McGee v. Federal Bureau of Prisons

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 20 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JOSEPH B. McGEE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 04-1142
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS; (D.C. No. 03-Z-2522)
MICHAEL B. COOKSEY, Assistant (D. Colorado)
Director; WARDEN THOMAS;
CAPTAIN JENKINS; CAPTAIN
KELLER; S.I.A. CHILDS; S.I.A.
TORRES; S.I.A. HARRISON,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before KELLY, BALDOCK, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Joseph McGee, a federal prisoner, filed a Bivens action against federal
prison officials alleging violations of his constitutional rights, which included a claim for
violation of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, arising out of defendants’ decision to
classify him as a member of the Aryan Brotherhood. The district court dismissed without
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
prejudice his claims under the Privacy Act and the Eighth Amendment for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, and dismissed his due process claims as legally
frivolous. McGee appeals those rulings. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, affirm the dismissal of McGee’s Privacy Act and Eighth Amendment claims for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, reverse the dismissal of his due process claims
as legally frivolous and remand with directions to dismiss these claims without prejudice
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
I.
On December 5, 2003, McGee filed a pro se complaint against the Federal Bureau
of Prisons (BOP), two BOP officials, and various BOP employees. The following
allegations were contained in that complaint: While McGee was housed at the federal
penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas (USP-Leavenworth), he was subpoenaed to testify in
court as a witness for an individual who was a known member of the Aryan Brotherhood
(AB). McGee testified, although prison officials allegedly warned him not to appear and
testify. Upon his return to USP-Leavenworth, he was allegedly placed in confinement
and informed by a prison official that he “had screwed up” and “could join the rest of
them (the Aryan Brotherhood members) since he wanted to help them out so bad.” ROA,
Doc. 2 at 4. He allegedly was further advised that he was going to be officially classified
as a member of the AB and transferred to a more secure facility.
Although USP-Leavenworth officials allegedly abandoned their attempt to classify
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McGee as a member of the AB, McGee was transferred to the federal penitentiary in
Florence, Colorado (USP-Florence). In April or early May 2002, McGee was informed
by prison officials that he had been officially classified as a member of the AB.
Approximately one month later, confidential papers from McGee’s prison file were
allegedly left in the inmate law library by staff members as a result of “mishandling and
neglect,” and were subsequently circulated among the inmate population at USP-
Florence. Id. at 10. The file included, in pertinent part, “a statement that alleged
[McGee] admitted he in fact was A/B and agreed to . . . cooperate with the government.”
Id. at 9. McGee was immediately transferred to the special housing unit at the Federal
Correctional Institution at Florence (FCI-Florence) for his protection.
In June 2002, shortly after his transfer to FCI-Florence, McGee was transferred to
the federal penitentiary in Coleman, Florida (USP-Coleman), and placed in general
population. According to the complaint, officials at USP-Coleman “were aware of
plaintiff’s need for protection and did nothing to protect” him. Id. at 10. Between
October 2002 and March 21, 2003, several inmates, all alleged AB members, were
transferred from USP-Florence to USP-Coleman. According to McGee, he was
transferred to USP-Coleman for protection from these same inmates.
In approximately December 2002, several inmates informed USP-Coleman
officials about a “hit” on McGee’s life, but the officials took no action in response to that
information. On March 21, 2003, McGee was attacked and stabbed six times. Since the
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attack, McGee has been placed in a cell with two inmates from whom he required
protection.
Based upon these factual allegations, McGee’s complaint asserted three general
claims. First, the complaint asserted that prison officials at USP-Florence violated the
Privacy Act by disclosing his classification as an AB member to other inmates. Second,
the complaint alleged the classification violated his due process rights. Third, the
complaint (together with an amended complaint McGee filed on January 15, 2004)
alleged that defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by (a) falsifying documents
classifying him as a member of the AB, (b) allowing this falsified information to reach
other inmates, (c) housing him, both in general population and in some instances in the
same cell, with inmates known to be a threat to him because of his classification as an AB
member, (d) failing to take any steps to protect him after learning a “hit” had been placed
on his life as a result of his classification as an AB member, (e) failing to protect him
from an actual assault that occurred on March 21, 2003, and (f) failing to provide him
with adequate medical care for the stab wounds he incurred during the March 21, 2003,
assault.
