did not become a confidential informer or
perhaps was not even contacted by the government is not clear from the record.)
The information provided by Cervantes did not result in any arrests or
prosecutions and Cervantes never testified in any grand jury investigation or trial
proceedings as a result of his cooperative efforts.
D. Appellant’s sentencing
On March 31, 2003, after learning the government did not intend to move
for a downward departure, Cervantes filed objections to the presentence report,
moved to withdraw his plea on the grounds that the government breached its plea
agreement and, in the alternative, requested the court depart downward from the
applicable sentencing guidelines notwithstanding the government’s determination
that Cervantes’ assistance did not warrant such a departure and his prior promise
not to attempt to do so. On April 30, 2003, after oral argument, Cervantes’
motion to withdraw his plea was denied. In its Order of April 29, 2003 denying
Cervantes’ motion to withdraw plea, the district court found that Cervantes (1)
failed to meet his threshold burden of demonstrating his innocence; (2) failed to
assert his actual innocence; (3) failed to assert that his plea was unknowing or
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involuntary; (4) did not assert ineffectiveness of counsel; and, (5) the government
would be prejudiced by granting of the motion.
Cervantes’ initial sentencing hearing was held on June 17, 2003. At the
hearing, Cervantes persisted in his motions seeking a downward departure from
the applicable sentencing range. The district court judge declined to take up the
issue, finding that Cervantes’ had agreed not to seek a downward departure from
the applicable sentencing guideline range and continued the hearing. On July 1,
2003, the parties joined to amend the plea agreement to allow Cervantes to move
for a downward departure. In the joint motion, the government maintained its
position that it opposed Cervantes’ motion for downward departure on its merits.
A final sentencing hearing was held on September 18, 2003. Following oral
argument, Cervantes’ remaining motion for downward departure and all
objections to the presentence report were denied. In denying Cervantes’ motion
for downward departure, the district judge explained that Cervantes was aware
when he entered into the plea agreement “that if everything went exactly the way
the Government and he intended, there was still no guarantee of a substantial
assistance departure.” The district judge found Cervantes’ guideline
imprisonment range to be 188-235 months, which included a three level reduction
in offense level for acceptance of responsibility, and imposed the guideline
minimum term of 188 months.
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DISCUSSION
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Title 28, United States Code, section 1291 provides that “The courts of
appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the
district courts of the United States . . . .” See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The district
court’s entry of a sentence against Cervantes constitutes a final judgment. See
e.g. United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1320 (10th Cir. 2004) (“It is beyond
dispute that a conviction and imposition of a sentence constitute a final judgment
for § 1291 purposes.”). Thus, this Court has jurisdiction under § 1291, “even
when the defendant has waived his right to appeal in an enforceable plea
agreement.” Id. at 1322.
B. The Government’s Alleged Breach of the Plea Agreement
Cervantes argues on appeal that the government obligated itself to give him
the opportunity to render substantial assistance in exchange for relief in
sentencing and that the government’s failure to do so resulted in a breach of the
plea agreement. Whether the government has breached a plea agreement is a
question of law we review de novo. See United States v. Brye, 146 F.3d 1207,
1209 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Courtois, 131 F.3d 937, 938 (10th Cir.
1997). In making this determination, consistent with the leading case on the
subject, Santebello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971), we “examine the
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nature of the government’s promise” and then “evaluate this promise in light of
the defendant’s reasonable understanding of the promise at the time the guilty
plea was entered.” United States v. Werner, 317 F.3d 1168, 1170 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 74 (2003). General principles of contract law guide our
analysis of the government’s obligations under the agreement. See United States
v. Guzman, 318 F.3d 1191, 1195 (10th Cir. 2003). Thus, “we look to the express
terms of the agreement and construe any ambiguities against the government as
the drafter of the agreement.” United States v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 1167, 1171
(10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1131 (2001).
Here, the plea agreement signed by Cervantes required that he “cooperate
with the United States by giving truthful and complete information and/or
testimony concerning [his] participation in and knowledge of criminal activities.”
