United States v. Baskin

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 20 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 04-3196
v. (D.C. No. 03-CR-10228-01-WEB)
BENTON G. BASKIN, (D. Kansas)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, Chief Judge, BRISCOE, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
On September 25, 2003, two Wichita police officers stopped the vehicle of
Defendant Benton G. Baskin, requested identification from him, discovered that
he had an outstanding warrant for violating parole, and consequently arrested him.
The officers then searched his vehicle, discovering a handgun and loaded
magazine in the locked trunk. Defendant was indicted for being a felon in
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to suppress the firearm
and magazine as fruit of an unlawful search. After the district court denied this
motion, Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty, preserving for review his
challenge to the search. He then appealed to this court. We review the district
court’s factual findings for clear error and its conclusions of law, de novo. See
United States v. White, 326 F.3d 1135 (10th Cir. 2003). We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
The fruits of an unconstitutional search need not be suppressed when they
inevitably would have been discovered by constitutional means. See
United States v. Tueller, 349 F.3d 1239, 1243 (10th Cir. 2003). The district court
found that “the officers undoubtedly would have impounded the car and would
have . . . conducted an inventory search of the trunk . . . if they had not proceeded
to search the trunk in response to the defendant’s comment to ‘go ahead and
look.’” Memorandum and Order (Mar. 5, 2004) at 12. This finding is not clearly
erroneous. Consequently, the question before us is whether the hypothetical
“inevitable” search would have been a constitutional inventory search.
An inventory search is constitutional if (1) it is conducted according to
established procedures and (2) it is designed to produce an inventory rather than
being a cover for general rummaging. See Tueller, 349 F.3d at 1243. The district
court found that the hypothetical inventory search it thought inevitable “was
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authorized by the [police department’s] impoundment procedures” and “that the
inventory policy applie[d] to the entirety of the vehicle, including the trunk.”
Memorandum and Order (Mar. 5, 2004) at 12-13. That finding is not clearly
erroneous and we hold that it satisfies part one of the constitutional test.
Defendant points to no evidence that the hypothetical inventory search
would have been a mere cover for general rummaging. The district court found
that the police officers would have impounded and, consistent with police-
department policy, inventoried the car because it would have been a safety hazard
had they left it where it was, it might have contained valuables, and it would have
been unreasonable at that hour (about 3:00 a.m.) to attempt to contact someone
who could pick up the car. Because these findings of a bona fide reason for the
hypothetical inventory search are not clearly erroneous and Defendant offers no
contrary evidence, we hold that the second part of the constitutional test also is
satisfied.
We therefore AFFIRM the denial of the motion to suppress.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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