The district court dismissed McGee’s claims. With respect to the Privacy Act and
Eighth Amendment claims, the district court concluded that McGee had failed to
adequately exhaust his administrative remedies by asserting those claims at every level of
the administrative review process. As for the alleged due process violations, the district
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court concluded they were legally frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Specifically,
the district court concluded “McGee was not deprived of life or property as a result of his
classification as a member of the Aryan Brotherhood,” there was no “indication that . . .
McGee’s classification . . . impose[d] any atypical and significant hardship [on him] in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,” and “no indication that [his]
classification inevitably w[ould] affect the length of his confinement.” ROA, Doc. 12 at
6-7.
McGee filed a timely notice of appeal, followed by a pro se appellate brief
challenging all aspects of the district court’s order of dismissal. We appointed counsel to
represent McGee and directed counsel to file a supplemental brief addressing the district
court’s dismissal of his alleged due process violations.1
II.
Privacy Act and Eighth Amendment Claims
In his pro se appellate brief, McGee contends the district court erred in dismissing
without prejudice his Privacy Act and Eighth Amendment claims for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. We review de novo a district court’s finding of failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. See Jernigan v. Stuchell, 304 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th
Cir. 2002).
1
We note that by our order the government has been required to brief and orally
argue a case in which none of the named defendants have ever been served.
5
It is well established that a plaintiff seeking to assert either a Bivens claim or a
claim under the Privacy Act must first exhaust all available administrative remedies. E.g.,
Yousef v. Reno, 254 F.3d 1214, 1216 n.1 (10th Cir. 2001) (dismissing Bivens action for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Taylor v. United States Treasury Dep’t, 127
F.3d 470, 476-78 (5th Cir. 1997) (dismissing Privacy Act claim for failure to exhaust).
Moreover, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (PLRA) provides that “[n]o action
shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any
other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility
until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
A complaint “that fails to allege the requisite exhaustion of remedies is tantamount to one
that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Steele v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 355 F.3d 1204, 1210 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). An inmate
must not only adequately plead exhaustion, but must also attach copies of the “applicable
administrative dispositions to the complaint.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
The BOP maintains a four-step procedure for processing inmate grievances. The
inmate must first attempt to resolve his complaint informally with his prison counselor.
28 C.F.R § 542.13. If unable to reach an informal resolution, the inmate may then direct
his complaint to the warden of his institution through a written administrative remedy
request. 28 C.F.R §§ 542.13, 542.14. After the warden’s response, if still unsatisfied, the
prisoner may submit an appeal to the regional director. 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a). Finally,
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the inmate may appeal to the office of general counsel in Washington, D.C. 28 C.F.R.
§ 542.15. Each stage of the process has its own time limits and procedural instructions,
and inmates are required to adhere to them.
After carefully examining the record on appeal, we conclude that McGee has
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his Privacy Act claim.
Although McGee filed three official grievances (plus what appear to have been at least
two requests filed directly, and thus improperly, with the regional director) concerning his
classification as a member of the AB, none of those grievances alleged any Privacy Act
violations.2 More specifically, none of McGee’s grievances mentioned his classification
2
McGee’s first grievance was filed on April 28, 2002, and was assigned case No.
266711-F1. It challenged his classification as an AB member and requested a transfer to
a federal correctional institution. The warden at USP-Florence denied that grievance on
the grounds that McGee met the BOP’s “criteria to be classified as a Validated Member
of” the AB. ROA, Doc. 10, attachment. McGee thereafter failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies with respect to this case.
McGee’s second grievance was filed on May 15, 2002, and assigned case No.
268974-F1. The grievance challenged his classification as an AB member and stated that
the “classification needlessly endanger[ed] [McGee’s] life.” Id. The warden at USP-
Florence rejected the grievance on the same grounds as the first grievance. Although
McGee appealed the denial to the regional director and the office of general counsel, it
does not appear that his appeals were resolved on the merits. Instead, it appears they
were rejected on procedural grounds.
McGee’s third grievance was filed on September 25, 2002 and assigned case No.
278816-F1. It challenged his classification as an AB member, but made no mention of
his life being in danger. The warden at USP-Coleman denied the grievance on October
21, 2002, concluding McGee satisfied BOP criteria for being classified as a member of
the AB. McGee subsequently exhausted his administrative remedies in this case. In his
appeal to the office of general counsel, McGee stated for the first time that his
classification as an AB member endangered his life and placed unwarranted restrictions
on his custody.