Aplt. App. at 14. The agreement does not contain, however, any express
stipulation or promise by the United States to afford Cervantes an opportunity to
render valuable assistance. Rather, the agreement states:
Upon completion of the defendant’s cooperation described above, the United
States may move, pursuant to U.S.S.G § 5K1.1, to have the Court depart
downward from the applicable guideline sentence. The defendant understands that
the decision of whether to seek a downward departure for substantial assistance
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will be made in the sole discretion of the United States Attorney for the District
of New Mexico. Id. at 15.
Additionally, at Cervantes’ plea hearing, the district judge explained that
the decision of whether to seek a substantial assistance departure was at the
discretion of the government.
THE COURT: The government may file a 5K1.1 for downward departure,
but that’s up to the U.S. Attorney’s Office whether they do that or not. Do
you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
Cervantes does not claim he was promised a motion for downward
departure. Rather, he argues that inherent in the government’s agreement to
consider his cooperation in deciding whether to file a motion for downward
departure was the promise to provide him with an opportunity to render assistance
meriting such a departure. Cervantes contends that he “entered into the
agreement lured by the inducement of a reduced sentence” and that the
government’s inability or unwillingness to capitalize on his cooperation following
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks denied him the benefit of his bargain.
We disagree.
It is established that “when a plea rests in any significant degree on a
promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the
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inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” Santobello v. New
York, supra, 404 U.S. at 262. This is not a case, however, where a promise was
made and not fulfilled. Given that the U.S. Attorney has sole discretion to decide
whether to file a downward departure motion, his failure to do so was not a
breach of the plea agreement. In United States v. Courtois, supra, the defendant
claimed the government breached its plea agreement which stated, “the discretion
[to file a downward departure motion for substantial assistance] rests solely with
the government.” 131 F.3d at 937 (brackets in original). The defendant argued
that this provision obligated the government to afford him an opportunity to
render substantial assistance and that the government’s failure to do so resulted in
a breach of the agreement. As in the instant case, the “defendant gave truthful
information to the government” in good faith, including identifying potential
buyers of the narcotics seized in the course of his arrest. Id. at 938. The
government was unable to take advantage of the defendant’s assistance, however,
and terminated the investigation, in part, because (1) the defendant was unable to
actively cooperate under supervised release, and (2) the lead agent was unable to
continue the investigation due to operational constraints beyond the defendant’s
control. Id. It was held that the plea agreement, by “expressly leaving the
decision to file [a substantial assistance downward departure] motion in the sole
discretion of the government,” did not create an obligation on the government to
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continue the investigation. Id. at 939. Rather, this Court concluded that “the
government decided to terminate its investigation, rendering defendant’s
cooperation unnecessary. As defendant has not alleged that the government
terminated its investigation for impermissible or irrational reasons, he has alleged
no grounds for relief.” Id.Here, the government made no promises to Cervantes that went unmet.
Like the plea agreement in Courtois, the agreement signed by Cervantes left the
decision of filing a motion for downward departure for substantial assistance
within the sole discretion of the United States Attorney. Moreover, Cervantes
does not allege that the government terminated its investigation for impermissible
or irrational reasons. To the contrary, Cervantes acknowledges that the
reallocation of federal resources rendering the fruits of his assistance not overly
helpful “may not be the government’s fault.” Aplt. Brief-in-Chief at 14. We find
no basis for interpreting the plea agreement as requiring the government to
provide Cervantes an opportunity to cooperate in exchange for relief in
sentencing. Thus, accepting arguendo Cervantes’ theory that he was not given the
opportunity to provide substantial assistance due to a shift in the mission of the
United States Customs Service from primarily smuggling control to homeland
security, he has failed to allege any breach of the plea agreement.
C. The District Court’s Denial of Cervantes’ Motion to Withdraw His Plea
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Cervantes next argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying
his motion to withdraw his plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B) provides that “the
defendant may withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere . . . after the court
accepts the plea, but before it imposes sentence if . . . the defendant can show a
fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” “The burden of
demonstrating a ‘fair and just reason’ rests with the defendant.” United States v.
Kramer, 168 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 1999). We review the district court’s
denial of Cervantes’ motion to withdraw his plea for an abuse of discretion,
United States v. Killingsworth, 117 F.3d 1159, 1161 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 522
U.S. 961 (1997), and “we will not reverse absent a showing that the trial court
acted unjustly or unfairly.” Kramer, supra, 168 F.3d at 1202.
