Longyear v. Utah Board of Pardons & Parole

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 8 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
BRUCE R. LONGYEAR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 04-4029
(D. Utah)
UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS & (D.Ct. No. 01-CV-408-PGC)
PAROLE,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, LUCERO, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See F ED . R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Bruce Longyear, an inmate at the Purgatory Correctional Facility in Utah,
appeals the dismissal of his pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights claim against the
Utah Board of Pardon and Parole (the Board). 1 He claims the district court erred
in finding the prison provided adequate access to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and concluding there was no excusable reason for his failure to file the
necessary post-judgment motions. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291, we AFFIRM.
Background
In 2001, Longyear filed a pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint alleging the
Board violated his due process rights by holding his original parole hearing
without affording him notice or an opportunity to be heard. In addition, he
alleged the Board improperly determines parole on the basis of the particular
inmate’s religion. The district court, sua sponte, dismissed his due process claim
for failure to state a claim under the United States Constitution. It also dismissed
his religious discrimination claim as “clearly baseless.” See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(I) (dismissal required if the action “is frivolous or malicious”).
On his first appeal (Longyear I), he raised three issues, whether: (1) the
Board violated his due process rights when holding his original parole hearing;
1
We construe pro se pleadings liberally. Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, Kan., 318
F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003).
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(2) the factual basis for his religious discrimination claim was sufficient; and (3)
Utah’s executive and legislative branches are conspiring to allow these violations
to continue. We affirmed the dismissal of Longyear’s due process and conspiracy
claims. See Longyear v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole, No. 02-4159 (10th Cir.
June 5, 2003). Addressing his religious discrimination claim, a majority found
Longyear had presented sufficient facts in his appellate brief to demonstrate his
claim was not frivolous, but that he failed to present these facts to the district
court or to file any post-judgment motion. Consequently, the panel affirmed the
district court’s dismissal of his claim. Id.
Longyear moved for rehearing, which the panel granted. It again denied his
due process and conspiracy claims. However, it was uncertain whether he had
access to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rules”), specifically,
Rules 59 and 60; if not, his failure to file post-judgment motions should be
excused. As a result, the panel remanded the case for a hearing and findings as to
whether Longyear had access to the Federal Rules. Longyear v. Bd. of Pardons &
Parole, No. 02-4159 at 3 (10th Cir. Aug. 29, 2003).
On remand, Longyear offered two reasons why the district court should
allow him to amend his complaint to include facts alleged for the first time in the
Longyear I brief. First, he claimed the Federal Rules were not available in the
prison’s legal resources, which provided only Utah law and the local federal
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district court rules. Second, he asserts the packet of materials provided to
inmates who wish to file civil claims contained only the Rules of Practice for the
United States District Court for the District of Utah (“local rules”), and the
language in the local rules misled him into believing no other rules must be
consulted. From that, he argues he had a reasonable excuse for failing to file
post-judgment motions under the Federal Rules.
In response, the Board submitted a Martinez report 2 in which it conceded
the Federal Rules were not immediately available at the prison facility. However,
it asserted Longyear had access to the Federal Rules through his ability to contact
persons trained in law and the availability of the Federal Rules, on request, from
at least two sources: (1) the contract attorneys for the Board; and (2) the Sheriff’s
Office of Washington County (“Sheriff’s Department”), the office responsible for
general prison services. The Martinez report included a letter written by the
contract attorneys and the affidavit of Mary Reep, a correctional officer for the
Sheriff’s Department in charge of supportive services.
The contract attorneys’ letter listed each of Longyear’s requests for legal
assistance, the date it was received, and the date and substance of their response.
2
Even though the Board was technically not a party at this time, upon order of the
district court, it submitted a report addressing Longyear’s access to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317, 319 (10th Cir. 1978) (the district
court may order the prison administration to submit a report to be included in the
pleadings in cases where a prisoner has filed suit alleging a constitutional violation).
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The letter indicates Longyear made five requests for copies of cases or articles
between April and July, 2001. In response to his requests, the contract attorneys
declined to provide copies of the requested materials, explaining their “contract
only provides for provision of cases pertinent to pleadings we may be assisting an
inmate with.” (R. Doc. 30, Ex. A at 1.) However, on several occasions they
listed the addresses of law libraries which provided copies for a nominal fee and
further suggested that Longyear submit a request to meet with a contract attorney
if he had any questions.