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information being leaked to other inmates. Thus, the district court properly dismissed that
claim without prejudice due to McGee’s failure to exhaust.
We reach the same conclusion with respect to McGee’s Eighth Amendment
claims. In each of his three grievances, McGee asserted his classification as an AB
member was wrong. In none of them, however, did he assert that prison officials (a)
knowingly falsified his classification, (b) leaked his classification information to other
inmates, (c) housed him with inmates known to be a threat to him, or (d) failed to take
necessary steps to protect him from violence as a result of the classification. At best,
McGee’s second grievance (assigned case No. 268974-F1) stated the classification
“needlessly endanger[ed] his life.” ROA, Doc. 10 attachment. This assertion, however,
was not sufficient in our view to alert prison officials to the existence of the Eighth
Amendment violations alleged in McGee’s complaint and amended complaint. As for the
Eighth Amendment claims pertaining to the March 21, 2003, assault and the alleged
inadequate follow-up medical care for injuries sustained in that assault, McGee filed no
administrative grievances. Indeed, all three official grievances predated the March 21,
2003, assault. Thus, we conclude the district court properly dismissed McGee’s Eighth
Amendment claims without prejudice due to his failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.
Due Process Claims
McGee’s pro se complaint generally alleged a violation of his due process rights
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arising out of his classification as an AB member. The district court, presumably
attempting to decipher the precise nature of the alleged violations, concluded they were
legally frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In the supplemental brief filed by
appointed counsel, McGee challenges the district court’s conclusion, but in doing so
provides substantially more detail regarding the alleged violations. In particular, McGee
makes reference to both procedural and substantive due process violations that allegedly
arose out of his classification. Although we generally do not address new theories on
appeal, e.g., Okland Oil Co. v. Conoco Inc., 144 F.3d 1308, 1314 n.4 (10th Cir. 1998), we
will, out of an abundance of caution given the circumstances of this case, proceed to
address the specific due process violations asserted in McGee’s supplemental brief. For
the reasons outlined below, we conclude those alleged violations have not been
administratively exhausted and must be dismissed without prejudice.
Procedural due process violations – In the supplemental brief, McGee makes at
least a passing reference to a denial of procedural due process when he alleges that his
classification as an AB member was “an extraordinary restraint on [his] liberty that
call[ed] for a reasonably prompt hearing and periodic review.” Supp. Aplt. Br. at 32. It is
clear, however, that this allegation was never presented to prison authorities via the
administrative remedy process. Thus, it is unexhausted and must be dismissed without
prejudice.
Substantive due process violations – As regards a violation of substantive due
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process rights, McGee states his “right to life and personal security are protected by the
due process clause, and are directly implicated by his mis-classification as a member of
the” AB. Supp. Aplt. Br. at 11. In addition, McGee argues that “prison classification as a
member of a hate group that defines itself as a religious organization implicates liberty
interests and other fundamental constitutional rights in a way that typical administrative
classifications do not, and triggers the protection of the due process clause.” Id.The problem, again, is that McGee has not exhausted these claims via the
administrative remedy process. Indeed, the only “claim” that has actually been pursued
by McGee through all of the proper administrative remedy steps is his assertion that he
was improperly classified as a member of the AB. Although at certain times he also
mentioned that his classification as an AB member placed him in danger, he never fully
exhausted that claim by pursuing it through all levels of the administrative remedy
process. Thus, we conclude McGee’s claim that defendants violated his right to personal
safety has not been properly exhausted and should be dismissed without prejudice.
We reach the same conclusion with regard to McGee’s claim that the classification
violated his liberty interest by requiring him to be housed at a maximum security facility.
In the final step of the one grievance that he fully exhausted, McGee alleged for the first
time that his classification placed unwarranted restrictions on his custody. In denying
McGee’s appeal, the administrator of the National Inmate Appeals process did not
address this new issue, and instead only addressed McGee’s assertion that he had been
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improperly classified. Thus, the claim remains unexhausted and must be dismissed
without prejudice.
The dismissal of McGee’s Privacy Act and Eighth Amendment claims is
AFFIRMED. The dismissal of his due process claims as legally frivolous is REVERSED
and REMANDED with directions to the district court to also dismiss McGee’s due
process claims without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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