We have set forth seven relevant factors for consideration in determining
whether a defendant has shown a fair and just reason for permitting withdrawal of
a guilty plea: (1) whether the defendant has asserted his innocence; (2) prejudice
to the government if the motion is granted; (3) defendant’s delay in filing the
withdrawal motion; (4) whether the court is inconvenienced if the motion is
granted; (5) defendant’s assistance of counsel; (6) whether the plea was made
knowing and voluntary; and (7) the waste of judicial resources. See United States
v. Carr, 80 F.3d 413, 420 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567,
1572 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1184 (1994). The district judge
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who accepted Cervantes’ plea reviewed these factors, found that five of the seven
factors weighed heavily against granting the withdrawal motion, and concluded
that Cervantes had not presented a fair and just reason for the withdrawal of his
guilty plea. (The district judge who accepted Cervantes’ plea concluded that only
two factors, “inconvenience to the court” and “waste of judicial resource” did not
weigh heavily against permitting withdrawal of the guilty plea.)
On appeal, Cervantes adopts the same argument for withdrawal of his guilty
plea that he advanced in an attempt to establish the government breached the plea
agreement; namely that he entered the agreement with the belief the government
would provide him with the opportunity to cooperate in return for a substantial
assistance departure. Cervantes argues that the government’s failure to capitalize
on his cooperative efforts is a “fair and just” reason for granting his withdrawal
motion and, thus, the district court abused its discretion in finding that the that
the first, second, third and sixth factor weighed against permitting him to
withdraw his plea. As was discussed above, Cervantes’ argument is unavailing.
i. Assertion of innocence
First, Cervantes argues that the district court “acted unjustly and unfairly”
by relying primarily on his admission of guilt in denying his withdrawal motion.
He contends that he asserted his legal innocence “when he brought to the court’s
attention his claim of right to suppression of evidence.” The District of Columbia
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Circuit in considering the “meaning of the fair and just standard” found that
“[w]hether the movant has asserted his legal innocence is an important factor to
be weighed,” but that “the mere assertion of a legally cognizable defense is [not]
always a sufficient condition for securing a withdrawal of a plea.” United States
v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 221-22 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1013 (1975).
Barker further instructs that a court “must consider not only whether the
defendant has asserted his innocence, but also the reason why the defenses now
presented were not put forward at the time of original pleading.” Id. at 221.
Cervantes now asserts his legal innocence, arguing that he entered into the
plea agreement “[r]ather than pursue other remedies available to him, including
attempts to suppress the evidence seized from the vehicle.” Aplt. Brief-in-Chief
at 10. While such an assertion is a legally cognizable defense that might satisfy
the first factor in some circumstances, the argument overlooks the fact that
Cervantes unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence nearly three months
before pleading guilty to marijuana charge. Aplee. App. at 12-13, 18. Moreover,
Cervantes does not dispute that he committed the offense underlying the federal
indictment. Taken together, the district court acted well within its discretion in
determining that Cervantes had “failed to meet his threshold burden of
demonstrating his innocence.”
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ii. Prejudice to the Government
Next, Cervantes contends that the government would not suffer substantial
prejudice if he were allowed to withdraw his plea. Aplt. Brief-in-Chief at 17-18.
This argument was not advanced below in the withdrawal motion or at oral
argument. Even had it been properly raised, Cervantes argument fails to consider
that “the defendant bears the burden of persuasion at the trial level “and unless a
‘fair and just’ reason for the withdrawal [is presented], the court need not
consider prejudice to the government.” United States v. Hickok, 907 F.2d 983,
986 (10th Cir. 1990) (internal citation omitted). In any event, the district court’s
finding of prejudice to the government if the plea were withdrawn, thus
necessitating a trial, is certainly not error.
