United States v. Valdez-Palacios

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
July 27, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 04-4215
v. (D. Utah)
FRANCISCO VALDEZ- (D.C. No. 2:03-CR-913-DB)
PALACIOS, a/k/a Francisco Gama-
Palacious, a/k/a Francisco
Mendoza-Cruz, a/k/a Antonio
Bentancourt-Arellano,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL, McKAY, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See F ED . R. A PP . P. 34( F ). The case is therefore submitted without oral
argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10 TH C IR . R. 36.3.
I. BACKGROUND
Francisco Valdez-Palacios pleaded guilty to one count of illegal reentry
following deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). The presentence report
calculated the offense level at twenty-two (a base offense level of eight, a
sixteen-level increase for a prior felony conviction for a crime of violence, and a
two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility). At sentencing, the
government recommended an additional one-point reduction for acceptance of
responsibility. Based on an offense level of twenty-one and a criminal history of
VI, the district court determined the Guidelines range to be seventy-seven to
ninety-six months. Mr. Valdez-Palacios informed the court that he did not dispute
the guideline range and the criminal history category.
The district court sentenced Mr. Valdez-Palacios to eighty-seven months’
incarceration. It provided the following explanation of that sentence:
I have chosen a sentence midway between the low end and
the top end of the guidelines. That takes almost a year off
your sentence from what it could have been . . . . I know
that is not much shorter, but it is a year.
I hope that you recognize that I’m doing it because
I’m giving some credence to your story that your came
back [to the United States] for your child’s kidney
problem. And more importantly, I believe that you may be
planning to turn your life around. You’re 37 years old and
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I agree with [the probation officer] that if we just look at
the record it is dismal, a very bad criminal record. I am
sure if you return to this country illegally in the future that
the next sentencing judge will be less inclined that I am
today to give you any break at all.
Rec. vol. III, at 8-9 (Tr. of Aug. 18, 2004 Sentencing Hr’g).
.
II. DISCUSSION
The district court sentenced Mr. Valdez-Palacios on August 18, 2004,
before the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in United States v.
Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). In this appeal, Mr. Valdez-Palacios argues that, in
light of Booker, the district court erred in applying the United States Sentencing
Guidelines as mandatory. He characterizes this error as structural and contends
that we should remand the case for resentencing under the discretionary post-
Booker scheme.
Because Mr. Valdez-Palacios did not object in the district court
proceedings to the mandatory application of the Guidelines, our review is for
plain error. See United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 732 (10th Cir.
2005) (en banc). “Plain error occurs when there is (1) error, (2) that is plain,
which (3) affects substantial rights and which (4) seriously affects the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings.” Id. at 731-32 (quotation marks
and citation omitted).
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In conducting this analysis, we must first determine the particular kind of
Booker error at issue. As we have explained, Booker indicates that sentencing
courts can make two types of errors in applying the Guidelines. First, “a court
could err by relying on judge-found facts, other than those or prior convictions, to
enhance a defendant’s sentence mandatorily.” Id. Because this practice is barred
by the Sixth Amendment, we have christened it “constitutional Booker error.” Id.Second, “a sentencing court could err by applying the Guidelines in a mandatory
fashion, as opposed to a discretionary fashion, even though the resulting sentence
was calculated solely upon facts that were admitted by the defendant, found by
the jury, or based upon the fact of a prior conviction.” Id. at 731-32. This
second type of error is now known as “non-constitutional Booker error.” Id.
at 732.
Here, other than the prior convictions, the district court relied solely on
facts that Mr. Valdez-Palacios had admitted. Accordingly, Mr. Valdez-Palacios
has alleged only non-constitutional Booker error—that he was improperly
sentenced under the mandatory Guidelines scheme. Upon review of the record
and the applicable law, we conclude that although the district court committed (1)
non-constitutional Booker error that (2) was plain, Mr. Valdez-Palacios has failed
to establish either that this error (3) affected his substantial rights or (4) seriously
affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
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As to the third prong, Mr. Valdez-Palacios has the burden of showing that
his substantial rights have been affected. Id. at 732-33. To satisfy that burden,
he must show a reasonable probability that “had the district court’s applied the
post-Booker sentencing framework, he would have received a lesser sentence.”
United States v. Trujillo-Terrazas, 405 F.3d 814, 819 (10th Cir. 2005). He may
make that showing by pointing to the sentencing judge’s expressions of
unhappiness with the mandatory nature of the Guidelines. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403
F.3d at 734. Alternatively, he may attempt to argue, based on the facts of his
case, that there is a reasonable probability that his sentence would have been
different had the sentencing judge not viewed the Guidelines as mandatory. Id.As to the fourth prong of the plain error inquiry, Mr. Valdez-Palacios must
demonstrate that the non-constitutional error is “particularly egregious” and that
“our failure to notice the error would result in a miscarriage of justice.” Id. at
736 (internal quotation marks omitted). Conclusory statements as to the gravity
of the error are insufficient to satisfy this “demanding” standard. Id. at 737-38.
Here, Mr. Valdez-Palacios does not even attempt to argue that he would
receive a lesser sentence under the post-Booker discretionary scheme. Instead, he
argues that the non-constitutional Booker error is structural and thus does not
require a showing of prejudice. We have directly rejected that proposition. See
Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 734 (holding that “non-constitutional Booker error
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is not structural error”). In light of Mr. Valdez-Palacios’s failure to argue that he
was prejudiced by the mandatory application of the Guidelines, he has failed to
satisfy the third and fourth parts of the plain error inquiry.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we AFFIRM Mr. Valdez-Palacios’s sentence.
Entered for the Court,
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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