Ms. Reep’s affidavit avers the Sheriff’s Department received and granted
Longyear’s request to use the “Law on Disk” program available to inmates. (R.
Doc. 30, Exhibit B at 2.) While the program is limited to Utah state law, she also
stated her office would have supplied Longyear a copy of the Federal Rules, but
he never requested a copy.
Without further argument, the district court issued its ruling. It found that
although the Federal Rules were not directly available at the prison facility,
Longyear was aware he could have accessed additional legal materials through
outside sources. The district court rejected Longyear’s argument that he was
misled by the local federal district court rules, noting the references in the local
rules clearly indicated they were merely supplemental and such references should
have put Longyear on notice that he needed to request a copy of the Federal Rules
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for complete information with which to proceed. Accordingly, the district court
found Longyear had adequate access to the Federal Rules and his failure to
consult them was not otherwise excusable. As a result, it reinstated its dismissal
with prejudice of his religious discrimination claim. Longyear appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
Longyear repeats the arguments made in the district court. They may be
parsed into two categories. First, he argues the district court erred in finding he
had adequate access to the Federal Rules. Second, even if he had access, he
claims his failure to file post-judgment motions is due to excusable neglect. We
address each argument in turn.
A. Access to Legal Materials
Whether Longyear had access to the Federal Rules is a question of fact.
“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous.” F ED . R. C IV . P. 52(a). “A finding of fact is
clearly erroneous if it is without factual support in the record or if the appellate
court, after reviewing all the evidence, is left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made.” Manning v. United States, 146 F.3d 808, 812
(10th Cir. 1998) (citation and quotation omitted).
While the Supreme Court has acknowledged an inmates’s constitutional
right to access the courts, Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977), the Court
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has also held Bounds does not establish an abstract right to a law library or legal
assistance. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). Although providing access
to a law library is an acceptable means of effectuating the right of access to the
courts, Bounds did not “foreclose alternative means” to achieve access to the
court. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 830.
On appeal, Longyear argues the district court failed to consider the time
constraints caused by prison procedures governing requests for legal materials.
According to Longyear, he had no reason to read Rule 59 until after the dismissal
of his claim. The prison procedures required all requests be made in writing and
allowed a five day response time to the written requests. Longyear reasons that
the eight to ten day delay in receiving a response prevented him from accessing
the Federal Rules within the ten day time frame for filing a motion under Rule 59,
and therefore, his access was inadequate. Unfortunately, Longyear did not
present this particular theory to the district court.
It is clear in this circuit that absent extraordinary circumstances, we
will not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. This
is true whether an appellant is attempting to raise a bald-faced new
issue or a new theory on appeal that falls under the same general
category as an argument presented at trial. We have therefore
repeatedly stated that a party may not lose in the district court on one
theory of the case, and then prevail on appeal on a different theory.
McDonald v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 287 F.3d 992, 999 (10th Cir. 2002) (citations
and quotations omitted). In addition, the record is silent regarding the time
between a request and a response. Instead, the record evidence indicates that
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many of the contract attorney responses to Longyear’s requests were initiated the
same day they were received. Because this issue was not before the district court
and we do not consider factual allegations unsupported by the record, this
argument fails.
Even if we were to consider his allegations, the ten-day time frame for
filing a Rule 59 motion is irrelevant to whether Longyear had access to the
Federal Rules. Longyear knew he needed the Federal Rules to supplement the
local rules long before the district court dismissed his claim. His allegation that
the local rules’ introductory comments and the specific commentary to Rules 59
and 60 misled him is belied by his earlier pleadings referencing the Federal Rules.