iii. Delay in Filing Motion to Withdraw Plea
Third, Cervantes argues that the delay in filing his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea is reasonable, as it “was occasioned by the government’s repeated
contacts . . . requesting assistance.” Aplt. Brief-in-Chief at 18. Although this
delay may have been unavoidable, as the basis for Cervantes’ withdrawal motion
was the government’s decision not to seek a substantial assistance departure,
Cervantes’ displeasure with the unanticipated severity of his sentence given the
lack of a downward departure motion by the government is not a “fair and just”
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reason to withdraw from a guilty plea. See United States v. Rhodes, 913 F.2d
839, 845-46 (10th Cir. 1990).
iv. Voluntariness of Guilty Plea
Cervantes next raises the claim that the district judge erred in finding that
he knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea. Aplt. Brief-in-Chief at 19. He
argues that “[a]n agreement entered into voluntarily requires a mutual
understanding of the terms of the agreement . . . [and he] understood that if he did
his part by supplying the information and identification requested by the
government, the government would do its part by following up on the data
supplied.” Id. Thus, Cervantes asks this Court to find that he entered his plea
under false pretenses. Whether a plea is voluntary presents a question subject to
de novo review. Rhodes, supra, 913 F.2d at 843.
We find no basis for Cervantes’ claim that his plea was not made knowing
and voluntarily. As was discussed above, the government never promised to
provide Cervantes an opportunity to cooperate in exchange for relief in sentencing
and, therefore, the government’s failure to provide such an opportunity cannot be
relied upon to establish that his plea was entered involuntary and unknowing.
Moreover, Cervantes’ argument is counter to the express language of the
agreement, which states that Cervantes “agrees and represents that [h]is plea of
guilty is freely and voluntarily made and not the result . . . of promises apart from
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those set forth in th[e] plea agreement.” Aplt. App. at 16. Also, during
Cervantes’ plea hearing, the district judge meticulously explained the terms of the
agreement, including possible sentencing calculations, and obtained responses
from Cervantes that his plea was made knowingly and voluntarily:
THE COURT: All right. The government makes no agreement as to the
sentence that you will receive, and you acknowledge that this plea
agreement has conferred certain benefits on you. . . .
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
***
THE COURT: All right. You state your plea is freely and voluntarily
made . . . . Those are the terms of the plea agreement. Is there anything in
the plea agreement you want to ask me about?
THE DEFENDANT: No. Aplee. App. at 5-7.
In addition, to ensure there were no misunderstandings regarding the terms
of the plea agreement, the district judge queried Cervantes’ counsel regarding his
client’s understanding of the agreement:
THE COURT: Mr. Klipstine, did I correctly summarize the terms of the
plea agreement?
MR. KLIPSTINE: I believe so, Your Honor.
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THE COURT: All right. Are you satisfied that your client understands each
and every term in the plea agreement?
MR. KLIPSTINE: Yes, Your Honor. Id. at 7.
Recognizing that “[i]t is within the sound discretion of the trial court to
determine what circumstances justify granting” a plea withdrawal motion, United
States v. Wade, 940 F.2d 1375, 1377 (10th Cir. 1991), we conclude that Cervantes
has failed to show that the district court acted unjustly or unfairly in denying his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
C. District Court’s Denial of Cervantes’ Motion for Downward Departure
Lastly, Cervantes argues that the district court erred by refusing to review
the government’s discretionary refusal to file a substantial assistance motion and
denying his motion for downward departure. We need not confront the merits of
Cervantes substantive argument, concluding that Cervantes validly waived his
right to contest his sentence on appeal.
“A defendant’s knowing and voluntary waiver of the statutory right to
appeal his sentence is generally enforceable.” United States v. Elliot, 264 F.3d
1171, 1173 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see
also United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1318 (“Given the importance of plea
bargaining to the criminal justice system, we generally enforce plea agreements
and their concomitant waivers of appellate rights”). In Hahn, we adopted a three
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pronged analysis to determine whether a defendant’s waiver of appellate rights
requires dismissal of a defendant’s appeal. A defendant’s waiver will be enforced
if: (1) the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver; (2) the waiver was
made knowingly and voluntarily; and (3) enforcing the waiver would not result in
a miscarriage of justice. Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325. We address these issues in
turn.
