United States v. Gluchowski

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
May 27, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 04-2253
(District of New Mexico)
MECIEJ FELIKS GLUCHOWSKI, (D.C. No. CR-04-530-RB)
also known as Matthew Gluchowski,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, LUCERO, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs
without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This case is,
therefore, ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant-appellant Meciej Feliks Gluchowski pleaded guilty to illegal
reentry after removal following a conviction for an aggravated felony, in violation
of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1), (2), and (b)(2). The district court sentenced
Gluchowski to seventy months’ imprisonment. On appeal Gluchowski is
challenging his sentence. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)
and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we remand for resentencing.
II. BACKGROUND
On December 22, 2003, the vehicle in which Gluchowski was riding was
stopped by a Catron County, New Mexico deputy sheriff. United States Border
Patrol agents took custody of Gluchowski and his fellow occupants. Upon
questioning, Gluchowski admitted that he was an undocumented alien from
Poland and that he had previously been deported from the United States as an
aggravated felon.
A federal grand jury returned an indictment against Gluchowski charging
him with being found in the United States after having been removed following
conviction for an aggravated felony, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1), (2),
and (b)(2). On April 28, 2004, Gluchowski entered a guilty plea without a plea
agreement.
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The presentence report (“PSR”) established a sentencing range under the
United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G”) of seventy to eighty-seven
months. This was based on an adjusted offense level of twenty-one 1 and a
criminal history category of V. Gluchowski objected to the PSR, arguing that the
sixteen-level enhancement based on an alleged prior conviction violated his Sixth
Amendment rights under Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
Gluchowski also moved for a downward departure, asserting that the proposed
criminal history category significantly overrepresented the seriousness of his
criminal history. The district court denied Gluchowski’s motion for a downward
departure and rejected his Blakely argument. The court adopted the factual
findings contained in the PSR and sentenced Gluchowski to a prison term of
seventy months, at the bottom of the Guidelines range.
III. DISCUSSION
On appeal Gluchowski reasserts the argument he made before the district
court, contending that because the sixteen-level sentencing enhancement was
1
The adjusted offense level was calculated as follows: the base offense
level (for illegal reentry) of eight was enhanced sixteen levels pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) because Gluchowski had been deported after a
conviction for a felony drug trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed
exceeded thirteen months, and then reduced three levels for acceptance of
responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.
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based on an alleged prior conviction that was not found by a jury or admitted by
Gluchowski, his sentence violates his Sixth Amendment rights under Blakely.
During the pendency of this appeal, the Supreme Court decided United
States v. Booker, in which the Court extended its holding in Blakely to apply to
the federal Sentencing Guidelines. 125 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005). The Court held
that to satisfy the Sixth Amendment, “[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction)
which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by
the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the
defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Similarly, the
Supreme Court has held, prior to Booker, that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2), which
authorizes sentence enhancements, is a penalty provision and does not define a
separate crime. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226 (1998).
“Consequently, neither the statute nor the Constitution requires the Government
to charge the factor that it mentions, an earlier conviction, in the indictment.” Id.
at 226-27. This court has recently recognized that Almendarez-Torres remains
good law in the aftermath of Booker. United States v. Moore, 401 F.3d 1220,
1224 (10th Cir. 2005). Thus, because the existence of a prior conviction is not a
fact that must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by a
defendant, Gluchowski’s sentence does not violate the Sixth Amendment. See id.
at 1223-24.
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Although Gluchowski’s sentence does not involve a Sixth Amendment
violation, the “sentencing court [] err[ed] by applying the Guidelines in a
mandatory fashion, as opposed to a discretionary fashion.” United States v.
Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 731-32 (10th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Because
Gluchowski raised Blakely below, this sentencing error is reviewed for
harmlessness. United States v. Labastida-Segura, 396 F.3d 1140, 1143 (10th Cir.
2005). The government, however, has not asserted the error is harmless. See
United States v. Lang, __ F.3d __, No. 04-4165, 2005 WL 834669, at *4 (10th
Cir. Apr. 12, 2005).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we REMAND the case for resentencing pursuant
to Booker.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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