In September 2001, Longyear filed a motion to amend his complaint citing Rule
15 of the Federal Rules. Rule 15 is one of the many Federal Rules referred to in
the local rules with the same commentary found under Rule 59 and 60. 3 Thus,
Longyear knew the local rules merely supplemented the Federal Rules in 2001,
nearly a year before his claim was dismissed. Consequently, Longyear was aware
3
The local rules’ introductory comments inform the reader that “this packet
contains a complete set of the new rules.” Utah District Court Civil Rules (September 1,
1997). The specific commentary under Rule 59 and 60 states, “[t]here is no
corresponding local rule.” Id. at 14. Similarly, Rule 11 (Signing of Pleadings, Motions
and Other Papers; Representations to Court; Sanctions), Rule 12 (Defenses and
Objections - When and How Presented), Rule 13 (Counterclaim and Cross-Claim), Rule
15 (Amended and Supplemental Pleadings), Rule 17 (Parties Plaintiff and Defendant;
Capacity), Rule 19 (Joinder), Rules 27-36 (Discovery) comprise a list of only some of the
referenced Federal Rules with no corresponding local rule.
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his claims were governed by the Federal Rules long before Rule 59's ten-day time
restriction was at issue.
We also reject Longyear’s assertion that the limited contractual obligations
of the contract attorneys prevented access to a copy of the Federal Rules. Not
only did he manage to find a copy of Rule 15, but he completely ignores the list
of law library addresses sent to him by the contract attorneys on April 9 and May
7, 2001. The attorneys advised Longyear the law libraries “could provide case
law at a nominal cost.” (R. Doc. 30.) Even assuming Longyear believed he could
not receive a copy of the Federal Rules from the contract attorneys or the
Sheriff’s Department (an attempt he never made), he clearly could have requested
a copy from a law library.
In his final assault on the district court’s determination he had adequate
access to the Federal Rules, Longyear asserts the personnel at his facility and at
the Sheriff’s Department did not follow the procedures for providing legal
material. Again, this argument was not raised in the district court proceedings,
nor are the attachments to Longyear’s brief sufficient to support his factual
allegations. The record, as it exists, fully supports the district court’s
determination that Longyear had adequate access to the Federal Rules, including
Rules 59 and 60. We therefore find no error in the district court’s ruling.
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B. Excusable Neglect
In the alternative, Longyear contends that even if the materials were
available from an outside source, the confusion created by the local rules coupled
with a pro se plaintiff’s understandable difficulty in navigating the legal system
provides sufficient justification for his failure to request the Federal Rules. We
disagree.
The district court’s finding as to the presence or absence of “excusable
neglect” will not be overturned “unless there has been a clear abuse of
discretion." United States v. Torres, 372 F.3d 1159, 1161 (10th Cir. 2004)
(examining excusable neglect in filing notice of appeal under F ED . R. A PP . P.
4(b)(1)(A)). Whether a failure to meet a deadline is “excusable” is an equitable
determination considering “the danger of prejudice to the [other party], the length
of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the
delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and
whether the movant acted in good faith.” Pioneer Inv. Svcs. Co. v. Brunswick
Assoc. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993). We note that Longyear’s pro se
status does not excuse his obligation to comply with the requirements of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ogden v. San Juan County, 32 F.3d 452, 455
(10th Cir. 1994) (“While we of course liberally construe pro se pleadings, an
appellant's pro se status does not excuse the obligation of any litigant to comply
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with the fundamental requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil and Appellate
Procedure.”). Although the possibility of prejudice to the Board and the potential
impact caused by Longyear’s delay is probably minimal, we cannot find an abuse
of discretion in the district court’s determination that the reason for delay and
Longyear’s absence of good faith outweigh these considerations.
As discussed above, the record supports the district court’s finding that
Longyear should have been aware of the importance of the Federal Rules in
proceeding with his claim. While it may be arguable that the nuance of one rule
or procedure may cause confusion, Longyear’s disregard of the repeatedly
referenced Federal Rules can only be characterized as deliberate indifference.
Moreover, Longyear concedes the contract attorneys offered to meet with
him. He argues their offer to meet is of no import because he had no assurance
“that a meeting would have any meaningful value[.]” (Appellant’s Br. at 15.) In
light of Longyear’s lamentations on the difficulties of pro se litigation, it appears
there is little doubt a meeting with an attorney would have been advantageous,
especially for advice on procedure. Longyear’s disinterest in seeking the offered
legal advice is a sound reason for the district court’s conclusion that his failure to
file a post-judgment motion was not excusable.
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The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered by the Court:
Terrence L. O’Brien
United States Circuit Judge
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