i. Scope of Cervantes’ Waiver
A defendant’s waiver of his appellate rights is enforceable when the
disputed appeal falls within the scope the plea agreement. See Hahn, supra, 359
F.3d at 1325. In determining the scope of the waiver, we narrowly construe the
language of the plea agreement, reading any ambiguities in the agreement against
the government and in favor of a defendant’s right to appeal. Id.Cervantes’ plea agreement provides in relevant part as follows:
WAIVER OF APPEAL RIGHTS
11. The defendant is aware that Title 18, United States Code, § 3742 affords a
defendant the right to appeal the sentence imposed. Acknowledging that, the
defendant knowingly waives the right to appeal any sentence within the applicable
guideline range as determined by the Court after resolution of any objections by
either party to the presentence report to be prepared in this case, and the
defendant specifically agrees not to appeal the determination of the Court in
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resolving any contested sentencing factor. In other words, the defendant waives
the right to appeal the sentence imposed in this case except to the extent, if any,
that the Court may depart upwards from the applicable sentence guideline range
as determined by the Court. Aplt. App. at 16.
The district court made no upward departure from the applicable sentencing
guidelines, but rather sentenced Cervantes to the statutory minimum within the
applicable guideline range. Moreover, as Cervantes “specifically agree[d] not to
appeal the determination of the Court in resolving any contested sentencing
factor,”construing the language of the plea agreement narrowly, we conclude that
Cervantes’ appeal of the district court’s refusal to depart on the basis of his
cooperation unambiguously falls within the scope of his appellate waiver. See
Hahn, supra, 359 F.3d at 1325.
ii. Knowing and Voluntary
In determining whether Cervantes’s waiver of appellate rights was made
knowingly and voluntarily, two factors are considered. Hahn, supra, 1325. First,
whether the language of the plea agreement entered into by defendant states that
the agreement was made knowingly. Id. Second, whether the plea colloquy
conducted by the court pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, prior to the acceptance of
defendant’s plea was adequate. Id. The defendant bears the burden on this score.
Id. at 1329.
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First, the agreement states that Cervantes knowingly “waives” his right to
challenge the court’s imposition of a sentence within the applicable guideline
range. Aplt. App. at 15.
Second, Cervantes agreed in the plea agreement at paragraph 6.D that he
“will not seek a downward departure form the applicable sentencing guideline
range as determined by the court after resolution of any objections by either party
to the presentence report to be prepared in this case.”
Third, during Cervantes’ plea hearing, the district judge explained to
Cervantes’ his waiver of appellate rights with meticulous exactitude and obtained
responses that he voluntarily waived his right to contest his sentence on appeal.
THE COURT: All right. The government makes no agreement as to the
sentence that you will receive, and you acknowledge that this plea
agreement has conferred certain benefits on you. . . .
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: The government may file a 5K1.1 for downward departure,
but that’s up to the U.S. Attorney’s Office whether they do that or not. Do
you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
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THE COURT: Okay. You have the right to appeal. However, you are
waiving that right to appeal as part of your plea agreement.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: So when you’re sitting in prison and you say, “I’d like to
appeal,” there is no appeal.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.Aplee. App. at 5-6.
Cervantes has failed to satisfy his burden under Hahn, as the record does
not support his contention that his plea was made unknowing and involuntarily.
iii. Miscarriage of Justice
Enforcement of an appellate waiver results in a miscarriage of justice when
“(1) the district court relied on an impermissible factor such as race, (2) where
ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation of the waiver
renders the waiver invalid, (3) where the sentence exceeds the statutory
maximum, or (4) where the waiver is otherwise unlawful.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at
1327 (citations omitted). To satisfy the fourth factor under Hahn, the alleged
error must “seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings . . . .” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
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Enforcing Cervantes’ waiver of appellate rights will not result in a
miscarriage of justice. As previously discussed, even if the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks prompted a governmental shift in resources causing it to lose the
benefit of Cervantes’ assistance, the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings are not implicated. Cervantes’ argument that “[t]he
government, because of circumstances or otherwise, took from him and gave
nothing in return” overlooks the fact he was sentenced at the lowest range in the
guideline level and that the government acted well within its discretion in its
decline to seek a downward departure for no improper reason. Thus, Cervantes
has failed to demonstrate that enforcing his appeal waiver is “otherwise
unlawful.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327
CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
Entered for the Court
Phillip S. Figa
District Judge
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